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The emergence of online marketplaces has introduced important new dimensions
to online decision-making. Classical algorithms developed to guarantee worst-
case performance often focus strongly on the worst case; in typical inputs one
can perform much better which makes these approaches not practical. Moreover,
these marketplaces serve multiple agents who interact in complex ways; this
adds important facets to designing online decision-making approaches in these
systems. This thesis aims to shed light on both of these issues.
In particular, in the first theme of the thesis, we show how to utilize nice struc-
tures in the data to enhance classical worst-case guarantees without requiring
that these structures are perfectly present. Instead the performance gracefully
degrades as these structures become less present. We discuss how to exploit
three such nice structures: existence of a really good alternative, well-behaved
randomness, and predictability of future requests.
The second theme of the thesis explores the multi-agent aspect of modern
online decision-making which adds important constraints to the classical tasks.
In this direction, we discuss pricing under the existence of network externalities
(such as ones arising in ridesharing systems), outcomes in evolving game settings
with multiple strategic learning agents, and tradeoffs between effective online
decision-making and ethical goals regarding non-discrimination.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The question of how to make effective decisions in complex systems lies at the
heart of machine learning, algorithmic game theory, and optimization. Machine
learning uses past data to develop models for these systems that correctly classify
unseen requests. Algorithmic game theory addresses the system inefficiencies
caused by individual incentives. Optimization provides techniques to maximize
desired objective functions in the resulting models, informing decision-making.
The advent of online marketplaces has added an important dimension to
the decision-making process: decisions need to be made in a sequential manner
in complex multi-agent systems. For example, Google and Facebook need to
sequentially decide regarding the selection and pricing for millions of ads every
second, relying on effective advertising as their main business model. Uber and
Lyft transform transportation in urban centers via dispatch decisions that change
the configuration of their systems, thereby affecting future customers.
This thesis offers a principled approach towards effective and responsible on-
line decision-making in such multi-agent systems, centering around two themes.
The first exploits nice data patterns in a robust way, while the second addresses
complications in multi-agent online decision-making. Concretely we aim to:
Theme I: Provably enhance online decision-making if data have a nice
structure, being robust to this structure not being perfectly present.
Theme II: Address economic and societal issues with online decision-
making in modern applications where multiple selfish agents interact.
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1.1 Overview of results
In order to achieve provable guarantees in online decision-making, there are
two classical approaches. The more statistical approach involves some strong
assumption on the data (for example, that they are identically and independently
distributed across time). An alternative viewpoint is to make no assumptions
about the underlying distributions and aim for worst-case guarantees that are
robust against even adversarial inputs.
The first theme of this thesis (Section 1.2 and Chapters 2-4) bridges the afore-
mentioned two approaches in online decision-making. We show how to utilize
nice structures in data, arising in modern applications, to enhance performance
guarantees while retaining good performance when these structures are not
perfectly present. In particular, the guarantees we provide smoothly deteriorate
as the corresponding structures become less and less present. Examples of nice
structures in the data we utilize to enhance online decision-making are:
• The existence of an option that is almost perfect; the guarantees degrade
with the loss associated to this best option (Section 1.2.1 and Chapter 2).
• Well-behaved randomness in the performance of available options; bounds
decay with how far from independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
data end up being (Section 1.2.2 and Chapter 3).
• Predictability of future requests; the guarantees degrade with the eventual
inaccuracy of these predictions (Section 1.2.3 and Chapter 4).
Subsequently, we move forward to discuss challenges that arise in online
decision-making due to the multi-agent nature of modern online markets. Under-
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standing the effect of multi-agent interactions in offline settings is widely studied
within operations research, economics, and social sciences. However, classical
optimization approaches diregard the online aspect of these decisions and the fu-
ture externalities they cause to different agents in the resulting ecosystems. More
recently, there has been attention towards incorporating these issues [106, 63]
but there are important challenges that remain uncharted.
The second theme of this thesis (Section 1.3 and Chapters 5-7) addresses chal-
lenges in settings where multi-party interests overlap in a robust and responsible
manner. We tackle three particular instantiations of such challenges:
• Pricing decisions in ridesharing often affect future requests in different
locations, traditionally treated as independent (Section 1.3.1 and Chapter 5).
• Platforms are not the only data-savvy entities; advertisers can also use
data to adapt their behavior towards enhancing their individual utility,
potentially causing system ineffeciencies (Section 1.3.2 and Chapter 6).
• Optimization goals may conflict with ethical concerns such as discrimina-
tion against minority groups; this conflict is exacerbated when decisions
are made online and data are not i.i.d. (Section 1.3.3 and Chapter 7).
Below we expand on all these issues. We briefly illustrate the main questions
targeted, the main results obtained, and the technical highlights from each work.
1.2 Theme I: Exploiting nice data properties in a robust way
In the first theme of this thesis, we show how to enhance online decision-making
via utilizing nice structures that data exhibit in a way robust to these structures
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not being perfectly present. When all data are available offline, the decision-
maker can perform data analysis, identify desired nice structures, and apply
optimization techniques that actively use them. The online aspect of many ap-
plications makes this task significantly more difficult for multiple reasons. First,
once a structure is eventually identified, the decision-maker may have already
made many suboptimal decisions, irrevocably harming the system’s performance.
More critically, since not all data are available in advance, the decision-maker
may mistakenly identify a non-existing structure early in the process. This may
also arise due to self-interested entities directing the decision-maker towards
such mistakes and can have severe implications on future performance if the
employed optimization techniques are not robust to these mistakes.
To illustrate the complications that arise while making online decisions in
complex systems, let’s introduce a few particular tasks which we use as running
examples. A routing application such as Google Maps or Waze wishes to suggest
to their users routes minimizing their travel time. An online advertising platform
such as Google or Bing Ads wants to identify the most profitable ad to display in
response to a search query. A health care provider aims to offer the most effective
treatment to a patient with particular symptoms. In all of these scenaria, the
platform tries to extract which option is the most effective in order to use it. Since
this information is not known, the platform needs a way to learn it.
The classical machine learning approach (batch learning) is not very suitable
to inform decision-making in the aforementioned tasks. Batch learning consists
of collecting enough samples and subsequently using them to learn models
that perform well on unseen data. This approach works well when data come
from i.i.d. distributions and we can obtain access to clean samples from these
4
distributions, but can be very unreliable in dynamic environments with multiple
self-interested agents such as the tasks we described above. For instance, in rout-
ing, the travel times of different routes can be significantly affected by temporal
and not easily predictable events (an accident in a street causing high congestion,
the end of a baseball game affecting the traffic patterns around the stadium).
Moreover, travel times are also affected by the decisions of all the drivers in the
system who have their own individual goals and assuming that their behavior is
completely unchanging across time is unrealistic.
One approach towards circumventing some of the aforementioned pitfalls is
the literature of online learning that aims to adaptively balance the need of ex-
ploration with exploiting options that have been effective in the past. Initiated by
the seminal works of Robbins [113], Blackwell [25], Hannan [64], and Gittins [58],
the online learning framework formalizes this explore-exploit trade-off under
various modeling assumptions regarding the underlying system. Despite cleanly
capturing the essence of this trade-off, these classical approaches do not provide
very meaningful guidance for the applications we discussed as they suffer from
various issues. They often assume access to an unrealistic amount of information
in the form of knowing accurate priors on the performance of different actions
such as Markovian bandits [58, 126], or in the form of receiving feedback even
for options not selected such as the experts setting [25, 64, 54, 72]. Alternative
approaches that are prior-free and not full-information such as stochastic ban-
dits [113, 86, 11] suffer from an orthogonal issue of relying on the performance
of all options being completely i.i.d. across time. Finally, classical works that
avoid these assumptions such as adversarial bandits [12] tend to employ a com-
pletely worst-case approach and revert to overly cautious exploration to keep an
up-to-date view of the changing world, resulting in ineffective guarantees.
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In Sections 1.2.1-1.2.2 (and Chapters 2-3), we focus on ways to make online
learning more practical by avoiding shortcomings of classical approaches. In
Section 1.2.3 (and Chapter 4), we extend our scope to the notion of competi-
tive analysis that also captures the notion of state in the underlying systems.
The general philosophy behind our contributions is to design algorithms with
data-dependent guarantees that improve on the worst-case when data exhibit a
nice structure, but do not rely on such a structure being perfectly present and
gracefully degrade as the input becomes less well-behaved.
1.2.1 Contribution I: Mitigating exploration in online learning
To present the first contribution of this thesis, we need to provide a slightly more
formal description of non-stochastic online learning. We have a set of alternatives
(e.g. the paths in the routing example) which are typically referred to as arms.
At every round, the learner (e.g. Google Maps or Waze) selects an arm, possibly
in a randomized way. Then losses are selected for each of the alternatives; since
we do not want to make any i.i.d. assumption in the particular application,
the losses are assumed to be selected adversarially and are only assumed to
be bounded in [0, 1]. The only information that the adversary does not know
is which arm was selected (if the algorithm is randomized, the adversary only
knows the probability that each arm is selected). In most applications, there
is no explicit adversary but this stronger framework enables us to capture the
non-stochasticity of the environment. The learner incurs the loss of the selected
action and observes some feedback, e.g. the losses of all arms regardless whether
they were selected (full information), only the loss of the selected arm (bandit
feedback), or some partial feedback in between (as we discuss below).
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The learner wishes to minimize the aggregate loss of her selected arms over
time (the average travel time that a user experiences). However, this quantity on
its own does not provide meaningful guidance of whether the learner uses an
effective algorithm: the average travel time may be high because the algorithm
is making suboptimal decisions but it may also be high because there is no route
that has a small travel time. As a result, to evaluate the performance of the
algorithm, online learning literature compares the loss of the algorithm to the
loss of a benchmark. The classical notion of regret uses as comparator benchmark
the fixed action that is best in hindsight (has the smallest ex post aggregate loss).
Typical regret bounds are sublinear in the time horizon, i.e., the average regret
goes to 0 as time goes by. These no-regret guarantees capture the idea that, if there
exists a consistently good action, the algorithm should at some point realize it
and follow that action – the learner should not look back at the end of time and
regret not having followed that action. Note that, despite this property, the regret
may still be the dominant term when there exists a really good action.
Main question. An important issue that arises when employing online learning
while only receiving partial feedback is the need of over-exploration. The natural
tendency to deal with partial feedback is to explore often all arms, including
suboptimal ones, to ensure an up-to-date view on how well all actions behave.
This results in selecting suboptimal arms often which leads to ineffective regret
guarantees and is a big roadblock towards widely employing online learning.
One approach to deal with this problem is to aim for guarantees that, if
satisfied, prohibit this over-exploration. One such category is the small-loss regret
guarantees, which require the algorithm to achieve a regret that is sublinear in the
loss of the best arm. Note that when the best arm has aggregate loss close to 0,
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the algorithm is not allowed to select suboptimal actions often. Algorithms that
over-explore to keep an up-to-date view on all arms cannot satisfy this guarantee
which means that achieving small-loss guarantees, to a large extent, limits this
excessive exploration. Small-loss guarantees are also a particular way to exploit a
nice structure in data (best arm being almost perfect) while gracefully degrading
as we deviate from it: regret scales with the loss of that arm.
Small-loss guarantees are particularly challenging when one receives partial
feedback, c.f. [3]. With full information, these bounds are easily achieved by
most online learning algorithms such as multiplicative weights [54] or follow
the perturbed leader [72]. This happens because, when the learner receives full
information, she automatically obtains an up-to-date view about how all actions
are behaving without selecting them. On the other hand, for partial feedback,
the landscape is significantly less clear. Outside of the work we present here,
there are only a few such guarantees that focus on restricted feedback settings:
label-efficient prediction [39], pure bandits [5, 53], combinatorial semi-bandits
[104], and (subsequently to our work) contextual bandits [33]. All of them
rely on algorithms tailored to the setting and give guarantees that only hold in
expectation for the weaker notion of pseudoregret that compares to an arm fixed
in advance (not the best in hindsight). As a result, we ask the natural question:
What is a general recipe to derive small-loss bounds with partial feedback ?
Result. To approach this question, we focus on a general combinatorial feed-
back setting, the graph-based feedback introduced by Mannor and Shamir [96].
Before selecting an arm, the learner observes a time-varying undirected graph
determining the feedback structure. In particular, the learner observes the loss
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of the selected arm but she also observes the loss of all neighboring arms (and
therefore has access to extra information). This model captures full information
(complete graph) and bandit learning (empty graph) as two extremes. Interest-
ingly, it also captures other important partial feedback settings such as contextual
bandits [12, 87, 2, 33] and, with a small modification, combinatorial semi-bandits
[72, 10, 104]. Alon et al. [6] provided regret bounds for graph-based feedback
that scale with the independence number of the graph (the appropriate feedback
dimension in the setting); however their guarantees also scale with the time
horizon and suffer from the over-exploration issue we discussed before.
In joint work with Karthik Sridharan and E´va Tardos [93], we provide a
general way to obtain small-loss regret guarantees for the graph-based feedback
setting. Our algorithm takes as input a full information algorithm with a small-
loss guarantee (these algorithms are ubiquitous in the litarature), and seamlessly
transforms it, in a black-box way, to an algorithm with a small-loss guarantee for
the graph-based feedback. Our guarantee holds with high-probability and scales
with the maximum independence number of the graphs. In a black-box way, the
dependence on the loss L? of the best action is (L?)2/3 but, for particular settings,
we use specific algorithms to derive an optimal
√
L? guarantee. Interestingly,
even for the special case of bandits, our results are the first to provide this
guarantee with high probability. We elaborate on these results in Chapter 2.
Technical highlight. The crux of this general reduction is to ignore low-
performing actions but treat them optimistically, allowing them to recover. This
requires some background. The classical strategy to deal with partial feedback is
to reduce it to full information. However, a full information algorithm expects to
receive the losses of all the actions, which is not available in the partial feedback
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setting. For this reason, classical approaches create an estimator of the losses,
ensuring that the estimated losses behave as if they were the actual losses (i.e.
the estimator is unbiased and therefore the expected estimated loss is equal to
the actual loss for any arm). In order to have good regret guarantees, partial-
feedback algorithms try to create such an estimator while not pulling suboptimal
arms too often. However, if an arm is not observed often, the variance of an
unbiased estimator for its loss will be relatively high. Since this variance ends
up in the eventual regret bound, the algorithms need a way to control it by
obtaining more information about these arms. Classical algorithms such as EXP3
[12] and EXP3-DOM [6] achieve this via mixing the action distribution with a
uniform distribution, ensuring that each action is selected (and therefore also
observed) with a big enough probability. However, this means that at every
round they select suboptimal arms with big enough probability which results in
regret bounds scaling with the loss of the worst arm (rather than the best).
We follow an alternative approach by temporarily freezing (not selecting) the
low-performing arms. This resolves the variance problem but creates another is-
sue: estimated losses no longer accurately capture the actual losses for the frozen
arms (they may be observed with probability 0). It turns out that, to resolve this,
it suffices to credit these arms optimistically treating them as perfect while we
ignore them. The idea of freezing arms towards small-loss guarantees was ini-
tially suggested by Allenberg et al. [5] who derived pseudoregret guarantees for
pure bandits. We extend this technique by making it black-box, high-probability,
and dealing with the more involved graph-based feedback setting. This setting
poses the extra complication that, when an arm gets frozen, neighboring arms
may lose probability of observation and may need to subsequently also get
frozen. A nice technical contribution is that we control this snowball effect via a
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double-thresholding technique based on a potential function analysis.
1.2.2 Contribution II: Robustness to adversarial corruptions
Although the environment in online markets is rarely completely i.i.d., there
are important applications where data is mostly i.i.d. As an example, consider
online advertising: when a user arrives in a particular website, a platform such
as Google Ads needs to decide which ad to display. For a particular type of user,
it is important for the platform to display the ad that will be more likely to get
clicked; this ensures that the user receives relevant content and also provides
revenue to the platform which is typically paid per-click. Each ad is associated
with the so called click-through rate, which is the probability that, if displayed,
it will get clicked. The platform does not know this quantity and needs to
explore different alternatives to understand which is the most profitable. This is
a canonical example of stochastic bandit learning where the reward for each of
the alternatives comes from i.i.d. distributions. Recommender systems exhibit
similar issues; the alternatives there correspond to restaurants that, for example,
Yelp needs to recommend in a particular area and the stochasticity relates to the
quality of experience of a typical user as evaluated by the number of stars.
Stochastic bandit learning exploits the fact that, when the input is i.i.d., the
alternative with the highest mean can be learned and subsequently be repeatedly
selected to optimize the performance. This task of learning the most profitable
alternative is easier when the mean of the best arm a? is significantly better
that the means of other arms; the difference between the mean of a? and of
another arm a is typically called the gap of the arm a. The improved guarantees
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for the stochastic case depend only logarithmically on the time horizon and also
scale with the inverse of these gaps which captures how easily identifiable the
best arm is. Classical algorithms like Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) [11] and
Active Arm Elimination [51] retain empirical means for each arm (based on the
average experienced reward) and confidence intervals around them (helping
them position the actual means of the arms). This enables them to cease selecting
arms that are very unlikely to be the best. Other algorithms such as Thompson
sampling [124] employ a randomized way to capture these empirical means but
they also achieve gap-based guarantees [4].
Main question. The second contribution of this thesis is to address an impor-
tant limitation of these classical stochastic bandit learning approaches: in reality,
data is not completely stochastic and is often corrupted by self-interested ad-
versarial entities. In online advertising, there is the phenomenon of click fraud
where a competing advertiser may try to harm the most profitable alternative
a?, to increase her own displays. One instantiation of click fraud is that the
competing advertiser creates bots that obtain fake impressions and, when a? is
displayed, deliberately not click the ad, misleading the platform to conclude that
a? is not a profitable ad and therefore it should not be displayed often. Similar
attacks can arise in recommender systems with paid fake reviews.
Companies try to detect and mitigate this fraudulent activity, but we cannot
hope that it is completely eliminated. Google spends a lot of resources to try to
identify activity coming from bots and correct for that. Yelp requests users to
report offers for paid fake reviews in order to punish the restaurants that deploy
such strategies. Therefore we can expect that most of the attempted fraudulent
activity is stopped. However, there is no hope that all of the activity will get
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caught and some corruption will end up in the data.
The problem is that classical methods fail to be robust to even little fraudulent
activity if they utilize the inherent stochasticity in the rewards. Stochastic bandit
approaches are easily fooled even by small amounts of corruption and often
eliminate (or mostly ignore) the most profitable arm a?. The other extreme of
adversarial bandits which we elaborated in the previous subsection is not fooled
by the corruptions but also does not exploit the fact that most of the input is
stochastic. Prior to our work, the best approach towards the problem is the
literature on best of both worlds [34, 120, 14, 119] which designs algorithms that
simultaneously achieve the stochastic guarantee if the input is i.i.d. while also
retaining worst-case guarantees. This line of work does not handle the typical
case where data are not completely i.i.d. but there is only a minimal amount of
corruption in the data. Addressing this limitation, we ask the following question:
Can we make stochastic bandits robust to small amounts of corrupted data?
Result. To tackle this question, in joint work with Vahab Mirrokni and Renato
Paes Leme [92], we introduce a model that slightly modifies the stochastic bandit
learning framework to incorporate corruptions in the data. More precisely, each
arm is associated with a distribution that is fixed across time – this is the classical
stochastic bandit learning assumption. At every round, rewards are drawn from
this distribution and, at the same time, the learner commits to a probability
distribution across the set of k arms. However, unlike stochastic bandit learning,
an adversary subsequently corrupts the feedback that the learner observes and
returns as feedback some corrupted value in [0, 1] instead of the actual realized
reward. If the adversary never changes the feedback then we are in the purely
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stochastic setting; if she changes it every single time then we are in a heavily
corrupted setting where one cannot hope to exploit the stochasticity in the data.
Our goal is to robustify the design of stochastic bandit learning algorithms so
that they can accommodate a modest amount of corruption in the data without
knowing in advance how much this amount is.
In that direction, we provide an algorithm that achieves this desired robust-
ness. Our guarantees have three very nice properties. First, we obtain (up to a
logarithm) the gap-based guarantee of classical stochastic bandits when there is
no corruption in the data; as a result, the extra penalty that we pay to achieve this
robustness is relatively small. Second, our guarantees degrade gracefully with
the amount of corruption in the data; in particular, the decay in performance
is linear with the total corruption that the adversary injected in the data. We
note that this linear degradation is unavoidable even in simple instances. Third,
our guarantees are agnostic to the amount of corruption: we do not need to
know how much corruption occurs in the data. This is very important in the
applications we discussed as, if our algorithm is tailored to a particular level of
corruption, it may aim for a pessimistic bound that will ruin the stochastic guar-
antee when there is close to no corruption. More importantly, if the algorithm has
a hard-coded level of robustness, it is easily gameable by an adversarial entity
that just needs to add a little more corruption. Finally, our guarantee holds with
high probability instead of weaker notions of expected performance; this helps
to mitigate the effect of such attacks. We elaborate on these results in Chapter 3.
Technical highlight. Our algorithm is based on a multi-layer random sparsi-
fication technique that extends the Active Arm Elimination stochastic bandit
algorithm. Active Arm Elimination selects arms in a round-robin fashion until
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their empirical means concentrate enough so that the difference in empirical
means gives confidence that the dominated arm is suboptimal; at this point, it
eliminates the dominated arm. This typically takes a logarithmic number of
rounds as then concentration bounds kick in. An adversary can mislead this al-
gorithm by corrupting the feedback of the optimal arm for the initial logarithmic
rounds, leading the algorithm to eliminate the optimal arm and therefore make
mistakes in the remainder of time.
To robustify this algorithm, we run parallel versions of Active Arm Elim-
ination (layers) and, at each round, randomly select a layer with decreasing
probabilities. Our approach applies broadly against any adversary but, to obtain
intuition, consider the adversary who corrupts just the initial rounds. Layers
selected with smaller probhability receive only a few corrupted samples and keep
exploring even when the adversary stops corrupting. As a result, the majority
of their data are not corrupted and they are not fooled by the adversary. Our
technique seamlessly combines the layers ensuring that the first robust layer
corrects the mistakes of all less robust layers. Crucially, we never need to identify
this robust layer which makes our algorithm agnostic to the level of corruption.
1.2.3 Contribution III: Online algorithms with predictions
Although online learning provides a clean framework to reason about online
decision-making, it ignores important externalities among decisions present in
most modern systems. In online learning, the decisions are, to a large extent,
decoupled and are only connected via the information learned regarding the
system. This enables addressing the explore-exploit trade-off which is an impor-
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tant consideration in online decision-making. However, in most systems, current
decisions also affect the state of the system and alter the available options. For
instance, in two-sided markets such as TaskRabbit, matching customers to a ser-
vice provider may make the latter unavailable for future requests possibly more
amenable to their skill set. Similarly, pricing decisions with limited supply may
have externalities to future customers, affecting the product’s future availability.
Competitive analysis can be thought as the analogue of adversarial online
learning for settings where state is an important consideration. Compared to
online learning, competitive analysis results tend to compare to a stronger bench-
mark (the optimal online algorithm instead of the optimal action in hindsight).
On the other hand, the guarantees are weaker (multiplicative instead of additive).
Despite their fundamental theoretical contributions, works in competitive
analysis suffer from not being very practical, an issue we already discussed with
respect to classical adversarial online learning. Over the last couple decades,
competitive analysis has addressed many important settings where state is an
issue, such as bipartite matching [75, 47], paging [52, 18], and k-server [83, 32].
These works offer valuable paradigms that enhance our understandning of
powerful techniques such as the online primal-dual analysis [36] or online mirror
descent [32]. However, since competitive analysis wants to be robust against the
worst-case, the resulting algorithms suffer again from a need to be conservative
and do not tend to exploit the fact that data may enjoy a nice structure.
Main question. One particular such nice structure that the current data-driven
era arms us with is that the future is often predictable in a relatively accurate
manner. This is enhanced by the rise of machine learning heuristics based on
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deep learning and data modeling analyses. However, these techniques tend to
not have robust guarantees and are prone to errors, for instance, due to outliers
or adversarial examples. As a result, the empirical success of machine learning
and the robust techniques of competitive analysis pose the natural question:
How can we take advantage of the predictive power of machine learning
without sacrificing the worst-case robustness of competitive analysis?
To understand this trade-off, let’s consider the paging problem. In the classical
(unweighted) paging, there is a cache of size k that can be used to serve future
requests fast, and requests arrive sequentially. If the element requested is in
the cache, this corresponds to a cache hit and the element is served at zero cost.
Otherwise, we have a page fault or cache miss and we need to wait to bring the
element in the cache. We therefore incur a cost (in the unweighted case, a cost of
1) and we need to also decide which element to evict from the cache to load the
requested element. The classical application of caching is in computer systems
where the cache corresponds to physical memory. More recently, the setting has
found important applications in storing, say, Youtube videos for companies such
Akamai, or saving pages in the cloud for companies such as Microsoft.
So how can one approach this problem? If the future sequence can be perfectly
predicted, the simple greedy Be´la´dy algorithm [22], that evicts elements arriving
further in the future, performs optimally. At the absence of this hindsight, the
competitive analysis approach is settled. Almost any reasonable deterministic
scheme such as First In First Out (FIFO) or Least Recently Used (LRU) achieves
a competitive ratio of Θ(k). Surprisingly, reverting to randomized schemes
leads to an exponential improvement in performance of Θ(log(k)) [52]. On the
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heuristics side, the computer systems community has developed multiple smart
data-mining schemes to better exploit properties such as locality of reference.
Result. To combine the predictive power of these heuristics with the worst-case
robustness of competitive analysis, in joint work with Sergei Vassilvitskii [95],
we incorporate machine learned predictions to the caching task. In particular, we
assume that when an element arrives, we get a prediction about the next time it
will arrive again in the future. We do not make any assumption on the nature of
the predictor and therefore this information may be erroneous; the hope is that it
may also often contain useful predictions. To quantify the error of the predictor,
we can use many metrics; here we focus on the `1 error η of the predictor: total
absolute distance between predicted arrivals and actual arrivals for all elements.
We aim for three important desiderata, which are essential to appropriately
combine predictions and competitive analysis. First, we want almost perfect
performance when the predictor is perfect (consistency). Second, since the predic-
tions will not be perfect, we want graceful degradation in performance with the
error in the prediction (robsutness); ideally in an optimal rate. Finally, regarldess
of how good the predictor is, we want to have performance comparable to the
one of the best online algorithm (worst-case competitiveness).
Our algorithm achieves these desired properties and has multiple other prac-
tical features. Regarding the bound, our algorithm achieves a competitive ratio
of 2 ·min
(
1 +
√
η/OPT, 2 log(k)
)
where OPT refers to the optimal number of cache
misses in the ex-post sequence. This is a factor of 2 worse than both the optimal
offline algorithm (if predictions are perfect, i.e. η = 0) as well as the classical
online algorithm Marker that is 2 log(k)-competitive. At the cost of this extra
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factor, it allows us to seamlessly interpolate between perfect and completely
inaccurate predictions without knowing in which regime it lies in. Beyond the
particular bound, our approach can provide a more robust version of the Least
Recently Used (LRU) algorithm. Despite its practical empirical performance,
LRU suffers from competitive ratio of k (exponentially worse than the guarantees
of the best randomized algorithms). Through the lens of our framework, we can
take advantage of the predictive power of LRU while at the same time capping its
worst-case performance by Θ(log(k)). We elaborate on these results in Chapter 4.
Technical highlight. Our algorithm, which we term Predictive Marker, is a slight
predictor-based modification of the classical Marker online algorithm. Marker
works in phases; at the beginning of the phase all elements in the cache are
unmarked and when an element comes, it gets marked. At the event of a cache
miss, it never evicts a marked element (to ensure that it evicts elements that have
not arrived very recently) but instead it evicts an element among the unmarked
elements uniformly at random, which leads to the logarithmic competitive ratio.
We only alter the tie-breaking rule across the elements that are unmarked: instead
of evicting unmarked element uniformly at random, we do that according to the
predictions. To achieve the desired trade-off, we keep a blame graph which enables
us to control the error of the predictor with respect to the optimal solution. When
the predictor is locally inaccurate, we locally switch to random evictions among
unmarked elements to guarantee a worst-case competitive ratio.
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1.3 Theme II: Multi-agent online decision-making
In the second theme of the thesis, we broaden our viewpoint to discuss settings
where the multi-agent nature of modern markets adds an important novel dimen-
sion to online decision-making. In the first theme, we assumed that the system
designer is able to enforce any outcome (a route in Waze, an ad to display in
Google Ads, or a page to evict in caching). The loss of different outcomes and the
feedback observed was affected by the multiple different parties in the system,
but we assumed that the designer can enforce the desired outcome. For example,
in routing, although the travel time experienced was affected by the decisions of
other agents and the resulting congestion they caused, the user could not deviate
from the prescribed strategy and necessarily followed the suggested path.
In modern two-sided markets, platforms may often need to think ahead
about the fact that its selected actions are implemented by and on multiple
different agents. An agent may not follow the recommended suggestions if these
suggestions do not align with her incentives. In fact, having access to past data,
she can also employ online learning techniques to find strategies better serving
her own goals, misreport her true valuations, or even abstain if this better aligns
with her individual objectives. Moreover, algorithmic decisions directly affect
the experience or opportunities of different people. As a result, optimization
methods need to also be thoughtful about societal concerns such as privacy or
fairness, potentially sacrificing effectiveness to avoid compromising such issues.
The second theme of this thesis aims to improve our understanding of how
strategic behavior and societal issues in multi-agent decision-making affect sys-
tems where the decisions are made online. Despite recent focus on multi-agent
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questions, most works disregard the online aspect of this decision-making which
often introduces novel challenges. In Section 1.3.1 (and Chapter 5), we study
pricing, which is maybe the most basic representative of optimization under
strategic behavior, in the ridesharing context that introduces multiple complex
spatial externalities. In Section 1.3.2 (and Chapter 6), we examine whether the
fact that agents can also employ online learning techniques to adapt their behav-
ior in dynamic environments introduces further inefficiencies in the underlying
systems. Finally, in Section 1.3.3 (and Chapter 7), we discuss whether the online
learning techniques we previously discussed are compatible with different group
fairness notions and whether there are inherent trade-offs between effectiveness
and group fairness in such online decision-making settings.
1.3.1 Contribution IV: Dynamic pricing in ridesharing
Pricing is arguably the most basic setting where the system designer needs to
take the incentives of the agents into consideration. From sports events to airline
tickets, pricing is the simplest revenue management technique and therefore lies
at the heart of many works in economics, operations research, and theoretical
computer science. The simplest online pricing setting is the so called prophet
inequalities [85] where the different agents i arrive online and have values drawn
from distributions Fi known to the designer. The designer wants to set prices in
an online manner aiming to maximize her revenue knowing that the agents are
price-taker, i.e. they will only purchase the good if their value is above the price.
This problem can be formulated as a Markov Decision Process where the goal
is to find the desired stopping time but there are also simple threshold-based
schemes with a single threshold that achieve constant approximation ratios.
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Main question. The rise of online markets has significantly complicated the
complexity of these online pricing decisions; one of the best examples to illustrate
this is a ridesharing application such as Lyft or Uber. In traditional pricing, there
is a straightforward relation between the price displayed to a user and the
availability of the good in the future: if the price is higher, the user is less likely
to purchase the good and therefore the good is more likely to be available for
future users. In ridesharing, we tend to have users in many different locations
and the good is reusable as it corresponds to a driver providing a ride to the
customer and this driver can be useful for future customers as well. As a result, a
lower price at a location means that the driver is less likely to stay there to serve
future local requests, but may help the driver serve another possibly profitable
request in the destination of the customer – this can propagate throughout
the system (affecting its state). These complex network state externalities of any
single pricing decision makes this setting significantly more complicated than
traditional pricing. Tackling these complexities, we pose the following question:
Can we design effective pricing at the face of network state externalities?
Result. To study this question, in joint work with Siddhartha Banerjee and
Daniel Freund [17], we focus on a queueing-theoretic modeling of the setting
as prominent in the literature of shared vehicle systems. In our model, we
have n discrete locations (nodes) that correspond to the discretizations that such
ridesharing companies employ in all their decisions; we also assume that there
are m drivers (units). To isolate the first-order effect that we wish to study, we
assume that the number of drivers is fixed and that the drivers are not strategic.
For any pairs of nodes (i, j), there is a demand of price-taker customers that want
to get rides; we assume a continuous-time (Poisson) arrival model and fixed
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value distributions Fi j for any pair of nodes. The designer needs to select prices,
possibly in a state-dependent way (depending on the configuration of drivers
across locations), aiming to maximize some desired objective such as revenue or
social welfare. Since such systems tend to operate in fast timescales, we ignore
the initial mixing time and focus on the steady-state performance of the resulting
processes. In queueing-theoretic terms, the prices create an alternative Markov
Decision Process (MDP) whose arrival rates are thinned via removing part of the
demand; the goal is to create the MDP that optimizes the desired objective.
In this model, we derive a general approximation framework. The approxi-
mation ratio of our approach is 1+n/m: asymptotically optimal as ratio of drivers
per location increases and very close to 1 in the real-system parameters (there are
typically significantly more drivers than locations). Notably, our pricing policy
is state-independent (it outputs only one price for each pair of locations) but the
guarantee stands even against state-dependent policies. Our framework applies
to a large class of objective functions including throughput, welfare, revenue (un-
der a regularity distributional assumption common in the revenue management
literature), Ramsey pricing (max. revenue subject to lower bound on welfare). It
also extends to constrained pricing settings such as cases where the prices need
to come from some discrete set and to various other rebalancing controls such
as deciding which driver to match to a particular customer and allowing for
empty-vehicle rebalancing. Finally, our results apply generally to optimization in
closed queueing networks (where the number of units remains unaltered), even
outside the ridesharing application. We elaborate on these results in Chapter 5.
Technical highlight. Our framework which we term Elevated Flow Relaxation is
based on solving a convex relaxation of the problem and deriving the approxi-
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mation ratio via a three-step argument. In revenue management, it is easier to
express the objectives in terms of quantiles associated to prices (percentage of de-
mand that has value higher than the price) instead of prices. If there was always
a driver available to serve any request, then the objective would be concave and
as a result we could apply convex optimization techniques to find the optimal
price. However, the difficulty arises due to the network supply externalities:
each pricing scheme induces a Markov chain that has some probability of driver
unavailability in each node. Unfortunately, the resulting system is non-convex
with respect to the quantiles (or the prices) and therefore not easily optimizable.
To tackle this issue, we first drop the dependence on the unavailability prob-
ability from the objective function. This makes our objective concave but now
the solution of the program does not necessarily correspond to some quantiles
derived by some pricing scheme (as it does not deal with unavailability). To
address this, we add flow conservation constraints which is a necessary con-
dition for the solution to be actually achievable as quantiles of some pricing
policy. We finally need to connect the solution of the relaxation to the m-unit
system objectives we are interested in. For that, we show three properties: a) this
solution is no less than the optimal state-dependent solution, b) this solution can
be achieved by an infinite-unit system, and c) the objective of the m-unit system
differs to the one of the infinite-unit system by at most a factor of 1 + n/m.
1.3.2 Contribution V: Efficiency of dynamic learning outcomes
The task of how the agents should behave is often significantly more complicated
than what described in the previous section. In the pricing settings we discussed
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before, the strategic nature of the agents is very simple: if their value is above the
price then they make the purchase, otherwise they abstain. This simplicity is, in
fact, one of the reasons why pricing is so universally applied. However, in many
situations, the decision of what to do is not that clear. Consider the role of an
advertiser in a first-price auction: each advertiser bids on the item, the highest
bidder is awarded the item, and pays her bid. Let’s assume that the utility of
the advertiser is quasilinear, i.e. it is equal to the value minus the price if she
obtains the item and 0 otherwise. Now clearly, bidding the actual value is not
a good choice as, even if she gets the item, she will get utility of 0. As a result,
deciding how to bid is a more complicated task that has to do with understanding
how other agents behave and what is the price that is needed for her to win.
Fortunately for the advertisers, the online nature of the setting enables them
to obtain access to past data and see what bids worked well and what did not.
As a result, they can employ online learning techniques, for example the ones
discussed in Section 2, to ensure that they have good performance against the
best possible fixed bidding strategy they could have used in hindsight.
Positing that players perform at least as well as what adversarial online learn-
ing 1 suggests is an easily satisfiable behavioral assumption with nice properties.
It is much weaker than the assumption that they play repeatedly the Nash equlib-
rium of the classical one-shot version [101] which requires them to obtain perfect
beliefs about how other players behave in order to best respond to their actions. It
is empirically supported as advertising actions can be rationalized via this learn-
ing behavioral assumption [102]. Finally, when the same advertisers compete for
the same items, the performance of no-regret learning outcomes compares well
to a socially effective solution for a large class of games [29, 116, 123].
1It is important to use adversarial online learning instead of stochastic as the rewards depend
on actions of other agents; assuming that the latter behave in an i.i.d. manner is unrealistic.
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Main question. The condition that all players and items remain the same across
time points to a significant issue with all the results establishing efficiency under
strategic behavior: the underlying settings are never the same across time. In
ad-auctions, advertisers may change their value for different keywords based on
recent trends or marketing decisions. In packet routing, when a video conference
ends, the configuration of data transmission alters. In transportation, when
people switch employments or take vacations, similar changes in the routing
patterns arise. The efficiency guarantees for learning dynamics improved the
relevance of the so called Price of Anarchy guarantees (beyond the restricted
notion of Nash equilibria). However, the requirement that the setting is static
across time sheds doubt on the applicability of these quarantees. Addressing this
issue, we pose the following question:
Are the efficiency guarantees under strategic behavior robust to the frequent
changes in dynamically evolving environments?
To tackle this question, in joint work with Vasilis Syrgkanis and E´va Tardos [94],
we introduce a dynamic population model parameterized by how rapid the
churn of turnover is. More concretely, we have a set of n players and, at each
round, every player departs independently with turnover probability p; once
this happens, the player is replaced by a new player with arbitrary valuation.
This means that, at every round in expectation p · n players leave the system.
The challenge is that a particular player’s departure may affect the benchmark
solution of multiple different agents. The analysis behind the static efficiency
guarantees relies on the fact that agents have no regret for not sticking to the
most profitable fixed item (we call this their favorite item). Consider a setting with
unit-demand advertisers in multi-item auctions (advertisers get no additional
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utility from getting more than one item). If one advertiser a leaves, then another
advertiser b, eyeing for a’s previous item, may switch their focus to that. This
can create a domino effect with another advertiser c wanting to switch to b’s
previous item (augmenting path in a bipartite matching). This example creates
the impression that, when a player departs, all others need to reinitialize their
learning algorithms to target their new favorite items which is problematic for
two reasons. First, advertisers need to learn when departures happen while,
in ad-auctions, they typically do not even know who the other advertisers are.
Second, this reinitialization needs to happen every time that a departure occurs
which means that the previous guarantees would only extend if departures
happen very sporadically (p  1/n) which is not the case in modern platforms.
Result. Countering these intuitions, we show that the efficiency guarantees
are robust to high rates of turnover where a constant fraction of the population
changes every single round. This result comes through two important techniques.
First, many classical online learning algorithms guarantee a stronger notion than
regret (shifting regret) that compares to a sequence of benchmark actions instead
of the best fixed action; this allows them to seamlessly adapt to changes without
needing to reinitialize their algorithms. Second, in many settings, there exist
benchmark solutions that are approximately optimal and significantly more
stable to agents’ departures. This enables us to obtain efficiency guarantees that
only lose compared to the static case a minor extra factor due to the stability and
gracefully degrade with the turnover probability p allowing for good efficiency
guarantees even if p is a constant independent of the number of agents. Applying
the above framework to online advertising and routing, we show efficiency
guarantees that are robust to the population being dynamically evolving.
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Technical highlight. The key technical contribution of this work lies in estab-
lishing that the underlying optimization problems of many important game
settings enjoy stable sequences of approximately optimal solutions. We provide
two different techniques on how such sequences can be identified. First, we
show that greedy algorithms with appropriate tie-breaking often come with such
stability properties. In that direction, we show that a sticky version of the greedy
bipartite matching algorithm provides a stable version of an approximately op-
timal solution allowing us to obtain efficiency guarantees for ad-auctions with
unit-demand bidders. Second, we make a connection between stable solution
sequences and joint differentially private solutions. The latter guarantee that
the output for any particular user cannot be drastically altered by a change in
one coordinate of the input. Connecting this to stability, we provide efficiency
guarantees for routing and multi-item auctions.
1.3.3 Contribution VI: A fairness view on online learning
The final facet of this thesis involves the societal context in which platforms
operate. Their decisions affect multiple different entities and it is therefore
important to understand undesired ethical repercussions they may cause. For
instance, targeting ads to particular populations based on irrelevant attributes,
such as race, may reinforce stereotypes harmful to society [122, 8]. Similarly a
routing platform should try to ensure that the exploration that is necessary for
the learning process is not suffered by, say, only minority populations [24, 109].
We focus on group fairness; to obtain a better idea about such notions, we
discuss the equalized odds notion introduced by Hardt et al. [65]. Consider the
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task of providing loans; a bank ideally wishes to provide loans to people who
will eventually repay them (those with a positive label) rather than to ones who
will default (those with a negative label). However, not having access to the true
labels, the bank makes mistakes in both directions, either giving loans to people
who end up defaulting (false positives) or denying loans to ones who would
have returned them if given the opportunity (false negatives). The notion of
equalized odds, in its simpler form, imposes that, with multiple populations, the
false negative rates (percentage of people with positive label who were denied)
is equal among different populations and the same holds for false positive rates
(defined analogously). This notion was popularized by a recent debate regarding
potential bias of machine learning risk tools for criminal recividism [7, 40, 78, 41].
Although such notions offer a way to reason about the effect of discrimination
in decision-making, they largely disregard that data are acquired in an online
manner and are not i.i.d. Applications such as online advertising, recommender
systems, medical trials, and image classification all require decisions to be made
sequentially. The corresponding labels are not identical across time and are
affected by the economy, recent events, etc. Similarly labels are not independent
across rounds – if a bank offers a loan then this decision can affect whether the
loanee or their environment will be able to repay future loans thereby affecting
future labels [89]. Moving beyond the batch setting introduces important trade-
offs that should be better understood.
Main question. To understand the effect of adaptivity in non-discrimination,
we revert to the classical model for non-i.i.d. adaptive decisions, the adversarial
online learning setting. The most fundamental version of this setting (experts
setting) revolves around the question: Given a class F of predictors , how can we
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make online predictions that perform as well as the best predictor in F . In Section 1.2.1,
we revisited this setting where predictors corresponded to alternative actions.
To study the effect of adaptivity in online decision-making, in joint work
with Avrim Blum, Suriya Gunasekar, and Nati Srebro [28], we ask the most basic
extension of the above question in settings where non-discrimination is an issue:
Given a class F of individually fair predictors, how can we fairly
combine them adaptively to perform as well as the best predictor in F ?
The assumption that predictors are individually non-discriminatory (or fair)
is a strong assumption and makes the task trivial when the input is i.i.d., e.g.
in the batch setting where the algorithm is given labeled examples and wishes
to perform well on unseen examples drawn from the same distribution. This
happens because the algorithm can learn the best predictor from the labeled ex-
amples and then follow it (since this predictor is individually fair, the algorithm
does not exhibit discrimination). This assumption enables us to understand the
potential overhead that adaptivity introduces and significantly strengthens any
impossibility result. Moreover, we can assume that predictors have been indi-
vidually vetted to satisfy the non-discrimination desiderata – we therefore wish
to understand how to efficiently compose these non-discriminatory predictors
while preserving non-discrimination. Finally, this question does not take position
on what is the right notion of non-discrimination or fairness and can be applied
to any group fairness notion.
Result. We address this question for two different notions of non-
discrimination. Our first result is regarding the notion of equalized odds that
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we discussed before. Surprisingly, we show that there is a fundamental trade-
off between performance and equalized odds when adaptivity comes to the
picture. We show that no algorithm that achieves the no-regret property, can
guarantee equalized odds even within an approximation factor (of, say, 20%) –
this holds even for algorithms using the group information. In fact, the exam-
ples generating this impossibility result are very simple with just two phases of
i.i.d. distributions. This issue seems to suggest that fairness notions establish-
ing equality among groups defined in a label-specific way may be arbitrarily
disrupted by the order in which the examples arise. Our second result focuses
on achieving this preservation of non-discrimination with respect to the natural
requirement of achieving equal average loss among the two groups (regardless
if this comes from false negative or false positive examples). Despite proving
impossibility results for algorithms that do not use the group information, we
show a group-aware algorithm that does achieve the desired guarantee.
Technical highlight. To obtain the positive result for the notion of equal ac-
curacy, we make an interesting learning-theoretic connection shedding light
on equality-based fairness notions. Generally, no-regret algorithms guarantee
that the average performance of the algorithm is no worse than the average
performance of the best predictor. Interestingly, there is a class of algorithms
(including the classical multiplicative weights algorithm) where the opposite
is also true: the average performance of the algorithm is also no better than
the average performance of the best predictor [59]. As a result, the average
performance of the algorithm at each of the groups is approximately equal to the
average performance of the best predictor at the group. Since we assume that the
predictors are individually non-discriminatory with respect to the average loss,
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it means that the average performance of the predictor at the one group is the
same across all groups which then establishes the positive result. This property
is, to a large extent, essential – in fact, we show that algorithms with stronger
guarantees (shifting regret algorithms) suffer from impossibility results.
1.4 Roadmap of this thesis
This introduction chapter served as an initial exposition to the context of this
thesis and the main contributions in it. In the following chapters, we elaborate
on each of the contributions in the thesis. The chapters are intended to be
self-contained in order to be able to be read on their own, though we point to
connections to previous chapters where appropriate.
For each chapter x, our aim is to convey the following information in a similar
structure. We first start with an introductory part introducing the reader to the
setting; we advise the reader to also refer to the corresponding subsection in
Chapter 1 as not all points are repeated in this part. Subsequently, in Section x.1,
we provide background technical information that is necessary for the readability
of the chapter. By Section x.2, we provide the details of the particular model
and desiderata that we wish to achieve in the chapter. Section x.3 serves as an
exposition of what can go wrong and why classical approaches fail to address
the question under investigation. Sections x.4 and x.5 describe the main result of
the chapter as well as an additional result (either a warm-up or a follow-up to the
main result). Finally, Section x.6 aims to put the particular work in the broader
context, discusses other works in the area, elaborates on particular assumptions,
and points to important open questions.
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CHAPTER 2
MITIGATING EXPLORATION IN ONLINE LEARNING
Maybe the biggest bottleneck in online decision-making is related to the in-
sufficient information regarding the system at hand. In complex systems, the
decision-maker often deals repeatedly with a similar task, trying to decide across
a set of different alternatives. The challenge is to make effective decisions despite
not knowing initially any information about the system and only receiving partial
feedback determined by the selected action. We focus on settings where the re-
ward or loss of different alternatives does not follow nice stochastic patterns (e.g.
it is not i.i.d. across time). This non-stochasticity is often due to interactions of
multiple agents whose decisions affect the performance of different alternatives.
Originated by game-theoretic considerations in multi-agent dynamics [25, 64],
adversarial online learning emerged as a way to deal with online decision-making
without imposing any distributional assumption on the input. This powerful
framework provides a robust way to balance exploring different alternatives and
exploiting ones that have been profitable in the past. Surprisingly, even without
any prior information about the system and even when losses are adversarially
selected, these techniques can guarantee performance asymptotically as good as
the one of the best alternative in hindsight. Intuitively, despite the fact that the
learner is initially clueless about different options, she can soon realize that some
actions perform well, and can therefore start selecting them. In Chapter 6, we
will see that this property has important consequences regarding the efficiency
of complex systems with selfish participants.
In this chapter, we address an important limitation in current adversarial
online learning techniques when applied in realistic settings where the learner
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only has access to partial feedback. In particular, although classical partial-
feedback online learning techniques achieve asymptotically good performance,
the rate in which this is achieved is relatively large, which is ineffective in
practice. This issue arises because these approaches need to revert to over-
exploration to deal with the non-stochasticity of the environment, even when
there exist actions that are really good (and therefore learning to follow them
should occur easier). We will show how to mitigate this phenomenon when there
exists one such good action (with small loss) without significantly sacrificing
the worst-case performance of the system. This is one example of obtaining
data-dependent guarantees for online decision-making that can utilize some well-
behaved structure in the data while being robust to this structure not holding.
In the subsequent two chapters, we will see two more examples where such
data-dependent guarantees can arise.
2.1 Preliminaries on adversarial online learning
Online learning setting. We first introduce the basic online learning setting,
which describes the framework in which the sequential decisions are made. The
decision-maker or learner has access to a set of d alternatives that we will refer to
as arms or actions a = 1, . . . , d. At round t = 1, . . . ,T , the following process occurs:
1. The learner selects a probability distribution pt ∈ ∆(d) over the d possible
arms; this is such that
∑d
i=1 p
t
a = 1.
2. The adversary then selects losses `t = (`t1, . . . , `
t
d) where `
t
a ∈ [0, 1] denotes
the loss of action a at round t and is assumed to lie in [0, 1].
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3. The learner then draws action A(t) ∼ pt from the distribution pt she com-
mitted to and suffers the loss of the selected action `tA(t).
4. The learner observes feedback about the losses based on a feedback model.
In the full feedback model (experts setting), the learner observes the loss of all
the actions {`ta}∀a regardless what she selected. In the bandit feedback model,
she only observes feedback only for the selected action `tA(t). We will focus on a
general feedback model interpolating between these two extremes.
Graph-based feedback model. In this chapter, we focus on a feedback model
suggested by Mannor and Shamir [96] where the learner receives partial feedback
based on an undirected feedback graph G(t) that possibly varies across rounds.
The learner observes the loss `tA(t) of the selected arm A(t) and, in addition, she
also observes the losses of all arms connected to the selected arm A(t) in G(t).
More formally, she observes the loss `ta′ for all the arms a
′ ∈ N tA(t) where N ta denotes
the set containing arm a and all neighbors of a in G(t) at round t. The full feedback
setting and the bandit feedback setting are special cases of this model where the
graphs G(t) are the complete and the empty graph respectively for all rounds t.
We allow the feedback graph G(t) to change each round t, but assume that the
graph G(t) is known to the player before selecting her distribution pt. This model
also includes the contextual bandits problem of [12, 87] as a special case, where
each round the learner is presented with an additional input xt, the context. In
this contextual setting, the learner is offered d policies, each suggesting an action
depending on the context, and each round the learner can decide which policy’s
recommendation to follow. To model this with our evolving feedback graph
model, we use the policies as nodes, and connect two policies with an edge in
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G(t) if they recommend the same action in the context xt of round t.
Regret. The goal of the learner is to minimize the loss of the algorithm. On its
own, the loss of the algorithm is not providing enough insight of whether the
algorithm is good or not. The loss of the algorithm may be large because the
algorithm selects suboptimal arms, but it may also be large because no arm has
good performance. As a result, to evaluate how well the algorithm is doing, we
typically focus on the so called regret against an appropriate benchmark. The
traditional notion of regret compares the performance of the algorithm to the
best fixed action f in hindsight. For an arm f we define regret as:
Regret( f ) =
T∑
t=1
[
`tA(t) − `tf
]
.
To evaluate performance, we consider regret against the best arm:
Regret = max
f
Regret( f )
Note that both Regret( f ) and Regret are random variables, depending on the
randomness in the algorithm.
A slightly weaker notion of regret is pseudoregret (c.f. [35]), which compares
the expected loss of the algorithm to the expected loss of any fixed arm f , fixed
in advance and not in hindsight. More formally, this notion of expected regret is:
PseudoReg = max
f
E
A(1)...A(t)
[
Regret( f )
]
This is weaker than the expected regretEA(1)...A(t)
[
Regret
]
= EA(1)...A(t)
[
max f Regret( f )
]
.1.
1To see the difference, consider n arms that are similar but have high variance. Pseudoregret
compares the algorithm’s performance against the expected performance of arms, while regret
compares against the “best” arm depending on the outcomes of the randomness. This difference
can be quite substantial, like when throwing n balls into n bins the expected load of any bin is 1,
while the expected maximum load is Θ(log n/ log log n).
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We aim for an even stronger notion of regret, guaranteeing low regret with
high probability, i.e. for all δ > 0 with probability 1 − δ, instead of only in
expectation, at the expense of a logarithmic dependence on 1/δ in the regret
bound for any fixed δ. Note that any high-probability guarantee concerning
Regret( f ) for any fixed arm f with failure probability δ′ can automatically provide
an overall regret guarantee with failure probability δ = dδ′. A high-probability
guarantee on low Regret also implies low regret in expectation.2
2.2 Small-loss guarantees with partial feedback
Classical regret guarantees with an appropriate feedback dimension. Adver-
sarial online learning aims to achieve the so called vanishing regret. This means
that regret scales sublinearly with the time horizon T . Hence the average regret is
vanishing as time grows large; this is typically referred to as the no-regret property.
In the full feedback case, there are very simple and natural algorithms achieving
this property with the regret scaling as a function of
√
T log(d). Examples include
multiplicative weights [54] and follow the perturbed leader [72].
More recently, this property was satisfied even at the absence of full feedback,
scaling with an appropriate feedback dimension of the feedback model. In bandit
feedback [12] the regret is of the order of
√
dT scaling with the number of arms d.
This dependence on d stems from the fact that, even with i.i.d. losses for each
arm, the learner may need to select all arms enough times to identify the best per-
forming. In the general graph-based feedback setting, the dependence on d can
2If the algorithm guarantees regret at most B log(1/δ) with probability at least (1 − δ) for any
δ > 0, then we can obtain the expected regret bound of O(B) by upper bounding the expected
regret by the integral
∫ ∞
0 x · P(Regret > x)dx.
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be replaced by the cardinality of the largest independent set α(G) of the feedback
graph G [6], also referred to as independence number. Intuitively, this dependence
is necessary as it is plausible that all arms not lying on the largest independent
set have always high loss. As we cannot select them often, the setting reduces to
bandit feedback on the α nodes lying on the largest independent set.
Small-loss regret bounds. One issue with the above guarantees is that they
scale with the time-horizon T . When the input is not i.i.d. and we do not receive
full feedback, the only way to have an up-to-date view of how different arms
perform is by exploring all of them (including suboptimal ones). However, doing
so, we select suboptimal actions with big enough probability every single round
which, inescapably, leads to regret guarantees that scale with T (this is formally
described in the next section). This is particularly undesirable in settings where
there exist some almost perfect actions with really small loss (that is significantly
less than T ) – in that case, the input has a well-behaved structure as this action
is more easily identifiable. However, the effort to keep an up-to-date view of
the world leads to exploring suboptimal actions often despite the existence of an
almost perfect action. This over-exploration is a significant roadblock towards
employing online learning algorithms in practice.
To address this over-exploration, one approach is to aim for regret guarantees
that prohibit it, i.e. any algorithm that over-explores cannot satisfy them. One
such guarantee is the small-loss regret bounds, where the regret of the algorithm
needs to scale with the loss of the best arm instead of the time horizon. To achieve
these guarantees, we first focus on the notion of approximate regret (c.f. [53]),
which is a multiplicative relaxation of the regret notion. We define -approximate
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regret for a parameter  > 0 and an arm f as
ApxReg( f , ) = (1 − )
T∑
t=1
`tA(t) −
T∑
t=1
`tf .
We prove bounds on ApxReg( f , ) in high probability and in expectation, and
use these to provide small-loss regret bounds by tuning  appropriately via
an approach that is often used in the literature in achieving classical regret
guarantees and is referred to as self-confidence [13]. In Chapter 6, we will also see
that approximate regret is also often useful in its own sake.
Typically, approximate regret bounds depend inversely on the parameter ;
to derive small-loss regret bounds, this needs to be appropriately tuned over
time. For instance, in classical full feedback algorithms such as multiplicative
weights [54] or follow the perturbed leader [72], the expected approximate regret
is bounded by O(log(d)/) and therefore setting  = √log(d)/T , one obtains
the classical O(√T log(d)) uniform bounds. If we knew L?, the loss of the best
arm at the end of round T , one could set  =
√
log(d)/L? and get the desired
O
( √
L? log(d)
)
guarantee. Of course, L? is not known in advance, and depending
on the model of feedback, may not even be observed either. To overcome these
difficulties, we can make the choice of  depend on L̂, the loss of the algorithm
instead, and apply doubling trick: start with a relatively large , hoping for a
small L̂ and halve  when we observe higher losses. This combines doubling
trick with the idea of the so called self-confident online learning approach [13].
2.3 Classical reduction cannot give small-loss guarantees
Importance sampling and roadblock with variance. The classical way to
translate such full-feedback small-loss results to partial feedback fails as they
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rely on observing often the losses of all arms. The full-feedback case is very well
understood and we have many algorithms that achieve approximate regret of
O(log(d)/). The natural way to extend these results to partial feedback is to try to
create estimated losses that can be created via the available feedback and behave
as if they were the actual losses. This can be achieved, for example, through what is
called importance sampling or inverse propensity weighting. In classical impor-
tance sampling, the estimated loss of an arm is equal to its actual loss divided by
the probability of it being observed, if the arm is observed, and 0 otherwise. This
makes the estimator unbiased as the expected estimated loss of any arm is equal
to its actual loss. Such estimators lie in the heart of the reductions providing
regret guarantees for bandit feedback [12] as well as graph-based feedback [6]. In
the graph-based feedback model, we acquire information for all arms observed
and not only for the ones played. As a result, importance sampling is applied
via dividing the loss of the arm when observed by its probability of observation:
˜`t
a =
`ta∑
a′∈Nta p
t
a′
1A(t)∈Nta .
Let’s see formally how such a reduction looks like to understand the first road-
block. We wish to show that the approximate regret scales sublinearly to the
loss of the best action
∑
t `
t
f and only depends on the maximum independence
number α across all graphs G(t), having only a logarithmic dependence on the
number of arms d. For bandit feebdack, α = d; the roadblock applies even then.
Suppose that we apply the above reduction with a full information algorithm
Awith approximate regret log(d)/ for parameter . Since the estimated losses
do not lie in [0, 1] and since the algorithm is applied on the estimated losses, the
resulting approximate regret scales with the maximum estimated loss maxa,t ˜`ta.
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Starting from the loss of the algorithm, we can obtain:
(1 − )E
∑
t
`tA(t)
 = (1 − )E∑
t
∑
i
pta ˜`
t
a
 as E[ ˜`ta] = `ta on all arms played.
≤ E
∑
t
˜`t
f +
(
max
a,t
˜`t
a
)
· log(d)

 by the low approx regret ofA.
≤
∑
t
E
[
`tf +
(
max
a,t
˜`t
a
)
· log(d)

]
as E
[
˜`t
f
]
= `tf
As a result, if we could get an upper bound on the quantity maxa,t ˜`ta then we
would be able to derive an approximate regret guarantee despite the partial
feedback. Unfortunately, this quantity can be arbitrarily large as the probability
of observing any arm can be aribtrarily low (and it appeears in the denominator of
the estimator). This poses a major roadblock towards in the black-box reduction
from a classical full feedback algorithm.
Mixing uniform action-distribution and new roadblock. To deal with this,
typical partial information algorithms, such as EXP3 [12] or EXP3-DOM [6],
mix the resulting distribution with a uniform action distribution, guaranteeing
a lower bound on the probability of being observed and therefore an upper
bound on the range of estimated losses. More formally, if the full-feedback
algorithm suggests a distribution p˜t, the resulting probability for arm a is pta =
(1 − θ) · p˜ta + θ · (1/d) for a new parameter θ. As a result, this guarantees an upper
bound on maxa,t ˜`ta ≤ d/θ.
However, when doing so, the algorithm’s performance suffer from at least an
extra (θ/d) · (maxa ∑t `ta) as with this much probability the algorithm selects the
arm with the highest loss (over-exploration). As a result, the performance of the
algorithm scales with the worst arm which may have loss of 1 every single round
and be linear on θ · T instead of depending on the cumulative loss L? of the best
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arm which may besignificantly smaller when the input is well behaved. It is
easy to see that when maxa
∑
t `
t
a = T , there is no way to set the mixing parameter
θ that will avoid introducing a dependence on the time horizon T . Intuitively,
since the added mixing makes the algorithm select badly performing arms, this
approach results in uniform regret bounds and not small-loss guarantees.
2.4 Main result: General reduction to partial feedback
Instead of mixing with a uniform action distribution, we use an alternate tech-
nique, first proposed by Allenberg et al. [5] in the context of the Multiplicative
Weights algorithm for bandit feedback. We set a threshold γ and in each round
neither play nor update the loss of arms with probability below this threshold.
We refer to such arms as (temporarily) frozen. We note that frozen arms may get
unfrozen in later rounds, if other arms incur losses, as we update frozen arms
assuming their loss is 0. The resulting estimator for the loss of an arm is no
longer unbiased since the estimated loss of frozen arms is 0. However, crucially
the estimator is unbiased for the selected arms and negatively biased for all arms;
this allows us to extend the regret bound of the full-feedback algorithm. When
freezing arms, we need to normalize the probabilities of other arms so that they
form a probability distribution. To obtain -approximate regret guarantees, the
total probability of all frozen arms should be at most ′ = Θ(). Allenberg et al.
[5] guarantee this for the bandit feedback setting by selecting γ = ′/d resulting
in a dependence on the number of arms in the approximate regret bound.
In this section we extend this technique in three different ways:
• We obtain small-loss learning algorithms for the case of feedback graphs,
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where the regret bound depends on the maximum independence number
α = maxt α(Gt), instead of d (number of nodes).
• We achieve the above via a black-box reduction using any full information
algorithm, not only via using the Multiplicative Weights algorithm.
• We provide a small-loss guarantee that holds with high probability and not
only in expectation.
Seeking for bounds that are only a function of the size maxt α(Gt), and have no
dependence on the number of arms, we introduce a novel double-threshold
freezing technique. At each round t, we first freeze arms that are observed
with probability less than some threshold γ. We show (Claim 2.1) that the total
probability frozen at this initial step is at most α(Gt)γ. However, freezing an arm
may cause a snowball effect, decreasing the probability that its neighbors are
observed. This can propagate and cause additional arms to be observed with
probability less than γ, violating the upper bound on the estimated loss. To
bound the total probability frozen in the propagation steps as a function of α(Gt)
while maintaining a lower bound on the probability of observation for the played
arms, we recursively freeze all arms with observation probability smaller than
γ′ = γ/3. We show in Claim 2.2 that the total probability frozen in the recursive
process is at most 3 times the total probability frozen in the initial step.
We proceed by providing the algorithm (Algorithm 1), the crucial lemma
that enables improved bounds beyond bandit feedback (Lemma 2.1), and the
black-box guarantee. For clarity of presentation we first provide the approximate
regret guarantee in expectation (Theorem 2.1) and then show its high-probability
version (Theorem 2.2), in both cases assuming that the algorithm has access to an
upper bound of the maximum independence number α as an input parameter.
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In Theorem 2.3 we provide the small-loss version of the above bound without
explicit knowledge of this quantity.
Algorithm 1: Double-Threshold Freezing Algorithm
Require: Full-feedback algorithmA, an upper bound on the size of maximum
independent sets α, number of arms d, learning parameter ′.
1: Initialize p˜1a for arm a based on the initialization ofA and set t = 1.
2: for t = 1 to T do
3: Initial step: Freeze arms whose observation probability is below γ = ′/(4α)
to obtain: F t0 =
{
a :
∑
a′∈Nta p˜
t
a′ < γ
}
.
4: Propagation steps: Recursively freeze arms if their probability of being
observed by unfrozen arms is below γ′ = γ/3 to obtain F t =
⋃
k≥0 F tk where:
F tk =
a <
 k−1⋃
m=0
F tm
 : ∑
a′∈(Nta\⋃k−1m=0 Ftm)
p˜ta′ < γ
′

5: Normalize probabilities of unfrozen arms so that they form a distribution:
pta = 0 if a ∈ F t and pta = p˜
t
a
1−∑a′∈Ft p˜ta′ otherwise.
6: Draw arm A(t) ∼ pt and incur loss `tA(t).
7: Compute estimated losses: ˜`ta =
`ta∑
a′∈Nta p
t
a′
if a ∈ N tA(t)\F t and ˜`ta = 0 otherwise.
8: Update p˜t+1a using full information algorithmAwith loss ˜`t for round t.
9: end for
Lemma 2.1. At every round t, the total probability of frozen arms is at most ′:∑t
a∈Ft p˜
t
a ≤ ′, and hence any non-frozen arm a increases its probability due to
freezing by a factor of at most (1 − ′).
The proof of the lemma follows from understanding how much probability is
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frozen in the initial steps and how much is frozen during the propagation steps.
These are bounded in the two following claims.
Claim 2.1. The total probability frozen in the initial step is
∑
a∈Ft0 p˜
t
a ≤ α(Gt)γ.
Proof. Let S t be a maximal independent set on F t0. Since the independent set is
maximal, every node in F t0 either is in S
t or has a neighbor in S t, so we obtain:
∑
a∈Ft0
p˜ta ≤
∑
a∈S t
∑
a′∈(Nta∩Ft0)
p˜ta′ < α(G
t) · γ.
where the last inequality follows since there are at most α(Gt) nodes in S t and, as
they are frozen, the probability of being observed is at most γ for each. 
Claim 2.2. The total probability frozen in the propagation steps is bounded by
three times the total probability frozen at the initial step. More formally:
∑
a∈⋃k≥1 Ftk
p˜ta ≤ 3
∑
i∈Ft0
p˜ta.
Proof. The purpose of the lower threshold γ′ in line 4 is to limit the propagation
of frozen probability. Consider an arm a frozen on step k ≥ 1. Since arm a was
not frozen at step 0, the initial probability of being observed by any node of Gt is
at least γ = 3γ′. When this arm becomes frozen, it is observed with probability
at most γ′. Hence 2γ′ of the original probability stems from arms frozen earlier.
Using this, we can bound the probability mass in F t1 by at most 1.5 times the
mass of F t0. Further, from these arms at most γ
′ of the originally at least 3γ′
probability is newly frozen, and hence can affect non yet frozen arms, creating
further cascade. We show that the total frozen probability is at most 3 times the
probability of nodes in F t0. The proof of this fact follows in a way analogous of
how the number of internal nodes of a binary tree is bounded by the number of
leaves, as any node can have at most 1 parent, while having 2 children.
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More formally, we consider an auxiliary function that serves as an upper
bound of the left hand side and a lower bound of the right hand side, proving
the claim. The claim is focused on a single round t. For simplicity of notation,
we drop the dependence on t from the notations, i.e., use F = ∪kFk for the set
of nodes frozen, p˜a for the probability of node a, use G for the graph, and E for
its edge-set. Let F≥1 =
⋃
k≥1 F tk. We order all nodes in F based on when they are
frozen. More formally, if a ∈ Fm and a′ ∈ Fk with m < k then a ≺ a′. This is a
partial ordering as ≺ does not order nodes frozen at the same iteration of the
recursive freezing. We now introduce the heart of the auxiliary function which
lies in the sum of the products of probabilities p˜a · p˜a′ along edges (a, a′) with
a ≺ a′, such that (a, a′) ∈ E, i.e.
∑
a∈F,a′∈F≥1,a≺a′
(a,a′)∈E
p˜a p˜a′ (2.1)
To lower bound the quantity in (2.1), we sum over a′ first. Node a′ was not in F0
so its neighborhood has a total probability mass of at least γ = 3γ′. By the time
a′ is frozen, the remaining probability mass is less than γ′, so a total probability
mass of at least 2γ′ must come from earlier frozen neighbors.
∑
a∈F,a′∈F≥1,a≺a′
(a,a′)∈E
p˜a p˜a′ =
∑
a′∈F≥1
p˜a′ ·

∑
a∈F,a≺a′
(a,a′)∈E
p˜a
 ≥
∑
a′∈F≥1
p˜a′ · 2γ′
To upper bound the quantity in (2.1), we sum over a first, and separate the sum
for a ∈ F0 and a ∈ F≥1. Nodes a ∈ F0 have total probability of less than γ = 3γ′ in
their neighborhood, as they are frozen in line 3 of the algorithm. Nodes a ∈ F≥1
have at most γ′ probability mass left in their neighborhood when they become
frozen, thus at most this much total probability contributes to the products with
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neighbors later in the ordering.
∑
a∈F,a′∈F≥1,a≺a′
(a,a′)∈E
p˜a p˜a′ =
∑
i∈F0
p˜a

∑
a′∈F≥1,a≺a′
(a,a′)∈E
p˜a
+
∑
a∈F≥1
p˜a

∑
j∈F≥1,a≺a′
(i, j)∈E
p˜a′
 ≤
∑
i∈F0
p˜a ·3γ′+
∑
a∈F≥1
p˜a ·γ′
The above lower and upper bounds imply that:
2γ′
∑
a∈F≥1
p˜a ≤ 3γ′
∑
a∈F0
p˜a + γ′
∑
a∈F≥1
p˜a.
Hence we obtain the claimed bound (reintroducing the round t in the notation):∑
a∈⋃k≥1 Ftk
p˜ta ≤ 3
∑
a∈Ft0
p˜ta

Proof of Lemma 2.1. We first consider the arms frozen due to the γ-threshold (line
3 of the algorithm). Claim 2.1 shows that the total probability frozen in the initial
step is bounded by
∑
a∈Ft0 p˜
t
a ≤ α(Gt)γ. We then focus on the arms frozen due to
the recursive γ′-threshold (line 4 of the algorithm). Claim 2.2 bounds the total
probability frozen in the propagation processs by three times the total probability
frozen in the initial step. Combining the two Claims, we obtain:∑
i∈Ft
p˜ti =
∑
i∈Ft0
p˜ti +
∑
i∈⋃k≥1 Ftk
p˜ti ≤ α(Gt)γ + 3α(Gt)γ = 4α(Gt)γ ≤ ′.
The lemma then follows from the normalization step of the algorithm (line 5). 
Bounding pseudoregret. We are now ready to prove our first result: a bound
for learning with partial feedback based on feedback graphs. We first provide
the guarantee for approximate pseudoregret in expectation. We assume both the
learning rate  as well as an upper bound α on the size of the independent sets
are given as an input. At the end of this section, we turn these results into regret
guarantees via doubling trick without knowledge of the independence number.
47
Theorem 2.1. Let A be any full-feedback algorithm with an expected approxi-
mate regret guarantee given by: E
[
ApxReg( f , /2)
] ≤ 2L · A(d,T )/ against any
arm f , when run on losses in [0, L]. The Double-Threshold Freezing Algorithm run
with learning parameter ′ = /2 on inputA, α, d, has expected -approximate
regret guarantee: E
[
ApxReg( f , )
]
= 48α · A(d,T )/2.
Proof. The proof follows the classical reduction described in Section 2.3 but uses
freezing to deal with the resulting shortcomings in three ways. First, freezing
guarantees that the maximum estimated loss is L = 1/γ′ (since the probability of
being observed is at least γ′ for any non-frozen arm; else this arm becomes frozen
at step 4 of the algorithm). Second, although the estimator is no longer unbiased
for all arms, it is unbiased for all non-frozen arms a < F t at all rounds t, i.e.
E[ ˜`ta] = `ta. It is always negatively (optimistically) biased regardless of whether
the arm is frozen or not, i.e. E[ ˜`ta] ≤ `ta. Finally, the frozen probability is dis-
tributed proportionally to the probabilities of non-frozen arms, hence increases
the algorithm’s loss proportionally. This is in contrast with mixing a uniform
action distribution in which case the extra probability is distributed across all
arms uniformly, resulting to guarantees that scale with the performance of the
worst arm. More formally:
(1 − )E
∑
t
`tA(t)
 = (1 − )E∑
t
∑
a
pta ˜`
t
a
 as E[ ˜`ta] = `ta on all arms played.
≤ 1 − 
1 − /2 E
∑
t
∑
a
p˜ta ˜`
t
a
 by Lemma 2.1.
≤ E
∑
t
˜`t
f + L ·
A(d,T )
′
 by the low approx regret ofA.
≤
∑
t
E
[
`tf
]
+
A(d,T )
γ′ · ′ as estimator is negatively biased
=
∑
t
E
[
`tf
]
+ 48α · A(d,T )
2
using definitions of L, γ′, γ and ′.
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The second inequality also uses the fact that (1 − ) ≤ (1 − /2)2. 
Notice that, for the result, it was important to be able to use a freezing thresh-
old γ ∝ /α instead of γ ∝ /d for the above analysis, allowing an approximate
regret bound with no dependence on d.
High probability bound. To obtain a high-probability guarantee (and hence
a bound on the actual regret, not pseudoregret), we encounter an additional
complication since we need to upper bound the cumulative estimated loss of
the comparator by its cumulative actual loss. For this purpose, the mere fact
that the estimator is negatively biased does not suffice. The estimator may, in
principle, be unbiased (if the arm is never frozen), and the variance it suffers
can be high, which could ruin the small-loss guarantee. To deal with this, we
apply a concentration inequality, comparing the expected loss to a multiplicative
approximation of the actual loss. This is inspired by the approximate regret
notion, is a quantity with negative mean, and has variance that depends on 1/
as well as the magnitude of the estimated losses which is 1/γ′.
Theorem 2.2. Let A be any full-feedback algorithm with an expected approx-
imate regret guarantee of: E
[
ApxReg( f , /5)
] ≤ 5L · A(d,T )/, against any arm
f , when run on losses in [0, L]. For any δ > 0 with probability 1 − δ, the Dual-
Threshold Freezing Algorithm run with learning parameter ′ = /5 on inputA, α,
d, has -approximate regret: ApxReg( f , ) = O
(
α·(A(d,T )+log(d/δ))
2
)
.
To prove the theorem, we need the following concentration inequality, show-
ing that the sum of a sequence of (possibly dependent) random variables cannot
be much higher than the sum of their expectations conditioned to the past3:
3The conditional expectations are still random variables depending on past realizations.
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Lemma 2.2. Let (xt)t≥1 be a sequence of non-negative random variables, s.t. xt ∈
[0, 1]. Let Et−1[xt] = E[xt|x1, . . . , xt−1]. Then, for any , δ > 0, with probability at
least 1 − δ ∑
t
xt − (1 + )
∑
t
Et−1[xt] ≤ (1 + ) ln(1/δ)

and also with probability at least 1 − δ
(1 − )
∑
t
Et−1[xt] −
∑
t
xt ≤ (1 + ) ln(1/δ)

The proof follows the outline of classical Chernoff bounds for independent
variables combined with the law of total expectation to handle the dependence.
For completeness, the proof details are provided in Appendix A.1.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. To obtain a high-probability statement, we use Lemma 2.2
multiple times as follows:
1. Show that the sum of the algorithm’s losses stays close to the sum of the
expected losses.
2. Show that the sum of the expected losses stays close the sum of the expected
estimated losses used by the full information algorithmA
3. Show that the sum of the estimated losses of each arm f stays close to the
sum of the actual losses.
Starting with the item 1, we use xt = `tA(t), and note that its expectation conditioned
on the previous losses is mt =
∑
i pti`
t
i so we obtain that, for any δ
′,  > 0, with
probability at least (1 − δ′)
∑
t
`tA(t) − (1 + ′)
∑
t
∑
i
pti`
t
i ≤
(1 + ′) ln(1/δ′)
′
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Next item 3, for a comparator f we use the lemma with xt = ˜`tf and its
expectation mt = `tf . Now xt is bounded by 1/γ and not 1, so by scaling we obtain
that with probability (1 − δ′)∑
t
˜`t
f − (1 + ′)
∑
t
`tf ≤
(1 + ′) ln(1/δ′)
γ′
Finally, we use the lower bound in the lemma to show item 2: for xt =∑
i pti˜`ti, the expected losses observed by the full information algorithm, and its
expectation mt =
∑
i pti`
t
i. Again, since xt ∈ [0, 1/γ], with probability (1 − δ′),∑
t
∑
i
pti`
t
i − (1 + ′)
∑
t
∑
i
pti ˜`
t
i ≤
(1 + ′) ln(1/δ′)
γ′
Using union bound and δ′ = δ/(d + 2), all these inequalities hold simultane-
ously for all δ > 0. To simplify notation, we use B = (1+
′) ln((d+2)/δ)
γ′ for the error
bounds above.
Combining all the bounds we obtain that∑
t
`tA(t) ≤ (1 + ′)
∑
t
∑
i
pti`
t
i + B by item 1 above
≤ 1 + 
′
1 − ′
∑
t
∑
i
p˜ti`
t
i + B
 by Lemma 2.1
≤ (1 + 
′)2
1 − ′
∑
t
∑
i
p˜ti ˜`
t
i + 2B
 by item 2 above
≤ (1 + 
′)2
(1 − ′)2
∑
t
˜`t
f + 2B +
A(d,T )
γ · ′
 by the low approx. regret ofA
≤ (1 + 
′)3
(1 − ′)2
∑
t
`tf + 3B +
A(d,T )
γ · ′
 by 3 applied to f
The theorem then follows as (1+
′)3
(1−′)2 ≤ (1 − )−1 for ′ = /5. 
The small-loss guarantee without knowing α. So far, we presented the results
in terms of approximate regret and assuming we have α, an upper bound for
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the maximum independent set, as an input. Next we show that we can use this
algorithm with the classical doubling trick without knowing α, and achieving
low regret both in expectation as well as with high probability, not only approx-
imate regret. We start with a large  and small α and halve and double them
respectively, when observing that they are not set right. There are two issues
worth mentioning.
First, observe that computing the maximum independent set is challenging
since this task is NP-hard to approximate. However, if one looks carefully into
our proofs, we just require knowledge of a maximal independent set on the γ-
frozen arms and not one of maximum size. This can be easily computed greedily
at each round and therefore our algorithm can handle changing graphs without
requiring knowledge of the maximum independence number.
Second, unlike full feedback, partial feedback does not provide access to the
loss of the comparator L?. As a result, we apply doubling trick on the loss of
the algorithm instead and then bound the regret of the algorithm appropriately.
Using the loss of the algorithm instead is called self-confident approach [13]. Com-
bined with standard doubling trick arguments, this gives the following lemma
whose proof is provided in Appendix A.2 for completeness.
Lemma 2.3. Suppose we have a randomized algorithm that takes as input any
 > 0 and guarantees that, for some q ≥ 1 and some function Ψ(·), and any δ > 0,
with probability 1 − δ, for any time horizon s and any comparator f :
(1 − )
s∑
t=1
`tA(t) ≤
s∑
t=1
`tf +
Ψ(δ)
q
.
Assume using this algorithm over multiple phases (by restarting the algorithm
when a phase ends). We run each phase τ with τ = 2−τ until τL̂τ > Ψ(δ)(τ)q where
L̂τ denotes the cumulative loss of the algorithm for phase τ. For any δ > 0, the
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regret for this multi-phase algorithm is, with probability at least 1 − δ:
Regret ≤ O
((
L?
) q
q+1 Ψ
(
δ
log(L?+1)+1
) 1
q+1
+ Ψ
(
δ
log(L?+1)+1
)
+ 1
)
Combining the two observations, we prove the following small-loss bound.
Theorem 2.3. LetA be any full information algorithm with -approximate regret
bounded by L · A(d,T )/ when run on losses in [0, L] and with parameter  > 0.
If one runs the Dual-Threshold Freezing Algorithm (Algorithm 1) as in Theorem 2.2
and using the doubling scheme as in Lemma 2.3 and tuning α appropriately on
each phase, then for any δ > 0, with probability at least (1 − δ) the regret of this
algorithm is bounded by O
(((
L?
)2/3(αA(d,T ))1/3 + αA(d,T )) log(d log(L?+1)
δ
))
.
Proof. First for simplicity assume that α is known in advance. In this case, using
Theorem 2.2, we can conclude that for any δ, > 0, Algorithm 1 run with A
enjoys an -approximate regret guarantee of O
(
α·(A(d,T )+log(d/δ))
2
)
. Hence, running
Algorithm 1 while tuning -parameter using doubling trick as in Lemma 2.3 with
Ψ(δ) = O(α · (A(d,T ) + log(d/δ)) and q = 2 yields the regret guarantee of
O
(((
L?
)2/3(αA(d,T ))1/3 + αA(d,T )) log(d log(L? + 1)
δ
))
If α is not known in advance, we can begin with a guess (say α′ = 1) and double
the guess every time that this is incorrect, i.e. the maximal independent set of the
γ-frozen nodes has more than α′ nodes. We make at most log(α) updates. Within
one phase with the same update, the previous guarantee holds with probability
at least some δ′. At the time of each update we can lose an extra of at most 1.
For the rest of the rounds, the guarantees work additively. Therefore, setting
δ′ = δ/ log(α), we obtain the previous guarantee with an extra log(α) decay in the
guarantee. Since α < d, the dependence on log(α) is dropped in the O notation of
the regret bound. 
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2.5 Optimal small-loss guarantees for bandit feedback
To achieve optimal dependence on L?, we need to better understand the places
where the inefficiency arises. The first such place is when we apply the bound of
the full-information which, in a black-box analysis, needs to have dependence
both on the magnitude of losses, L ≤ 1/γ′, and on the approximation parameter
′. Instead of applying this bound, we provide a refined analysis that relates
the expected estimated loss of the full information algorithm to the sum of the
cumulative estimated losses of all the arms. Using multiplicative weights as a
full-information algorithm guarantees that the cumulative estimated losses of
all the arms are close to each other (Lemma 2.4) which enables us to remove
this inefficiency. This was also used by Allenberg et al. [5] to prove optimal
pseudo-regret guarantees but their analysis did not extend to high-probability.
To derive the high-probability guarantee, we address the second inefficiency of
the black-box, where to bound the negative bias of the comparator’s cumulative
estimated loss by its cumulative actual loss, we again had dependence on both
the magnitude of the estimated losses and . For that we apply the implicit
exploration idea of Koca´k et al. [81] which creates a negative bias to all arms
and not only the arms that are frozen (Lemma 2.5). Although Neu [103] used
implicit exploration to provide high-probability uniform bounds his results did
not extend to small-loss. Combining our framework with both multiplicative
weights and implicit exploration, we obtain an algorithm we term GREEN-IX
(Algorithm 2) that, with high-probability, guarantees regret bound of O(√L?).
Theorem 2.4. For any δ > 0, GREEN-IX run with learning parameter ′ = /2
guarantees an -approximate regret of O
(
d log(d/δ)

)
with probability at least 1 − δ.
Lemma 2.4 (implied by the proof of Theorem 2 in [5]). When using multiplicative
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Algorithm 2: GREEN-IX
Require: Number of arms d, learning parameter ′.
1: Initialize p˜1a for arm a ( p˜ta = 1/d), their cumulative losses (L˜0a = 0). Set t = 1.
2: for t = 1 to T do
3: Freeze arm a if its probability p˜ta is below threshold γ = ′/d to create the
set F t =
{
i : pta < γ
}
.
4: Normalize probabilities of unfrozen arms so that they form a distribution:
pta = 0 if a ∈ F t and pta = p˜
t
a
1−∑a′∈Ft p˜ta′ otherwise.
5: Draw arm A(t) ∼ pt and incur loss `tA(t).
6: Compute biased estimate of losses via implicit exploration ζ = ′/(2d):
˜`t
a =
`ta
pta+ζ
if a = A(t) and ˜`ta = 0 otherwise.
and update the cumulative losses of all arms L˜ta →= L˜t−1a + ˜`ta.
7: Update p˜t+1a via multiplicative weights with learning rate η = ′/(2d):
p˜t+1a =
exp(−ηL˜ta)∑
a′ exp(−ηL˜ta′ )
.
8: end for
weights as the full-information algorithm, for any two arms a and a′,
T∑
t=1
˜`t
a ≤
T∑
t=1
˜`t
a′ +
1
γ
+
ln(1/γ)
η
Proof. Let Ta be the last round that a is not frozen. Thus its probability (before
normalization) is then greater than γ.
γ ≤ p˜Taa =
exp
(
−η∑Ta−1t=1 ˜`ta)∑
j exp
(
−η∑T j−1t=1 ˜`tj) ≤
exp
(
−η∑Ta−1t=1 ˜`ta)
exp
(
−η∑Ta′−1t=1 ˜`ta′)
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As a result:
Ta−1∑
t=1
˜`t
a ≤
Ta′−1∑
t=1
˜`t
a′ +
ln(1/γ)
η
⇒
T∑
t=1
˜`t
a ≤
T∑
t=1
˜`t
a′ +
1
γ
+
ln(1/γ)
η
,
where the last inequality follows as ˜`ta ≤ 1/γ for all arms at all times and the
estimated loss of a is 0 after round Ta by definition of Ta. 
Lemma 2.5 (implied by Corollary 1 in [103]). For any δ > 0, with probability at
least 1− δ, any full information algorithm run on estimated losses ˜`t with implicit
exploration satisfies for all arms a ∈ [d] simultaneously:
T∑
t=1
(
˜`t
a − `ta
)
≤ log(d/δ)
2ζ
Proof. The lemma essentially follows from Corollary 1 in [103], that proves the
analogous statement when there is just implicit exploration without freezing.
Let’s consider some fictitious losses ¯`ta that are equal to the actual losses for all
arms a < F t and 0 for arms a ∈ F t and let ˆ`ta be the estimated loss with just
implicit exploration the losses ¯`ta. Then Corollary 1 in [103] establishes that:∑T
t=1
(
ˆ`t
a − ¯`ta
)
≤ log(d/δ)2ζ simultaneously for all a with probability at least 1 − δ. The
lemma follows by noting that the fictitious estimated losses are equal to the true
estimated losses, i.e. ˆ`ta = ˜`ta, since all the non-frozen arms have the same actual
losses and that the fictitious actual losses are no greater than the true actual
losses, i.e. ¯`ta ≤ `ta since the only difference occurs on arms with ¯`ta = 0 and all the
actual losses are non-negative. 
Lemma 2.6 (see for instance [35]). Multiplicative weights with learning rate η
applied on the estimated losses satisfies:
∑
t
∑
a
p˜ta ˜`
t
a −
∑
t
˜`t
f ≤ η
∑
t
∑
a
p˜ta
(
˜`t
a
)2
+
log(d)
η
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Proof of Theorem 2.4. The proof follows the roadmap of the proof of Theorem 2.2
but handles the suboptimal places of the black-box theorem’s proof by applying
Lemmas 2.4 and 2.5. We show that for each arm f , the guarantee holds with
failure probability δ′ = δ/d. Therefore the guarantee holds against all the arms f
simultaneously with probability at least 1 − δ. More formally:
(1 − )
∑
t
`tA(t) = (1 − )
∑
t
∑
i
(
pta + ζ
) · ˜`ta by definition of ˜`ti
≤ 1 − 
1 − ′
∑
t
∑
a
p˜ta ˜`
t
a + ζ
∑
t
∑
a
˜`t
a by Lemma 2.1
≤ 1 − 
1 − ′
∑
t
˜`t
f + η
∑
t
∑
a
p˜ta
(
˜`t
a
)2
+
log(d)
η
+ ζ
∑
t
∑
a
˜`t
a by Lemma 2.6
≤ 1 − 
1 − ′
∑
t
˜`t
f + (η + ζ)
∑
t
∑
a
˜`t
a +
log(d)
η
as `ta ≤ 1 and p˜ta ≤ pta + ζ
≤ 1 − 
1 − ′
∑
t
˜`t
f + (η + ζ)
∑
t=1
d ˜`tf
+ d(η + ζ)
(
1
γ
+
ln(1/γ)
η
)
+
log(d)
η
by Lemma 2.4
Now we use the strict negative bias of Lemma 2.5 to get that with probability at
least (1 − δ′) we can continue the above inequalities as:
(1 − )
∑
t
`tA(t) ≤
1 − 
1 − ′
∑
t
`tf +
log(d/δ′)
2ζ
+ (η + ζ)
∑
t=1
d`tf
+ d(η + ζ)
(
1
γ
+
ln(1/γ)
η
+
log(d/δ′)
2ζ
)
+
log(d)
η
≤
∑
t
`tf +
4d log(d) + 2 log(d2/δ)

+ d
(
1 + 2 ln(2/) + log(d2/δ)
)
.
where the final inequality is derived by replacing the parameters γ, ζ, η, and δ′,
and using the fact that 1−1−γd + (η + ζ)d ≤ 1 for the selection of the parameters. 
Corollary 2.1. GREEN-IX applied with doubling trick on parameter  guarantees
regret of O˜
( √
d log(d/δ) · L? + log(d/δ)
)
with probability at least 1 − δ, and hence
expected regret at most O˜(√d log(d) · L? + log(d/δ)).
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The proof follows similarly to the one of Theorem 2.2 by applying Lemma 2.3
with Ψ(δ) = O(d log(d/δ)) and q = 1.
2.6 Remarks
More information about the paper. The results presented in this chapter are
joint work with Karthik Sridharan and E´va Tardos [93]. Our reduction can
capture more important partial feedback paradigms such as combinatorial semi-
bandits, contextual bandits, and bandits with dynamically evolving comparators.
In particular, one important additional result in the paper is about combinatorial
semi-bandits where we provide optimal high-probability small-loss guarantees
similar to the results in Section 2.5. The latter result stems from combining
our black-box reduction with a) again the implicit exploration of Koca´k et al.
[81], b) a truncated version of follow the perturbed leader of Neu [104], and c)
the geometric resampling idea of Neu and Bartok [105]. Another interesting
additional result is that, for the case where the feedback graph is fixed across
time, the analysis provided in Section 2.5 can be extended to provide guarantees
with optimal dependence on L? that depend on the minimum clique partition,
instead of the number of arms. Extending this result to evolving graphs and
replacing the clique partition by the maximum independence number is a major
open question coming out of our work.
Other small-loss bounds with partial feedback. The work described in this
section is not the first to provide small-loss bounds with partial feedback, how-
ever these guarantees are generally challenging when moving away from full
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feedback, e.g. see the open problem in [3]. For example, such results existed for
the pure bandit feedback setting: e.g., the paper by Allenberg et al. [5] which we
extended here, as well as my previous joint work with Dylan Foster, Zhiyuan Li,
Karthik Sridharan, and E´va Tardos on online mirror descent with log-barrier reg-
ularizer [53]. Other settings where such small-loss guarantees were analyzed are
the label-efficient prediction setting [39], the combinatorial semi-bandit setting
[104] which we also extend in our work as described in the previous paragraph,
and (subsequently to our work) contextual bandits [33]. All these results rely on
algorithms tailored to the setting and give guarantees that only hold in expec-
tation for the weaker notion of pseudo-regret that compares to an arm fixed in
advance (not the best in hindsight). In contrast, our guarantees are for general
graph-based feedback, hold with high probability against the ex post optimal
arm, and our reduction for the suboptimal rate of (L?)2/3 is black-box.
Other data-dependent guarantees. Small-loss guarantees are a particular form
of data-dependent bounds. These guarantees improve on the worst-case when
the problem has a nice structure but do not rely on this structure to be perfectly
present and the guarantees gracefully degrade as we deviate from it. The nice
structure in our case is the fact that there exists an action that has small aggregate
loss; whenever this happens, we see significantly better performance. Another
important structure that has been employed to provide robust data-dependent
guarantees for adversarial online learning are guarantees that become better if
the variance between the losses in the realized sample path is small [67, 127]. In
the next chapter, we will also discuss an orthogonal version of data-dependent
guarantees that, instead of utilizing a nice structure in adversarial online learning,
aim to make algorithms that rely on a particular assumption (such as data being
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i.i.d.) robust to this assumption not completely holding.
Beyond the classical regret notion. Although we mostly focus on regret
bounds with respect to the classical benchmark that compares to the loss of
the best fixed action in hindsight, our results extend seamlessly to the stronger
benchmark of shifting regret [69] that compares to a sequence of comparator
arms (not changing too often). This extension is important when we discuss effi-
ciency of learning outcomes in dynamic environments in Chapter 6. We should
mention that there are a variety of other benchmarks considered in adversarial
online learning: for example, sleeping regret [26, 55, 30] allows different arms
to only be available in particular rounds and adaptive regret [91, 43] requires to
have good regret for each time interval; we will come back to those in Chapter 6.
Partial-feedback settings outside of graph-based feedback. In this chapter,
we focused on graph-based feedback, a combinatorial feedback structure where
the losses of different elements are observed separately. Apart from providing a
clean model to obtain intuition on handling side-information, this model captures
important partial feedback settings as special cases as discussed. However, there
are settings not captured in our framework. The most notable examples are
feedback settings that are more continuous such as linear bandits [42, 118] and
metric bandits [80]. Another such feedback setting that is relevant for packet
routing is end-to-end routing [15] where the learner receives feedback for the
whole path and not for all the segments as in combinatorial semi-bandits.
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CHAPTER 3
ROBUSTNESS TO ADVERSARIAL CORRUPTIONS
The explore-exploit trade-off in online decision-making is often more evident in
settings where the performance of the alternatives has some natural stochasticity.
Unlike adversarial online learning which stems from game-theoretic consid-
erations, the origin of sequential learning when the input is i.i.d. lies in the
design of sequential experiments [113]. Moving beyond the classical statistical
approach where all experiments were initially conducted before analyzing the
data, sequential experiment design allowed to adaptively balance the exploration
needed to identify the most profitable alternative with exploiting it once it is
identified. This gave rise to the stochastic multi-armed bandit setting [11] which
nicely encapsulates this explore-exploit trade-off.
The stochastic multi-armed bandit setting has become more useful due to the
rise of online marketplaces which comes with many opportunities for higher
adaptivity during sequential decision-making. Consider online advertising as
an example where a platform like Google or Facebook needs to select which ad
to display at a particular pageview. Different ads have different propensity to
be clicked; this is expressed by the click-through-rate (probability of a click if
the ad is displayed). The platform aims to select ads with high click-through
rate in order to provide relevant content to the user and revenue to itself (as it is
typically paid per-click). As a result, the crucial task in such an application is to
identify which ad is the most profitable while also making sure that suboptimal
actions are not selected too often. This trade-off also appears in recommender
systems where the different alternatives may correspond to restaurants and the
reward from an action could be associated with the experience of the user. This
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again is related to a distribution capturing the inherent quality of the restaurants.
In this chapter, we discuss a major roadblock in practically employing stochas-
tic multi-armed bandit algorithms: the input is not completely i.i.d. but may
be subject to the existence of fraudulent data. This is a prominent issue in the
applications of interest. For example, in online advertising, there exists the
phenomenon of click fraud. In one instantiation of click fraud, an attacking ad-
vertiser may try to obtain impressions from a competing ad and deliberatly not
click it. This way the attacking advertiser may manipulate the platform towards
thinking that the latter ad has a low click-throuh-rate and therefore should not be
often selected. Altough platforms actively spend resources to identify when click
fraud occurs, it is unreasonable to assume that it will be completely eradicated.
Similarly, in recommender systems, there are often fake reviews; again platforms
try to penalize such corrupted activity but again one cannot hope that all of it
will be completely eliminated. The challenge we face is that classical algorithms
completely fail even with a very small amount of fraudulent activity as we will
see in Section 3.3. Addressing this challenge, we will suggest a way to make
stochastic multi-armed bandit algorithms robust to such corruptions in the data.
3.1 Preliminaries on stochastic multi-armed bandit learning
Stochastic multi-armed bandits. The framework for stochastic multi-armed
bandits is similar to the one of adversarial online learning described in Section 2.1.
It differs from it in that the losses or rewards are drawn from distributions fixed
in advance instead of being adversarially selected. Since this is more common in
our applications, we switch the presentation to be about rewards in this chapter.
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More formally, the decision-maker or learner has again access to a set of
k alternatives that we will refer to as arms or actions. Each arm a ∈ {1, . . . , k}
is associated with a distribution F (a) with mean µ(a). The distributions are
assumed to have positive measure only on rewards in [0, 1] and are unknown to
the learner. At round t = 1, . . . ,T , the following process occurs:
1. The learner selects a probability distribution pt ∈ ∆(k) over the k possible
arms, i.e.
∑k
a=1 p
t
a = 1.
2. For each arm a, a reward rta ∼ F (a) is drawn from the corresponding
distribution where rta ∈ [0, 1] is assumed to lie in [0, 1] .
3. The learner then draws action A(t) ∼ pt from the distribution pt she com-
mitted to and gains the reward of the selected arm rtA(t).
4. The learner observes the reward rtA(t) only for the selected arm A(t).
Regret notions. If the learner knew in advance the distributions F (a), she
would always select the arm a? = argmaxa µ(a) as it provides the highest expected
reward. However, this information is not known in advance. As a result, the
notion of performane in stochastic bandits captures how costly this lack of
distributional information ends up being for the algorithm. More formally, the
notion of pseudoregret corresponds to the difference between the regret obtained
by the algorithm and the reward of arm a?.
PseudoReg = E
∑
t
[
rta? − rtA(t)
] = ∑
t
E
[
µ
(
a?
) − µ(A(t))].
A stronger regret notion is that of actual regret that compares the realized
performance of the algorithm to the realized performance of the best arm in
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hindsight instead of expectation against a?; note that the best arm in hindsight
may be different than the ex-ante optimal arm a?. More formally:
Regret = max
a
∑
t
[
rtA(t) − rta
]
The actual regret is a random variable that depends on the random rewards, the
randomness used by the learner, and the randomness of the adversary. We say
that a regret bound R(T, δ) holds with probability 1 − δ if P[Regret < R(T, δ)] > 1 − δ
where the probability is taken over all the three sources of randomness described.
Note that by Jensen’s inequality, PseudoReg ≤ E[Regret]. We can often obtain
improved bounds for pseudoregret since it allows us to offset large positive
regret events with large negative regret events (see discussion in Section 3.6).
Classical guarantees. One can generally exploit the stochasticity in the input to
obtain improved guarantees compared the adversarial online learning guarantees
of
√
T log(k) which we discussed in the previous chapter. The property that the
input is stochastic is more useful when arm a? is more easily identifiable. As a
result, the guarantees tend to scale inversely with the so-called gaps of the arms
a, i.e. ∆(a) = µ(a?) − µ(a), which captures how easily identifiable a? is.1 More
concretely, the guarantees are of the form Θ
(∑
a,a?
log(kT/δ)
∆(a)
)
for actual regret with
probability at least 1 − δ, and Θ
(∑
a,a?
log(kT )
∆(a)
)
for pseudoregret. In Section 3.3, we
show how these bounds are obtained for a classical stochastic bandit algorithm
and then illustrate why such algorithms are not robust to corruptions in the data.
The above guarantees may seem meaningless when there are arms with
∆(a) ≤ 1/√T . For those summands, the inverse dependence on the gap may
1We note that a? is one arm with optimal mean and this does not preclude the existence of
other arms with the same mean. If more than one such arms exist, let a? be an arbitrary arm
with optimal mean and the other arms a , a? with optimal mean have gap ∆(a) = 0. To simplify
presentation, we assume that a? is the unique arm with highest mean.
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initially seem vacuous; for instance, when there are two optimal arms a, a? with
the same mean, the upper bound becomes infinite as ∆(a) = 0. However, the
inverse dependence on the gap can be replaced by ∆(a) · T in the case of pseudo-
regret and
√
T in the case of actual regret.2 For simplicity of exposition, we omit
this from the remaining of the discussion.
3.2 Stochastic bandits with adversarial corruptions
Corrupted model. We now slightly modify the stochastic bandit learning set-
ting described in the previous section to incorporate adversarial corruptions
in the data. We consider an adversary who can corrupt some of the stochastic
rewards. The adversary is adaptive in the sense that the corrupted rewards can
be a function of the realization of the stochastic rewards up to that point and of
the learner’s choices in the previous rounds. More formally, at round t = 1, . . . ,T :
1. The learner selects a probability distribution pt ∈ ∆(k) over the k possible
arms, i.e.
∑k
a=1 p
t
a = 1.
2. For each arm a, a reward rta ∼ F (a) is drawn from the corresponding
distribution where rta ∈ [0, 1] is assumed to lie in [0, 1] .
3. The adversary observes the realizations of rta as well as the learner’s choices
pta and returns corrupted feedback r˜ta for all arms a.
4. The learner then draws action A(t) ∼ pt from the distribution pt she com-
mitted to and gains the reward of the selected arm rtA(t).
5. The learner observes the corrupted feedback r˜tA(t) only for selected arm A(t).
2If two arms have the same mean, then concentrantion bounds can only establish that the
reward of the algorithm will be at most
√
T worse than the ex-post best arm with high-probability.
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Delving into the model, steps 1, 2, and 4 are as in the stochastic bandit model.
The only modification is that there exists an extra step 3 in which the adversary
alters the feedback which the learner observes for the selected arm in step 5.
Note that, in the described model, we assume that the reward earned is the
one before corruption and the adversary only corrupts the feedback received.
This makes sense in settings with fraudulent activity such as fake reviews; the cor-
ruption in a review does not improve the user experience (earned reward). Our
algorithm extends to the setting where both the reward earned and the feedback
received are corrupted; we contrast the two settings further in Section 3.6.
Desiderata. We aim for guarantees that gracefully degrade based on how cor-
rupted the setting is. More formally, we quantify the amount of corruption
injected at round t by the maximum difference the adversary injected in any arm:
maxa|rta − r˜ta|. An instance is C-corrupted if the total injected corruption (across
time) is at most ∑
t
max
a
|rta − r˜ta| ≤ C
for all realizations of the random variables. The adversary is assumed to be adap-
tive, in the sense that she has access to all the realizations of random variables
for all rounds τ < t and the realization of rewards at round t but only knows the
player’s distribution at round t and not the arm at.
We aim for algorithms with the following three properties:
1. Stochastic: Retain the stochastic bandit guarantee when C = 0.
2. Robust: Have the guarantee degrade gracefully as a function of C.
3. Agnostic: Do not assume knowledge of parameter C.
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Note that a linear degradation with respect to C is unavoidable for the robust-
ness property. Consider two arms a and a′ with means µ(a) = 1 and µ(a′) = 0
respectively and an adversary who returns r˜t(a) = r˜t(a′) = 1 for both arms in the
first C rounds. No algorithm can do better than selecting uniformly at random
among these arms for the first C rounds, which leads to a pseudoregret of C/2.
3.3 Click fraud attack against classical bandit algorithms
Active Arm Elimination algorithm. The starting point of our design is the
Active Arm Elimination algorithm [51], which provides a simplified analysis of the
stochastic bandit guarantee compared to the more famous UCB algorithm [11].
This algorithm is based on the following idea: in an initial exploration phase,
we pull arms in a round-robin fashion and compute an estimate µ˜(a) as the
average empirical reward of arm a (average reward of a? when observed). After
n(a) pulls of arm a, usual concentration bounds establish that with probability
at least 1 − 1/T , the difference of the empirical and actual means is at most
wd(a) =
√
log(T )/n(a). We say that
[
µ˜(a) − wd(a), µ˜(a) + wd(a)] is the confidence
interval of arm a.
If, at some point, the difference between the empirical means of two arms
a and a′ becomes larger than the widths of the confidence intervals, i.e., µ˜(a′) −
µ˜(a) > wd(a) + wd(a′), then with high probability arm a is not the optimal arm.
Once this happens, the algorithm eliminates arm a by removing it from the
round-robin rotation. After both arm a and the best arm a? are pulled O
(
log(T )
∆(a)2
)
times, the confidence intervals will be small enough that arm a will be eliminated.
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Eventually all arms but the optimal are eliminated and we enter what is called
the exploitation phase. In this phase we only pull the arm a? which has the highest
mean. Before we enter exploitation, each suboptimal arm a is pulled at most
O( log(T )
∆(a)2 ) times. Each of those suboptimal pulls incurs regret ∆(a) in expectation
which leads to the pseudo-regret bound of O(∑a,a? log(T )∆(a) ). This bound can also be
converted to a high probability bound for any given failure probability δ > 0 if
we replace log(T ) by log(kT/δ).
Click fraud attack. The above algorithm is not robust to corruptions as an
adversary can easily target the exploration phase, manipulating the algorithm to
believe that a? is not the optimal arm.
Consider the case where we only have three arms a and a? with µ(a) = 0.9,
µ(a′) = 0 and µ(a?) = 1. As illustrated in the previous exposition, the algorithm
will realize that arm a′ is really suboptimal after a logarithmic number of rounds
and subsequently remove it from the round-robin rotation. As a result, what the
adversary can do is to make the optimal arm a? look exactly as a′ to provoke its
elimination. This can be easily achieved by modifying the feedback of arm a? to
0 for a logarithmic number of rounds. As a result, a? is then indistinguishable
from arm a′ and will fast get eliminated for the same reason. Subsequently, we
incur a regret equal to the gap ∆(a) = 0.1 for every single round, leading to a
linear regret which violates the robustness property as C = O(logT ) in the setting.
This is exactly the click fraud attack that occurs in online advertising. The
advertiser that has ad a may try to get impressions of the optimal ad a? to
manipulate the platform to believe that a? is really not effective and have their
own ad being selected for the remainder of the time.
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3.4 Warm-up: c-corrupted setting with valid upper bound c
To approach the setting, we first simplify it by assuming that we have access to an
upper bound c on the corruption, i.e. C < c, and aiming for guarantees gracefully
degrading with c. This is not an assumption we wish to make in practice for
various reasons. First, the typical way that such an upper bound may arise is
via setting a pretty loose upper bound to be sure it is a valid upper bound; this
will result in violating the stochastic property as, even if the setting ending up
being uncorrupted (C = 0), we will end up scaling with the loose upper bound c.
Even more damagingly, from a game-theoretic viewpoint, if the alogirhtm has a
hard-coded bound c it is robust to, the adversary needs to just try to add a little
more corruption since the algorithm then only satisfies the robustness property
for C < c. As a result, it is crucial to be agnostic to the amount of corruption.
However, this setting will serve as a useful building block in our framework.
Enlarged confidence intervals. With such an upper bound c, there is a simple
modification of Active Arm Elimination that gracefully degrades with c. In
particular, we can enlarge the confidence intervals to account for this quantity.
More formally, setting wd(a, t) =
√
log(T )
n(a,t) +
c
n(a,t) where n(a, t) is the number of times
the arm has been played until time t, the resulting algorithm has performance
O
(∑
a,a?
(
log(kT/δ)+c
∆(a)
))
with probability 1 − δ if the bound c is indeed a valid up-
per bound. This comes from two lemmas that will be useful moving forward;
their proofs follow standard stochastic bandit arguments and are provided in
Appendix B.1 for completeness.
Lemma 3.1. Assume that c is a valid upper bound for the total corruption and we
run active arm elimination with wd(a, t) =
√
log(2kT/δ)
n(a,t) +
c
n(a,t) . Then, with probability
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at least 1 − δ, arm a? never becomes eliminated.
Lemma 3.2. Assume that c is a valid upper bound for the total corruption and
we run Active Arm Elimination with wd(a, t) =
√
log(2kT/δ)
n(a,t) +
c
n(a,t) . Then, with prob-
ability at least 1 − δ, all arms a , a? become eliminated after N(a) = 36 log(2kT/δ)+6c
∆(a)2
plays.
3.5 Main result: Multi-layer Active Arm Elimination
We are now ready to provide our approach that combines the stochastic, ro-
bustness, and agnostic properties. To make the presentation more modular, we
first describe the simpler setting where we wish to obtain the usual stochastic
bound of O
(∑
a,a?
log (kT/δ)
∆(a)
)
if the input is purely stochastic while simultaneously
guaranteeing O
(
k · c ·∑a,a? log(kT/δ)2∆(a) ) if the input is C-corrupted with corruption
level C ≤ c upper bounded by a known c. Subsequently, we will extend it to the
agnostic case where we will provide the same result with respect to the realized
C without assuming knowledge of any upper bound.
Stochastic or corrupted with known valid upper bound c
To deal with this double purpose (stochastic and c-corrupted when C ≤ c for a
known c), we run in parallel two instances each targeting one of the two goals;
at each round we select the instances with appropriate probabilities described
below. Intuitively, the first instance is selected more often and quickly identifies
the best arm if the input is stochastic, but is not robust to corruptions. The second
instance is slower but more precise, in the sense that it can tolerate corruptions.
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Since the second instance is more trustworthy, if the second instance decides to
eliminate a certain arm a, we eliminate the same arm in the faster instance.
Decrease experienced corruption by sub-sampling. To keep the regret low if
the input is stochastic, the second instance of active arm elimination cannot pull a
suboptimal arm too many times, therefore enlarging the confidence intervals by c
is not effective. The main idea of the algorithm is to make arm a behave as if it was
almost stochastic in the slower instance even when there exists corruption C ≤ c
in the data, by running the slower instance with low probability. If the learner
selects the slower instance with probability 1/c then, when the adversary adds a
certain amount of corruption at some round, the slower instance observes that
corruption with probability 1/c. Hence, the expected amount of corruption the
learner observes in the slower instance is C · 1c which is less than 1 in expectation
(as C ≤ c) and less than cS = log(2kT/δ) with high probability (at least 1 − δ).3
This makes the arms behave almost like stochastic arms in the slower instance
despite the potential existence of corruption C via only enlarging the confidence
intervals by cS. The slower instance thus becomes robust to corruption by
randomly sparsifying the corruption it experiences.
Fast-slow active arm elimination race. We obtain our algorithm by combining
this random sparsification idea with enlarging confidence intervals. We have
two instances of active arm elimination which we denote by F (fast) and S
(slow). Each instance keeps, for each arm a and time t an estimate of the mean
µ˜F(a, t) and µ˜S(a, t) corresponding to the average empirical reward of that arm. It
also keeps track of how many times each arm has been pulled in that instance
3The dependence on k and T since we need high-probability guarantees for every arm and at
every time; hence the failure probability needs to allow for a union bound across all bad events.
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nF(a, t) and nS(a, t). To handle the robustness to different levels of corruption, we
enlarge the confidence intervals similarly to the previous section with cF = 0 and
cS = log(8kT/δ) + 3 respectively. This allows us to define a notion of enlarged
confidence interval in each of the instances as in the previous section with
respective widths wd`(a) =
√
log(8kT/δ)
n`(a) +
c`
n`(a) for ` = {F,S}. Also, each instance
keeps a set of eliminated arms for that instance I`.
In each round, with probability 1 − 1/c we make a move in the fast instance:
we choose the next active arm a in its round robin order, i.e., arm a ∈ [k] \ IF
which was played less often, pull this arm and increase nF(a) and update µ˜F(a)
accordingly based on the (potentially) corrupted feedback. As usual, if there are
two active arms a and a′ such that µ˜F(a) − µ˜F(a′) > wdF(a) + wdF(a′) we eliminate
a′ by adding it to IF.
With the remaining probability we make a move in the slow instance by
executing the exact same procedure as described for the other instance. There
is only one difference (which causes the two instances to be coupled): when we
eliminate an arm a in S we also eliminate it in F.
This probabilistic selection of the instance leaves us with a potential problem:
it is possible that all arms in the F instance end up being eliminated. If we reach
that point, we play an arbitrary active arm of the slow instance, i.e., any arm
a ∈ [k] \ IS, without updating anything. Via this, we ensure that, when layer F
failed to find the optimal arm, we select arms that are currently still active in
the more robust slow instance and therefore we can still bound the total regret
each arm causes by the number of rounds it survives in the slower instance.
Crucially we do not update the estimates in this case as we have not subsampled
the corruption in these samples and therefore they are less reliable.
72
The resulting algorithm is formally provided in Algorithm 3; to simplify
notation there, we denote the selected arm as at instead of A(t) and omit the
dependence on t from empirical mean µ˜`(a, t) and number of trials n`(a, t).
Algorithm 3: Fast-Slow Active Arm Elimination
Require: Number of arms k, horizon T , valid upper bound c on corruption.
1: Initialize n`(a) = 0, µ˜`(a) = 0, I` = ∅ for all a ∈ [k] and ` ∈ {F,S}
2: For rounds t = 1, . . . ,T
3: Sample algorithm `: ` = S with probability 1/c. Else ` = F.
4: If [k] \ I` , ∅
5: Play arm at ← argmina∈[k]\I` n`(a)
6: Update µ˜`(at)← [n`(at) · µ˜`(at) + r˜tat]/[n`(at) + 1] and n`(at)← n`(at) + 1
7: While exists arms a, a′ ∈ [k] \ I` with µ˜`(a) − µ˜`(a′) > wd`(a) + wd`(a′)
8: Eliminate a′ by adding it to I`
9: If ` = S then eliminate a′ from fast algorithm by adding it to IF
10: Else
11: Play an arbitrary arm in the set [k] \ IS without updating any estimate.
Towards the performance guarantee, Lemma 3.3 bounds the amount of cor-
ruption that actually enters the slow active arm elimination algorithm, which
enables the regret guarantee in Theorem 3.1.
Lemma 3.3. If the total corruption is C ≤ c then the slow active arm elimination
algorithm S observes, with probability at least 1 − δ, corruption of at most
ln(1/δ) + 3 during its exploration phase (when ` = S).
Proof sketch. If one cared just about the expected corruption experienced when
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` = S, it is at most a constant number since the total corruption is at most C and
it affects S with probability 1/c. To prove a high-probability guarantee we re-
quire a concentration inequality on martingale differences (since the corruptions
can be adaptively selected by the adversary). Since this makes the arguments
notationally heavier, we provide the proof details in Appendix B.2. 
Theorem 3.1. With probability 1 − δ, the fast-slow active arm elimination has
regret O
(∑
a,a?
log(kT/δ)
∆(a)
)
for the stochastic case and O
(
k · c ·∑a,a? (log(kT/δ))2∆(a) ) for the
C-corrupted case with C ≤ c.
Proof sketch. The result for the stochastic case follows standard arguments for
stochastic algorithms (since we obtain double the regret of this setting as we run
two such algorithms with essentially the same confidence intervals). For the
C-corrupted case, we establish via Lemma 3.3 an upper bound on the corruption
that will affect the slow active arm elimination algorithm S. Thanks to the sub-
sampling, this upper bound is close to a constant instead of depending on the
upper bound c which allows to not incur dependence on c in the stochastic case.
Having this upper bound, we can utilize Lemma 3.2 to obtain an upper
bound on the number of plays of suboptimal arms in S. Since the algorithms are
coupled, such a bound implies an upper bound on the regret that it can cause in F
as well. This is because in expectation the arm is played at most K ·C times more
in F as it may be selected every single time in F prior to getting eliminated by S
and F is selected c times more often than S. To obtain the above guarantee with
high probability, we lose an extra logarithmic factor. The latter requires upper
bounding with high probability the number of times between two consecutive
times that ` = S. This comes via analyzing the first time that a p-biased coin with
p = 1/c returns heads; the details of the proofs are provided in Appendix B.2. 
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The general case
Multiple layers of active arm elimination. We previously designed an algo-
rithm with two layers: one is faster but cannot tolerate corruptions and the
second one is slower but more robust. To be agnostic to corruption, we need to
plan for all possible amounts of corruption simultaneously. To achieve this, we
introduce logT layers. Each layer is slower but more robust than the previous
one. We achieve that by selecting the `-th layer with probability 2−`. By the argu-
ment in the last section, if the corruption level is at most C, then each layer with
` ≥ logC will observe O(1) corruption in expectation and at most O(log(kT/δ) cor-
ruption with high probability (probability at least 1−δ). As a result, enlarging the
confidence intervals by a logarithmic amount suffices to make the corresponding
active arm elimination instances behave almost as stochastic.
Global eliminations. We couple the logT instances through what we call
global eliminations. If arm a is eliminated by the `-th layer, then we elimi-
nate a in all layers `′ ≤ `. This is important to prevent us from pulling arm a
too often. If arm a is suboptimal and the adversary is C-corrupted, then arm a
eventually becomes eliminated in the `? = dlogCe layer after O˜
(
1/∆(a)2
)
plays
in that layer. Since layer `? is selected with probability 2−`? , it takes O˜
(
C/∆(a)2
)
iterations until arm is eliminated globally, in which case we have total regret at
most O˜(C/∆(a)) from that arm.
Multi-layer active arm elimination race. We now combine these ideas in an
algorithm for the general agnostic case. We call it a race since we view it as
multiple layers racing to pick the optimal arm. The less robust layers are faster
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so they arrive first and we select (mostly) according to them until more robust
but slower layers correct or confirm the current selection of the best arm.
The algorithm keeps logT different instances of active arm elimination (ex-
tending the two layers of fast-slow active arm elimination). The `-th instance has
as state the empirical means of each arm µ˜`(a), the number n`(a) of times each
arm a was pulled and the set I` of inactive arms. The width of the confidence
interval for arm a in the `-th layer is defined similarly to before as:
wd`(a) =
√
log(4kT · logT/δ)
n`(a)
+
log(4kT · logT/δ) + 3
n`(a)
.
In each round t we sample ` ∈ {1, . . . , logT } with probability 2−` (with the
remaining probability we select layer 1). When layer ` is selected, we make a
move in the active arm elimination instance corresponding to that layer: we
sample the active arm in that layer with the least number of pulls, i.e., arm
a ∈ [k] \ I` minimizing n`(a). In case [k] \ I` is empty, we pull an arbitrary arm
from [k] \ I`′ for the lowest `′ such that [k] \ I`′ is non-empty.
To couple different layers, we ensure the following invariant. Once arm a′
is eliminated in layer ` because there is another active arm a in layer ` such
that µ˜`(a) − µ˜`(a′) < wd`(a) + wd`(a′) we eliminate arm a′ in all previous layers,
keeping the invariant that: I1 ⊇ I2 ⊇ I3 ⊇ . . .. Figure 3.1 provides an example of
the state of the algorithm, which is formally defined in Algorithm 4. We again
simplify notation there, by using at to denote the selected arm and omitting the
dependence on t from empirical mean µ˜`(a, t) and number of trials n`(a, t).
Subsequently we provide the main result, a regret guarantee for multi-layer
active arm elimination race (Therorem 3.2).
Theorem 3.2. With probability 1 − δ, the multi-layer active arm elimination race
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µ˜1(1), n1(1) . . .µ˜1(2), n1(2) µ˜1(k), n1(k)
arm 1 arm 2 arm k. . .
` = 1
µ˜2(1), n2(1) . . .µ˜2(2), n2(2) µ˜2(k), n2(k)` = 2
µ˜3(1), n3(1) . . .µ˜3(2), n3(2) µ˜3(k), n3(k)` = 3
µ˜logT (1), nlogT (1) . . .µ˜logT (2), nlogT (2) µ˜logT (k), nlogT (k)` = logT
...
...
...
...
Figure 3.1: Example of the state of the algorithm: for each layer ` and arm a
we keep the estimated mean µ˜`(a) and the number of pulls n`(a).
Red cells indicate arms that have been eliminated in that layer.
If an arm is eliminated in a layer, it is eliminated in all previous
layers. If a layer where all the arms are eliminated (like layer 1
in the figure) is selected, we play an arbitrary active arm with
the lowest layer that contains active arms.
has regret in the agnostic C-corrupted case bounded by:
O
∑
a,a∗
k ·C · log(kT/δ) + log(T )
∆(a)
· log(kT/δ)
.
Proof sketch. Similarly to the previous theorem, the final regret guarantee comes
via summing over layers that are essentially stochastic and layers that are not
robust to corruption. All the layers `′ with C ≤ 2`′ fall into the first category;
similar to Lemma 3.3, with high probability the corruption they experience when
the selected layer ` = `′ is at most c` = log(kT/δ) as this corruption is subsampled.
Each such layer incurs therefore regret of O
(
log(kT/δ)
∆(a)
)
. Since there are at most log(T )
such layers, the second term in the theorem is derived.
The challenge is to bound the regret incurred by layers that are not robust to
the corruption (i.e. 2` < C). However, there exists some layer `? = min ` : C ≤ 2`
that is above the corruption level. By bounding the amount of steps that this level
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Algorithm 4: Multi-layer Active Arm Elimination Race
Require: Number of arms k, horizon T
1: Initialize n`(a) = 0, µ˜`(a) = 0, I` = ∅ for all a ∈ [K] and ` ∈ {1, . . . , logT }.
2: For Rounds t = 1..T
3: Sample algorithm ` ∈ {1, . . . , logT }with probability 2−`. Else ` = 1.
4: If [K] \ I` , ∅
5: Play arm at ← argmina∈[K]\I` n`(a)
6: Update µ˜`(at)← [n`(at) · µ˜`(at) + r˜tat]/[n`(at) + 1] and n`(at)← n`(at) + 1
7: While exists arms a, a′ ∈ [K] \ I` with µ˜`(a) − µ˜`(a′) > wd`(a) + wd`(a′)
8: Eliminate a′ by adding it to I`′ for all `′ ≤ `
9: Else
10: Find minimum `′ such that [K] \ I`′ , ∅; play arbitrary arm in that set
without updating any estimate.
will require in order to eliminate each suboptimal arm a , a? in the incorrect
layers (via Lemma 3.2), we again obtain a bound on the regret caused by this
arm in those layers. Since we take the minimum such layer and the tolerance
of layers is within powers of 2, the fact that its corruption level does not match
exactly the corruption that occurred only costs an extra factor of 2 in the regret.
The details of the proof are provided in Appendix B.3. 
3.6 Remarks
More information about the paper. The results presented in this chapter are
joint work with Vahab Mirrokni and Renato Paes Leme [92]. So far, we discussed
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the results with respect to the uncorrupted objective (where we earn the un-
corrupted rewards while observing the corrupted feedback). As we said, this
captures settings where there exists some fraudulent activity that does not count
towards the utility gained by the system, e.g. social welfare objective in online
advertising with click fraud or recommender systems with fake reviews. Our
results extend to the case where we also earn the corrupted rewards since the two
objectives are within C of each other and we anyway have a linear degradation
on C. This captures settings such as the revenue objective in click fraud (the
platform gets the revenue even if it comes from undetected corrupted activity) or
cases where the corruption is not malevolent but actually affects the experience in
a non-i.i.d. manner (e.g. a construction next door affects a restaurant experience
without having to do with the inherent quality of the restaurant).
Although for the uncorrupted objective, the linear degradation on C is unim-
provable as we discussed in Section 3.2, for the corrupted objective the situation
is less straightforward. For the notion of pseudoregret, we provide an improved
dependence for some regimes of C (in fact, follow-up work can obtain an optimal
dependence of
√
C through the technique of Wei and Luo [127]; personal commu-
nication with the authors). On the other hand, for high-probability guarantees we
show a lower bound showing that any algorithm that is optimal in the stochastic
case (as the fast-slow active arm elimination) needs to degrade linearly with
corruption even for the simpler setting where the input is either stochastic or
C-corrupted case with a known level C. Understanding, whether an improved
dependence on C can also be achieved with high probability at the expense of
some logarithmic degradation in the stochastic case is an exciting open direction.
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Related work regarding corruptions. Our work is one of the first trying to
understand the effect of corruptions in stochastic bandit learning.
Prior to our work, there have been two such attempts. One direction is the
best of both worlds [34, 120, 14, 119] which aims to provide a single algorithm
achieving simultaneously the stochastic guarantee when the input is stochastic
and the worst-case guarantee when it is adversarial. However, most of these
works provide no handling for scenaria that are in between, which is the more
common case. In fact, one of this works [120] has extended the guarantees to the
mildly contaminated case where the input can be corrupted but the corruption
cannot ever significantly alter the performance of different arms; in particular,
the empirical gap between a? and any other a can decrease by at most a factor
of 2. This assumption does not hold in the main motivating applications such
as click fraud where the adversary may completely corrupt the best arm in the
initial rounds. Another approach aimed to add some stochastic corruptions to
the feedback received to make bandit learning differentially private [56]; this is
orthogonal to our main motivation where the corruptions are adversarial.
From the follow-up work, the most directly related is the one of Gupta et
al. [61] who improve the guarantee presented in this chapter by decomposing
the dependence on kC from the dependence on the gaps. This is done via a
randomized scheme which works in phases and uses only samples from the
previous phase at any time to limit the effect that any particular sample can have
to the future. This plays a similar role to our multi-layer construction.
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CHAPTER 4
ONLINE ALGORITHMS WITH PREDICTIONS
In scenaria where the algorithmic decisions alter the state of the system, the
online learning framework is not directly applicable. For example, in bipartite
matching, when an element is matched to a user, it becomes unavailable for
future users. As a result, the notion of best fixed action in hindsight (of the regret
benchmark) is ill-defined as there one cannot match this item multiple times.
To deal with this state-dependent decision-making, a better approach is to
compare with the ex-post optimal solution (i.e. a benchmark that has the benefit
of hindsight and makes decisions with full knowledge of the future). This is
the classical benchmark that is mostly used in competitive analysis approaches,
which is the prominent approach in the theoretical computer science literature.
Note that it is a much stronger benchmark than the regret benchmark as it
compares to the true ex-post optimal solution. Not surprisingly, it tends to utilize
more structure in the underlying settings and does not allow the costs to change
arbitrarily as in adversarial online learning discussed in Chapter 2.
One nice property of competitive analysis techniques is that they target
worst-case instances without imposing distributional assumptions on the input.
However, this property is often a pitfall of the method as the resulting algorithms
tend to be overly cautious and, as a result, often cannot escape from the worst-
case guarantees even when the input is nicely behaved. In the previous two
chapters, we showed how to adapt online learning techniques to obtain improved
performance when a the input has a nice structure in a way that is robust to
the structure not holding. It is natural therefore to wonder whether something
similar can be achieved for competitive analysis techniques.
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In this chapter, we provide a way to enhance the performance of competitive
analysis techniques when we have a particular well-behavedness in our input.
In particular, we assume that we have access to a machine learned predictor
(potentially erroneous). We assume that this predictor, when accurate, offers
enough information to achieve offline optimality, i.e. the performance of the
benchmark. Augmented with this predictor, we show how we can use this
predictive power to enhance the performance when the predictor is relatively
accurate, without sacrificing the worst-case robustness of the employed method.
4.1 Preliminaries on caching and competitive analysis
The caching problem. The caching (or online paging) problem considers a
system with two levels of memory: a slow memory of size m and a fast memory
of size k, which we refer to as cache. A caching algorithm is faced with a sequence
of requests for elements. If the requested element is in the fast memory, a cache
hit occurs and the algorithm can satisfy the request at no cost. If the requested
item is not in the fast memory, a cache miss occurs, the algorithm fetches the item
from the slow memory, and places it in the fast memory before satisfying the
request. If the fast memory is full, then one of the items must be evicted. The
eviction strategy forms the core of the problem. The goal is to find an eviction
policy that results in the fewest number of cache misses.
Competitive analysis To obtain worst-case guarantees for an online algorithm
(that must make decisions as each element arrives), we compare its performance
to that of an offline optimum (that has the benefit of hindsight). Let σ be the
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input sequence of elements for a particular online decision making problem,
costA(σ) be the cost incurred by an online algorithmA on this input, and OPT(σ)
be the cost incurred by the optimal offline algorithm. Then algorithm A has
competitive ratio CR if for all sequences σ, costA(σ) ≤ CR · OPT(σ).
For the caching problem, the optimal offline algorithm at time t evicts the
element from the cache that will arrive the furthest in the future; this is typically
referred in the literature as Be´la´dy’s optimal replacement paging algorithm [22].
On the other hand, without the benefit of foresight, any deterministic caching
algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of Ω(k), and any randomized caching
algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of Ω(log k) (see [100] for a nice exposition).
4.2 Caching augmented with a machine learned predictor
Online with Machine Learned Advice. Before focusing on how to enhance
caching with a machine learned predictor, we specify a general framework to
incorporate predictors in online algorithms. We term this framework Online with
Machine Learned Advice or OMLA for a shortcut.
We first specify the input and the predictions made by the machine learned
predictor h ∈ H from a classH . The online input consists of a set of elementsZ.
For a specific input σ, its elements are denoted by z(σ1), z(σ2), . . . and its length
by |σ|. Formalizing the machine learning task, we assume a feature space X and
a label spaceY. The i-th element z(σi) has features x(σi) ∈ X and a label y(σi) ∈ Y
that represents ground truth. For any element i, the predictor returns a predicted
label h(x(σi)). To ease notation we will also denote this by h(σi). We instantiate
this framework to caching in the end of this section. To ease presentation, we
83
assume that the mapping from features to labels is deterministic; our results
extend to randomized mappings by applications of Jensen’s inequality.
To measure the performance of the predictor h, we first define a loss function
` : Y × Y → R≥0. When the labels lie in a metric space, some examples of loss
functions include absolute loss `1(y, yˆ) = |y− yˆ|, squared loss `2(y, yˆ) = (y− yˆ)2, and
classification loss `c(y, yˆ) = 1y,yˆ. In defining the framework, we are not concerned
with the semantics of the labels, i.e. what is the quantity that h is predicting or
how it was trained – we are only interested in its performance. The error of the
predictor h on a sequence σ with respect to loss function ` is therefore:
η`(h, σ) =
∑
i
`(y(σi), h(σi)).
Instantiated with the absolute loss function for the caching problem, the error of
the predictor is η`1(h, σ) =
∑
i |y(σi) − h(σi)|. We use η1(h, σ) as shorthand for this.
Definition 4.1. The Online with Machine Learned Advice (OMLA) model includes:
• An input σ = {z(σ1), z(σ2), . . . , z(σ|σ|); each z(σi) ∈ Z has features x(σi) ∈ X and
labels y(σi) ∈ Y.
• A predictor h : X → Y that predicts a label h(σi) for each x(σi) ∈ X.
• The error of predictor h at sequence σ w.r.t. loss `, i.e., η`(h, σ).
Our goal is to create online algorithms that, when augmented with a predictor
h, can use its advice to achieve an improved competitive ratio. To evaluate how
well an algorithmA performs with respect to this task, we extend the definition
of competitive ratio to be a function of the predictor’s error. We first define the
set of predictors that are sufficiently accurate.
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Definition 4.2. For a fixed optimization problem Π, let OPTΠ(σ) denote the value of
the optimal solution on the input σ. We say that a predictor h is -accurate with respect
to a loss function ` for problem Π if for any σ,
η`(h, σ) ≤  · OPTΠ(σ).
We will useH`() to denote the class of -accurate predictors, omitting the quantifier on
Π for notational clarity.
At first glance, it may appear unnatural to tie the error of the prediction to
the value of the optimal solution. However, our goal is to have a definition that
is invariant to simple padding arguments. For instance, consider a sequence
σ′ = σσ, which concatenates two copies of an instance σ, and assume that the
predictor makes the same (relative) predictions within each instance σ. It is
clear that the prediction error of any predictor doubles, but this is not due to the
predictor suddenly being worse. One could instead normalize the prediction
error by the length of the sequence, but in many problems, including caching,
one can artificially increase the length of the sequence without impacting the
value of the optimum solution, or the impact of predictions. Instead, normalizing
by the value of the optimum captures both of these problems.
Call an algorithmA -assisted if it has access to an -accurate predictor. The
competitive ratio of an -assisted algorithm is itself a function of .
Definition 4.3. Let CRA(h)(σ) be the competitive ratio of algorithm A, which uses a
-accurate predictor h with respect to a loss function `, when applied on sequence σ. The
competitive ratio of an -assisted algorithmA is:
CRA,`() = max
σ,h∈H`()
CRA(h)(σ).
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We are now ready to define the desiderata that we wish our algorithm to
satisfy. In particular, we would like our algorithm to perform as well as the
offline optimum when the predictor is perfect, degrade gracefully with the error
of the predictor, and perform as well as the best online algorithm regardless of
the error of the predictor. More formally:
Definition 4.4. Ah is β-consistent if CRA,`(0) = β.
Definition 4.5. A is α-robust for a function α(·), if CRA,`() = O(α()).
Definition 4.6. A is γ-competitive if CRA,`() ≤ γ for all values of .
Our goal is to find algorithms that simultaneously optimize aforementioned
three properties. They are ideally 1-consistent, recovering the optimal solution
when the predictor is perfect. They are α(·)-robust for a slow growing function
α, ideally in the smaller possible rate – these algorithms can seamlessly handle
errors in the predictor. Finally, they are also worst-case competitive and, even if
the predictor completely fails, they perform as well as the best online algorithms
without getting hurt by the predictor’s inaccuracies.
Instantiating the framework to caching. To instantiate the framework for the
caching problem, we need to define the oracle, the label space of the predic-
tions, and their semantics. The element space Z corresponds to the universe
of elements that may be requested. The input sequence σ = σ1, σ2, . . . , σn de-
termines the actual sequence of elements that are requested (fixed in advance
and oblivious to the choices of the algorithm but unknown to it). Each element
z(σi) ∈ Z has corresponding features x(σi) . These can encapsulate everything
that is known about z(σi) at the time i, for example, the times this element arrived
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in the past. The exact choice of X is orthogonal to our setting, though of course
richer features typically lead to smaller errors.
One of the design choices when adding ML advice to the problem is the ques-
tion of what to predict. For caching problems, a natural candidate is predicting
the next time a particular element is going to appear. When such predictions
are perfect, the online algorithm can recover the best offline optimum [22]. For-
mally, the label space Y is a set of positions in the sequence, Y = N+. Given a
sequence σ, y(σi) = mint>i{τ : x(σt) = x(σi)}. If the element is never seen again, we
set y(σi) = n + 1. Note that y(σi) is completely determined by sequence σ. We use
h(σi) to denote the outcome of the prediction on an element with features x(σi).
4.3 Blindly following the predictor is insufficient
Before describing our algorithm, we show that combining the predictions with
ideas from competitive analysis is to a large extent essential; blindly evicting the
element that is predicted the furthest in the future by the predictor or simple
modifications of this idea can result to poor performance both with respect to
robustness and competitiveness.
Evicting element predicted the furthest in the future. An immediate way to
use the predictor is to treat its output as truth and optimize based on the whole
predicted sequence. This corresponds to the Be´la´dy rule that evicts the element
predicted to appear the furthest in the future. We refer to this algorithm as algo-
rithm B (as it follows the Be´la´dy rule). Since this rule achieves offline optimality,
this approach achieves the consistency desideratum, i.e. if the predictor is perfect,
87
this algorithm is ex-post optimal. Unfortunately this approach does not have
similarly nice performance with respect to the other two desiderata. With respect
to robustness, the degradation with the average error of the predictor is far from
the best possible, while a completely unreliable predictor leads to unbounded
competitive ratios, far from the ones of the best online algorithm.
Theorem 4.1. The competitive ratio of -assisted algorithm B is CRB,`1() = Ω().
This means that when the error of the predictor is much worse than the offline
optimum, the competitive ratio becomes unbounded. With respect to robustness,
the rate of decay is far from optimal as we will see in Section 4.4.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We show that for every , there exist a sequence σ and a
predictor h such that the absolute error η1(h, σ) ≤  · OPT while the competitive
ratio of algorithm B is ( − 1)/2. For ease of presentation, assume that  > 3.
Consider a cache of size k = 2 and three elements a, b, c; the initial config-
uration of cache is a, c. The sequence consists of repetitions of the following
sequence with  − 1 requests. The actual sequence will be abcbcbc . . . (a appears
once and then b and c appear alternately for ( − 1)/2 times).
In any repetition, the predictor accurately predicts the arrival time of all
elements apart from two: i) when element a arrives, it predicts it to arrive again
in the next step (instead of in the first step of the next repetition) and ii) when
b arrives for the last time in one repetition, it predicts it to arrive again in the
fourth position of the next repetition (instead of the second). As a result, the
absolute error of the predictor is  ( − 2 error in the a-misprediction and 2 error
in the b-misprediction).
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The optimal solution has two mistakes per repetition (one to bring a in the
cache and one to directly evict it afterwards). Instead, the algorithm never
evicts a as it is predicted to arrive much earlier than the other, and therefore has
 − 1 cache misses. This means that the competitive ratio of this algorithm is
Ω(η1(h, σ)/OPT(σ)) which completes the proof. 
Evicting elements with proven wrong predictions. The problem in the above
algorithm is that algorithm B keeps too much faith in predictions that have been
already proven to be wrong (as the corresponding elements are predicted to
arrive in the past). It is tempting to ”fix” the issue by evicting any element whose
predicted time has passed, and evict again the element predicted the furthest
in the future if no such element exists. We call this algorithmW as it takes care
of wrong predictions. Formally, let h( j, t) denote the last prediction about z j at
or prior to time t. At time t algorithmW evicts an arbitrary item from the set
S t = { j : h( j, t) < t} if S t , ∅ and argmaxzi∈Cache(t) h(i, t) otherwise. We show that
algorithmW has similarly bad performance guarantees.
Theorem 4.2. The competitive ratio of -assisted algorithmW is CRW,`1() = Ω().
Proof. Consider a cache of size k = 3 and four elements a, b, c, d; the initial
configuration of cache is a, b, c and then d arrives. The actual sequence consists
of repetitions of the following sequence with (/2) + 1 requests (for ease of
presentation, assume that  > 6). The actual sequence is dabcabc . . . and is
denoted by σ.
In any repetition, the predictor h accurately predicts the arrival time of ele-
ment d but always makes mistake in elements a, b, c by predicting them to arrive
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two time steps earlier. As a result, the absolute error of the predictor is  (error of
2 for any of the appearances of a, b, c).
The optimal solution has two mistakes per repetition (one to bring element
d and one to evict it afterwards). Instead the algorithm always evicts elements
a, b, c because they are predicted earlier than their actual arrival and are therefore
evicted as ”wrong” predictions. This means that the competitive ratio of this
algorithm is also Ω(η1(h, σ)/OPT(σ)) which completes the proof. 
Beyond blindly trusting the predictor. The common problem in both exam-
ples is that there is an element that should be removed but the algorithm is tricked
into keeping it in the cache. To deal with this in practice, popular heuristics such
as LRU (Least Recently Used) and FIFO (First In First Out) avoid evicting recent
elements when some elements have been dormant for a long time. This tends
to utilize nice locality properties leading to strong empirical performance (es-
pecially for LRU and its variant, LRU-2). However, such heuristics impose a
strict eviction policy which leads to weak performance guarantees. Moreover,
incorporating the information provided by the predictor becomes complicated.
Competitive analysis has also built on the idea of evicting dormant elements
via developing algorithms with stronger theoretical guarantees such as Marker.
In Section 4.4, we show how to incorporate predictions in the Marker algorithm to
enhance its performance when the predictions are good while retaining the worst-
case guarantees. Interestingly, via our framework, we can provide improved
guarantees for the aforementioned heuristics such as LRU, improving their worst-
case guarantees while retaining their practical performance (see Section 4.5).
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4.4 Main result: Predictive Marker algorithm
We now present our main technical contribution, a prediction-based adaptation
of the Marker algorithm [52]. This -assisted algorithm gets a competitive ratio
of 2 ·min(O(√, 2Hk) where Hk = 1+ 12 + · · ·+ 1k denotes the k-th Harmonic number.
Classic Marker algorithm. We begin by recalling the Marker algorithm and
the analysis of its performance. The algorithm runs in phases. At the beginning
of each phase, all elements are unmarked. When an element arrives and is
already in the cache, the element is marked. If it is not in the cache, a random
unmarked element is evicted, the newly arrived element is placed in the cache
and is marked. Once all elements are marked and a new cache miss occurs, the
phase ends and we unmark all of the elements.
For the purposes of analysis, an element is called clean in phase r if it appears
during phase r, but does not appear during phase r − 1. In contrast, elements
that also appeared in the previous phase are called stale. The marker algorithm
has competitive ratio of 2Hk − 1 and the analysis is tight [1]. We use a slightly
simpler analysis that achieves competitive ratio of 2Hk below. The crux of the
upper bound lies in two claims. The first relates the performance of the optimal
offline algorithm to the total number of clean elements Q across all phases.
Claim 4.1 ([52]). Let Q be the number of clean elements. Then the optimal
algorithm suffers at least Q/2 cache misses.
The second comes from bounding the performance of the algorithm as a
function of the number of clean elements.
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Claim 4.2 ([52]). Let Q be the number of clean elements. Then the expected
number of cache misses of the marker algorithm is Q · Hk.
Predictive Marker. The algorithm of [52] is part of a larger family of marking
algorithms, which never evict marked elements when there are unmarked ele-
ments present. Any algorithm in this family has a worst case competitive ratio of
k. Therefore pairing predictions with a marking style algorithm would avoid the
pathological examples we saw previously.
A natural approach is to use predictions for tie-breaking, specifically evicting
the element whose predicted next appearance time is furthest in the future. When
the predictor is perfect (and has zero error), the stale elements never result in
cache misses, and therefore, by Claim 4.1, the algorithm has a competitive ratio
of 2. On the other hand, by using the Marker algorithm and not blindly trusting
the oracle, we can guarantee a worst-case competitive ratio of k.
We extend this direction to further reduce the worst-case competitive ratio to
O(Hk). To achieve this, we combine the prediction-based tie-breaking rule with
the random tie-breaking rule. Suppose an element e is evicted during the phase.
We construct a blame graph to understand the reason why e is evicted. There are
two cases: either it was evicted when a clean element c arrived, then we add a
directed edge from e to c. Alternatively, it was evicted because a stale element s
arrived, but s was previously evicted. In this case, we add a directed edge from e
to s. Note that the graph is always a set of chains (paths). The total length of the
chains represents the total number of evictions incurred by the algorithm during
the phase, whereas the number of distinct chains represents the number of clean
elements. We call the lead element in every chain representative and denote it by
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ω(r, c), where r is the index of the phase and c the index of the chain in the phase.
Our modification is simple – when a stale element arrives, it evicts a new
element in a prediction-based manner if the chain containing it has length less
than Hk. Otherwise it evicts a random unmarked element. (Looking ahead to
the analysis, this switch to uniform evictions results in at most Hk additional
elements added to any chain during the course of the phase. This guarantees
that the competitive ratio is at most O(Hk) in expectation; we make the argument
formal in Theorem 4.3. The key to the analysis is the fact that the chains are
disjoint, thus the interactions between evictions can be decomposed cleanly. We
give a formal version of the algorithm in Algorithm 5. For simplicity, we drop
dependence on σ from the notation.
Analysis. To analyze the performance of the proposed algorithm, we begin
with a technical definition that captures how slowly a loss function ` can grow.
Definition 4.7. Let AT = a1, a2, . . . , aT , be a sequence of increasing integers of length
T , that is a1 < a2 < . . . < aT , and BT = b1, b2, . . . , bT a sequence of non-increasing
reals of length T , b1 ≤ b2 ≤ . . . ≤ bT . For a fixed loss function `, we define its spread
S ` : N+ → R+ as:
S `(m) = min{T : min
AT ,BT
`(AT , BT ) ≥ m}
The following Lemma instantiates the spread metric for loss metrics we
consider and is proved in the Appendix C.
Lemma 4.1. For absolute loss, `1(A, B) =
∑
i |ai − bi|, the spread of `1 is S `1(m) ≤
√
5m. For squared loss, `2(A, B) =
∑
i(ai − bi)2, the spread of `2 is S `2(m) ≤ 3
√
14m.
We now prove the main theorem of this chapter.
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Algorithm 5: Predictive Marker
Require: Cache C of size k initially empty (C ← ∅).
1: Initialize phase r ← 1, unmark all elements (M← ∅), and set round i← 1.
2: Initialize clean element counter qr ← 0 and tracking set S ← ∅.
3: Element zi arrives, receive prediction hi, and save prediction p(zi)← hi.
4: if zi results in cache hit or the cache is not full (zi ∈ C or |C| < k)
5: Add to cache C ← C ∪ {zi} without evicting any element and go to step 22
6: if the cache is full and all cache elements are marked (|M| = k)
7: Increase phase (r ← r + 1), initialize clean counter (qr ← 0)
8: Save current cache (C → S) as set of elements possibly stale in new phase
9: Unmark elements (M← ∅).
10: if zi is a clean element (zi < S)
11: Increase number of clean elements: qr ← qr + 1.
12: Initialize size of new clean chain: n(r, qr)← 1.
13: Evict unmarked element with highest prediction: e = argmaxz∈C−M p(z).
14: if zi is a stale element (zi ∈ S)
15: It is the representative of some clean chain, let c be this chain: zi = ω(r, c).
16: Increase length of the clean chain n(r, c)← n(r, c) + 1.
17: if n(r, c) ≤ Hk
18: Evict unmarked element with highest prediction: e = argmaxz∈C−M p(z).
19: else Evict a random unmarked element e ∈ C −M.
20: Update cache by evicting e: C ← C ∪ {zi} − {e}.
21: Set e as representative for the chain: ω(r, c)← e.
22: Mark new element (M←M∪ {zi}), increase round (i← i + 1), go to step 3.
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Theorem 4.3. Let a loss function ` with spread bounded by S `. If S ` is concave,
the competitive ratio of -assisted Predictive Marker PM is bounded by:
CRPM,`() ≤ 2 ·min (1 + 2S ` () , 2Hk) .
To prove this theorem, we first introduce an analogue of Claim 4.2, which
decomposes the total cost into that incurred by each of the chains individually.
To aid in our analysis, we consider the following marking algorithm, which
we call SM (Special Marking). Initially we simply evict an arbitrary unmarked
element. At some point, the adversary designates an arbitrary element not
in the cache as special. For the rest of the phase, upon a cache miss, if the
arriving element is special, the algorithm evicts a random unmarked element and
designates the evicted element as special. If the arriving element is not special,
the algorithm proceeds as before, evicting an arbitrary unmarked element.
Lemma 4.2. Using algorithm SM, in expectation at most Hk special elements
cause cache misses per phase.
Proof. Consider the unmarked elements in the cache that never reappear during
the phase. If one of these is designated special, it will not cause another cache
miss before the end of the phase. We turn our analysis to elements that will
re-appear during the phase.
Let A denote the subset of these elements that may become special; this set
dynamically shrinks over time as elements appear and become marked. At the
time the first special element causes a cache miss, these are the elements that are
not already marked in the cache that will reappear during the phase, as well as
those outside the cache that will appear before the end of the phase. Order the
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elements in A in decreasing order of their first arrival time. Observe that at the
outset A contains at most k − 1 elements.
For any i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, we define Ei as the event that an element becomes
special when it is the i-th element in the active ordering. Our goal is to show that:
Pr[Ei] ≤ 1i + 1 . (4.1)
A key to the analysis is the fact that once event Ei occurs, only elements
arriving even later (i.e. those with lower index in the active set) can become
special. Therefore, given Equation (4.1), we can bound the expected number of
misses caused by special elements as:
1 +
k−1∑
i=1
1
i + 1
= Hk,
where the first term is due to the first special element arriving, the the second
term is due to the events E1 through Ek−1.
Consider the last time an element becomes special while there are more than
i elements in the active ordering; let ω be the special element. As we argued
above, until this point Ei could not have occurred.
Now consider the time that ω re-appears. If there are exactly i elements in
the active set, the probability that Ei occurs is bounded by 1i+1 . We may have
selected either one of the first i active elements, or an element in the cache that
never appears before the end of the phase (at least one such element must exist,
otherwise there are no cache misses during the phase). If there are fewer than i
elements, the probability of Ei occurring is 0. 
We now provide the lemma that lies in the heart of our robustness property.
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Lemma 4.3. For any loss metric `, any phase r, the expected length of any chain
is at most 1 + S`(ηr,c) where ηr,c is the cumulative error of the predictor on the
elements in the chain and S` is the spread of the loss metric.
Proof. The clean element that initiates the clean chain evicts one of the unmarked
elements upon arrival. Since it does so based on the Belady rule, it evicts the
element s1 that is predicted to reappear the latest in the future. If the predictor
is perfect, this element will never appear in this phase. If, on the other hand, s1
comes back (is a stale element) let s2 be the element it evicts, which is predicted
to arrive the furthest among the current unmarked elements.
Suppose there are m such evictions: s1, s2, . . . , sm. The elements were predicted
to arrive in reverse order of their evictions. This is because elements s j for j > i
were unmarked and in the cache when element si got evicted; therefore si was
predicted to arrive later. However, the actual arrival order is the reverse. If
ηr,c is the total error of these elements, setting the actual arriving times as the
sequence AT and the predicted ones as the sequence BT in the definition of spread
(Definition 4.7), it means that m ≤ S `(ηr,c). 
Combining the two above lemmas, we can obtain a bound on the expected
length of any chain.
Lemma 4.4. For any loss metric `, any phase r, the expected length of any chain is
at most min(1+ 2S`(ηr,c), 2 log k) where ηr,c is the cumulative error of the predictor
on the elements in the chain and S` is the spread of the loss metric.
Proof. The proof follows from combining the two above lemmas. By Lemma 4.2,
if the chain switches to random evictions, it incurs another Hk cache misses in
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expectation after the switch point (and its length increases by the same amount),
capping the total length by 2Hk ≤ 2 log k. If the chain does not switch to random
evictions, it has Belady evictions and, by Lemma 4.3, it incurs at most S`(ηr,c)
misses from stale elements. 
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Fix an arbitrary sequence of arrivals. Let Q be the number
of clean elements (and therefore also chains). Any cache miss corresponds to
a particular eviction in one clean chain; there are no cache misses not charged
to a chain by construction. By Lemma 4.4, we can bound the evictions from
clean chain c of the r-th phase by min(1+ 2 · S `(ηr,c), 2 log k). Since both S ` and the
minimum operator are concave functions, the way to maximize the length of
chains is to apportion the total error, η, equally across all of the chains. Thus for
a given error η and number Q of clean chains, the competitive ratio is maximized
when the error in each chain is ηr,c = η/Q each. The total number of stale elements
is then: Q ·min(2 · S `(η/Q), 2Hk). By Claim 4.1, Q2 ≤ OPT(σ), implying the result
since OPT ≤ Q. 
We now specialize the results for the absolute and squared losses.
Corollary 4.1. The competitive ratio of -assisted Predictive Marker with respect
to the absolute loss metric `1 is bounded by CRPM,`1() ≤ min
(
2 + 2 · √5, 4Hk
)
.
Corollary 4.2. The competitive ratio of -assisted Predictive Marker with respect
to the absolute loss metric `2 is bounded by CRPM,`1() ≤ min
(
2 + 2 · 3√14, 4Hk
)
.
On the robustness rate of Predictive Marker. We show that our analysis is
tight: any marking algorithm that uses the predictor in a deterministic way
cannot achieve an improved guarantee with respect to robustness.
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Theorem 4.4. Any deterministic -assisted marking algorithmA, that only uses
the predictor in tie-breaking among unmarked elements in a deterministic fash-
ion, has a competitive ratio worse than CRA,`() = Ω(S `()) for all  < k2.
Proof. Consider a cache of size k with k+1 elements. We will construct an instance
that exhibits the above lower bound. SinceA uses marking, we can decompose
its analysis into phases. Let σ be the request sequence, and assume that we do
not have any repetition of an item inside the phase; as a result the i-th element of
phase r corresponds to element σ(r−1)k+i.
Suppose the predictor is always accurate on elements 2 through k−S `()+1 in
each phase. For the last S `()−1 elements of phase r as well as the first element of
the of the next phase, the elements are predicted to come again at the beginning
of the subsequent phase, at time t = rk + 1. Since the algorithm is deterministic,
we order the elements so that their evictions are in reverse order of their arriving
time. By the definition of spread, the error of the predictor in these elements is
exactly  and the algorithm incurs a cache miss for each. On the other hand, the
offline optimum has only 1 miss per phase, which concludes the proof. 
Theorem 4.4 establishes that the analysis of Predictive Marker is tight with
respect to the rate of robustness, and suggests that algorithms that use the
predictor in a deterministic manner may suffer from similar rates. However, a
natural question that comes up is whether a better rate can be achieved using
by a randomized marking algorithm better utilizing the predictor. Note that our
algorithm uses randomization only once a competitive ratio of log k is already
incurred. We conjecture that a rate of log(1+
√
) with respect to the absolute loss
is possible, similar to the exponential improvement randomized schemes obtain
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over the deterministic guarantees of k with respect to worst-case competitiveness.
4.5 Practical traits of the algorithm
In this section, we discuss some traits that make the algorithm more practical.
In particular, we prove that our algorithm makes the errors of the predictor
only have local negative effect and prevent them from propagating further.
Subsequently, we show that common heuristic approaches, such as LRU, can be
used as predictors in our framework. This allows us to combine their predictive
power with robust guarantees when they fail.
Locality. The guarantee in Theorem 4.3 bounds the competitive ratio as a
function of the quality of the prediction. One potential concern is that if the
predictions have of a small number of very large errors, then the applicability of
Predictive Marker may be quite limited.
Here we show that this is not the case. Due to the phase-based nature of
the analysis, the algorithm essentially “resets” at the end of every phase, and
therefore the errors incurred one phase do not carry over to the next. Moreover,
the competitive ratio in every phase is bounded by O(Hk).
Formally, for any sequence σ, we can define phases that consist of exactly
k distinct elements. Let CL(r, σ) be the number of clean elements in phase r of
sequence σ, and let η`,r(h, σ) denote the error of predictor h restricted only to
elements occurring in phase r.
Theorem 4.5. Consider a loss function ` with spread S `. If S ` is concave, the
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competitive ratio of Predictive Marker PM at sequence σ when assisted by a
predictor h is at most:
CRPM,` ≤
∑
r CL(r, σ) ·min(1 + 2S `(η`,r(h, σ), 2Hk)∑
r CL(r, σ)
Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemma 4.4 and applying Jensen’s inequal-
ity only within the chains of the phase (instead of also across phases as we did in
Theorem 4.3). 
This theorem illustrates a very nice property of our algorithm. If the predictor
h is really bad for a particular chunk of time (has big locality in its errors) then
the clean chains of the corresponding badly predicted phases will contribute
the second term (the logarithmic worst-case guarantee) but the other phases
will provide enhanced performance utilizing the predictor’s advice. In this way,
the algorithm adapts to the quality of the predictions, and bad errors do not
propagate beyond the end of a phase. This quality is useful in caching where most
patterns are generally well predicted but there are few unforeseen sequences.
Robustifying LRU. Another practical property of our algorithm is that it can
seamlessly incorporate heuristics known to perform well in practice. In particular,
the popular Least Recently Used (LRU) algorithm can be expressed within the
Predictive Marker framework. Consider the following predictor h: when an
element σi arrives at time i, h predicts next arrival time h(σi) = −i.1
Note that, by doing so, at any point of time, among the elements that are in
the cache, the element predicted the furthest in the future is exactly the one that
1If we prefer positive numbers in the predictions, we can select h(σi) = T − i where T is the
number of requests.
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has appeared the least recently. Also note that any marked element needs to have
arrived later than any unmarked element. As a result, if we never switched to
random evictions (or had k in the RHS of line 17 in Algorithm 5), the Predictive
Marker algorithm assisted with the LRU predictor is exactly the LRU algorithm.
The nice thing that comes from this observation is that we can robustify the
analysis of LRU. LRU, and its variants like LRU(2), tend to have very good
empirical performance as using the recency of requests is a good predictor about
how future requests will arise. However, the worst-case guarantee of LRU is
unfortunately of the order of k since it is after all a deterministic algorithm. By
expressing LRU as a predictor in the Predictive Marker framework and using
a switching point of Hk for each clean chain, we exploit most of this predictive
power while also guaranteeing a logarithmic worst-case bound on it.
4.6 Remarks
More information about the paper. The results presented in this chapter are
joint work with Sergei Vassilvitskii [95]. In the paper, we also discuss further how
to trade off worst-case competitiveness for enhanced robustness by adapting
the switching threshold. Moreover, we show a general construction that can
combine an algorithm that is robust with one that is worst-case competitive
via multiple restarts of the algorithm. Although this construction is not very
practical, it suggests that the biggest bottleneck in designing algorithms with
our aforementioned desiderata lies in deriving algorithms that are robust, i.e.
gracefully degrade with the error of the predictor. Finally, we show that our
algorithm has good empirical performance, outperforming both LRU and Marker
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even without any modification in very simple datasets.
More generally on online algorithms with predictions. Our work has initi-
ated a line of work that studies the design of online algorithms that are aided
with a machine learned predictor and want to obtain improved guarantees when
the prediction is accurate while being robust to imperfections. Follow-up works
focus on dealing with such imperfections in predictions in online settings such
as ski rental or job scheduling by Purohit et al. [107] and Mitzenmacher [99].
Beyond online algorithms, there have been a few works nicely injecting pre-
dictions in decision-making tasks. Medina and Vassilvitskii [97] show how to
use such predictions in revenue optimization. Kraska et al. [84] demonstrate em-
pirically that introducing machine learned components to classical algorithms (in
their case index lookups) can result in significant speed and storage gains. Finally,
Rakhlin and Sridharan [110] show how to enhance online learning guarantees
when the losses can be predicted in a relatively accurate way.
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CHAPTER 5
DYNAMIC PRICING IN RIDESHARING
Another place where state becomes important is ridesharing. When Uber or Lyft
match a particular driver to a customer, the driver moves with the customer to
her desired destination. This changes the underlying state of the system and
may create an undesired spatial mismatch between supply (drivers) and demand
(customers). To deal with this mismatch, the platforms have at their disposal
some control levers such as pricing that can help them modulate the process.
Classical competitive analysis paradigms can apply in the above scenario but
often disregard crucial complexities that are first-order effects in these systems.
One such paradigm is the k-server problem (it extends the caching problem
which we discussed in the previous chapter). There, requests arrive in different
locations and the platform needs to send servers to deal with them aiming to
minimize the aggregate delay. This captures the spatial component of ridesharing
systems but optimizes a largely irrelevant objective: platforms typically do not
aim to serve all users under high stress. Instead they care about objectives such
as throughput (how many customers got served), social welfare (how much
value their service created to society), or revenue (how much money the platform
gained). Another classical competitive analysis paradigm is bipartite matching
which also captures an important effect: matching a customer to a driver makes
the latter unavailable to future requests. However, this paradigm ignores future
network effects as the driver will eventually become again available to serve
demand possibly in a different location. Finally, most competitive analysis results
target worst-case arrival sequences, while in a ridesharing system there is much
well-behaved stochasticity.
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In this chapter, we depart from competitive analysis and develop a general
queueing-theoretic framework capturing the stochasticity in user requests. Fo-
cusing on the steady-state performance of the system, we obtain approximation
guarantees in such ridesharing systems via appropriately pricing different rides.
Our queueing-theoretic approach for the setting is motivated by classical works
on controls in state-dependent stochastic processes. This approach allows us
to model most of the first-order effects in these systems such as the ones we
discussed in the previous paragraph. Interestingly, our guarantees are also
parametric and become better as the ratio of drivers to locations increases; they
achieve asymptotic optimality and provide effective approximation guarantees
for the real parameters of the systems. In particular, consider a ridesharing
system with m drivers and n distinct locations (for instance, corresponding to
Uber’s Hexagonal Hierarchical Spatial Index). In this system, the approximation
guarantee of our approach is 1 + (n − 1)/m, which is typically very close to 1 as
there are significantly more drivers than locations in these systems.
5.1 Preliminaries on pricing without state
Myopic agents. The classical way to think about pricing is via assuming distri-
butional knowledge about the values of the customers (demand elasticity). In
the simplest setting, we wish to sell a digital good to a customer; this allows us to
not care about future effects as digital goods have infinite supply. Let’s assume
that the customer has a value V drawn from a distribution F(·). Upon arrival, we
can quote a price p and the customer is myopic, i.e. buys the good if her value is
above the price (V ≥ p) or leaves the system otherwise.
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In the next section, we will extend this scenario in the settings where this
decision may also impose future network state externalities to other users. In
particular, we will assume that riders behave as myopic agents. They have a value
to go from a source location to a destination. When quoted a price lower than
their value, they pay it and perform the ride. The network externality component
comes from the fact that this can only happen if there exist an available vehicles
in the source location; this complicates the setting as we see in Section 5.2.
Revenue management without state. Coming back to the simpler setting, a
natural question is: What is the price that optimizes our expected revenue? To answer
the above question, we need to consider the two opposite forces that arise in this
process. On the one hand, putting a higher price p increases the likelihood that
we end up disswaying the customer from making the purchase – the purchase
only happens with probability 1 − F(p). On the other hand, condtioned on him
buying, a higher price means more revenue as we cash the price p. As a result, to
optimize revenue, we need to find the price p that optimizes p · (1 − F(p)).
Pricing for other objectives. Similarly, if we wanted to optimize throughput,
we would need to select the price that optimizes 1 · (1 − F(p)) and clearly this
corresponds to the smallest possible price so that all users want to buy the
good at this price. Last, if we wanted to optimize social welfare, we would
want to select the price that would optimize the expected value of the customer
EV∼F[V1V≥p] = E[V |V ≥ p] · (1−F(p)). Again, in this case this is trivially optimized
in the smallest possible price as it allows more users to buy. More generally,
all these reward functions have the form: R˜(p) = I˜(p) · (1 − F(p)), where I˜(p)
corresponds to the expected reward from a customer conditioned on selling and
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is instantiated as following for different objectives:
• Throughput: I˜T (p) = 1.
• Social welfare: I˜W(p) = EV∼F[V |V ≥ p].
• Revenue: I˜R(p) = p.
Quantiles and concave reward assumption. It is easier to express this quantity
with respect to the inverse demand or quantile q = 1−F(p). This denotes the fraction
of customers who accept price p. For ease of presentation we assume that the
density of F is positive everywhere in its domain (for which we only assume
that it is contiguous and intersects with (0,∞)), implying that there is a 1-1
mapping between prices and quantiles. As F is therefore invertible, we can write
p = F−1(1 − q). This allows us to abuse notation throughout this chapter by using
prices and quantiles interchangeably. Further, we define F(∞) = 1, that is, we
assume we can set a price high enough so that an arbitrarily small (or even 0)
fraction of customers is willing to pay it.
The reward function that the platform optimizes can be rewritten as a function
of quantiles as: R(q) = q · I(q) where I(q) is the quantile-equivalent of I˜(p) and
corresponds again to the expected reward from a customer conditioned on selling.
For the previous objectives, it is instantiated as:.
• Throughput: IT (q) = 1.
• Social welfare: IW(q) = EV∼Fi j
[
V |F(V) ≥ 1 − q].
• Revenue: IR(q) = F−1(1 − q).
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We refer to R(q) as the reward curve of the function for its reward objective
of interest (analogous to the notion of revenue curves; cf. [66]). Our framework
applies generally to any objective that satisfies the condition that R(q) are concave
in q, implying that I(q) are non-increasing in q. Note that this always holds for
throughput and welfare; for revenue, distributions fulfilling the condition are
referred to as regular distributions (cf. Appendix D.1)).
5.2 Pricing as a control in queueing-theoretic networks
In ridesharing, pricing decisions are more complex as they affect each other
through network supply externalities. In particular, a customer wishing to move
between locations i to j does not only contribute to the objective directly but may
also help future customers at j by moving the driver there (if the ride occurs).
Model. We therefore consider a system with m units (drivers or vehicles) and n
nodes (locations or stations). Customers traveling between nodes i and j arrive
at node i according to a Poisson process of rate φi j. As in the previous section,
each customer traveling from i to j has a value drawn independently from a
distribution Fi j(·). We assume that Fi j has a density and that each customer has
a positive value with some probability, i.e. Fi j(0) < 1; all the other assumptions
made in the previous section continue to hold for the value distributions. Upon
arrival at i, a customer is quoted a price pi j, and engages a unit to travel to j if her
value exceeds this price, i.e. with probability 1 − Fi j(pi j), and if at least one unit
is available at node i; else she leaves the system immediately. If a ride occurs, the
unit moves to j and the customer leaves the system thereafter.
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A continuous-time Markov chain tracks the number of units across nodes.
At time t ≥ 0, the state of the Markov chain X(t) = (X1(t), . . . , Xn(t)) contains the
number of units Xi(t) present at each node i. The state space of the system is
denoted by Sn,m =
{
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Nn0|
∑
i xi = m
}
. Throughout the chapter we use
X(t), Xi(t) to indicate random variables, and x, xi to denote specific elements of the
state space. Note that the state-space is finite and |Sn,m| =
(
m+n−1
n−1
)
= Ω(mn).1 Since
our focus is on the long-run average performance, i.e. system performance under
the steady state of the Markov chain, we henceforth suppress the dependence
on t for ease of notation. For ease of presentation, we assume that rides between
nodes occur without delay.2 In the context of our model, this translates into an
instantaneous state transition from X to X − ei + e j when a customer engages a
unit to travel from i to j (where ei denotes the ith canonical unit vector).
Pricing policies and objectives. We consider pricing policies that select point-
to-point prices pi j as a function of the overall state X. Formally, given arrival
rates and demand elasticities {φi j, Fi j(·)}, we want to design a pricing policy
p(·) = {pi j(·)}, where each pi j : Sn,m → R ∪ {±∞}maps the state to a price for a ride
between i and j. Equivalently, we want to select quantiles q(·) = {qi j} where each
qi j : Sn,m → [0, 1]. For a fixed pricing policy p with corresponding quantiles q,
the effective demand stream from i to j (i.e. customers traveling from node i to j
with value exceeding pi j) thus follows a (state-dependent) Poisson process with
rate φi jqi j(X). This follows from the notion of probabilistic thinning of a Poisson
process – the rate of customers wanting to travel from i to j is a Poisson process
of rate φi j, and each customer is independently willing to pay pi j with probability
1Every state corresponds to a placement of n − 1 stripes in between m circles with the number
of units at node k corresponding to the number of circles in between the (k−1)-th and k-th stripe).
2In the paper we drop this assumption as we discuss in Section 5.6.
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qi j = 1 − Fi j(pi j). State-dependent prices also allow us to capture unavailability
by defining qi j(x) = 0 if xi = 0 (i.e. a customer with origin i is always turned away
if there are no units at that station; recall we defined Fi j(∞) = 1). Thus, a pricing
policy p, along with arrival rates and demand elasticities {φi j, Fi j(·)}, determines
the transitions of the Markov chain. Note that this is a finite-state Markov chain,
and furthermore, is irreducible under weak assumptions on the prices and the
demand (cf. Appendix D.2); hence, it has a unique steady-state distribution pi(·)
with pi(x) ≥ 0∀ x ∈ Sn,m and ∑x∈Sn,m pi(x) = 1.
Our goal is to design a pricing policy p to maximize the steady-state perfor-
mance under various objectives. In particular, we consider objective functions
that decompose into per-ride reward functions Ii j : R→ R, which correspond to
the reward obtained from a customer engaging a ride between stations i and j at
price pi j. This can be instantiated for canonical objectives such as throughput,
social welfare and revenue as in the previous section. For a given objective, our
aim is to select a pricing policy p, equivalently quantiles q, that maximizes the
steady-state rate of reward accumulation, given by
OBJm(q) =
∑
x∈Sn,m
pi(x)·
(∑
i, j
φi j·qi j(x)·Ii j(qi j(x))) = ∑
x∈Sn,m
pi(x)·
(∑
i, j
φi j·Ri j(qi j(x))). (5.1)
Intuitively, Equation (5.1) captures that at any node i, customers destined for j
arrive via a Poisson process with rate φi j, and find the system in state x ∈ Sn,m
with probability pi(x). They are then quoted a price pi j(x) (corresponding to
quantile qi j(x)), and engage a ride with probability qi j(x). The resulting ride
then contributes in expectation Ii j(qi j(x)) to the objective function. Recall that
unavailability of units is captured by our assumption that qi j(x) = 0 whenever
xi = 0. Notice that the component of Equation (5.1) that captures the flow of units
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traveling from i to j can be written as
fi j,m(q) =
∑
x∈Sn,m
pi(x) · φi j · qi j(x). (5.2)
State-independent pricing and closed queueing models. The Markov chain
described in Section 5.2 has the structure of a closed queueing network (cf. [121, 77]),
a well-studied class of models in applied probability (closed refers to the fact
that the number of units remains constant; in open networks, units may arrive
and depart from the system). Our analysis crucially relies on some classical
results from the queuing theory literature, which we review in this section. Our
presentation here closely resembles that of Serfozo [121]. One particular class of
pricing policies is that of state-independent policies, wherein we set point-to-point
prices {pi j}which do not react to the state of the system. As a consequence, we
have a constant rate of units departing from any node i (at any time t when
Xi(t) > 0); this rate is independent of the network state. The resulting model is a
special case of a closed queueing model proposed by Gordon and Newell [60].
Definition 5.1. A Gordon-Newell network is a continuous-time Markov chain on
states x ∈ Sn,m, in which for any state x and any i, j ∈ [n], the chain transitions from x
to x − ei + e j at a rate Pi jµi1{xi(t)>0}, where µi > 0 is referred to as the service rate at node
i, and P ≥ 0 as the routing probabilities satisfying ∑ j Pi j = 1.
In other words, if units are present at a node i in state x, then departures from
that node occur according to a Poisson distribution with rate µi > 0; conditioning
on a departure, the destination j is chosen according to state-independent routing
probabilities Pi j.
The Markovian dynamics resulting from state-independent pricing policies
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fulfill the conditions of Gordon-Newell networks: fixing a price pi j (with corre-
sponding qi j) results in a Poisson process with rate φi jqi j of arriving customers
willing to pay price pi j. These customers engage a unit only if one is available, else
leave the system. Thus, given quantiles q, the time to a departure from node i
is distributed exponentially with rate µi =
∑
j φi jqi j when Xi > 0 and with rate 0
otherwise. Further, conditioned on an arriving customer having value at least
equal to the quoted price, the probability that the customer’s destination is j, is
Pi j = φi jqi j/
∑
k φikqik, independent of system state.
Unlike state-dependent policies that can be very complex, state-independent
policies are easier to reason about. In particular, one advantage of consider-
ing state-independent policies (and drawing connections with Gordon-Newell
networks) is that the resulting steady-state distribution
{
pip,m(x)
}
x∈Sn,m can be ex-
pressed in product form, as established by the Gordon-Newell theorem.
Theorem 5.1 (Gordon-Newell Theorem [60]). Consider an m-unit n-node Gordon-
Newell network with transition rates µi and routing probabilities Pi j. Let {wi}i∈[n]
denote the invariant distribution associated with the routing probability matrix{
Pi j
}
i, j∈[n], i.e. wi =
∑n
j=1 Pi jw j, and define the traffic intensity at node i as ri = wi/µi.
Then the stationary distribution is given by:
pi(x) =
1
Gm
n∏
j=1
(
r j
)x j
, (5.3)
where the Gordon-Newell normalization constant is Gm =
∑
x∈Sn,m
∏n
j=1
(
r j
)x j
.
To obtain some intuition for the form of Equation (5.3), consider a system
with just one unit. If µi is equal to 1 for all i, then wi exactly captures the stationary
distribution of a simple random walk with routing matrix P. Further, changing
µi at a node i does not affect how frequently the unit visits i, but it affects how
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much time the unit spends at i before departing again. The distribution above
can now be seen to be the occupancy distribution induced by m independent
random walks. For a formal proof of how this stationary distribution arises in
the case of the Gordon-Newell network, we refer the reader to Serfozo [121].
We now show how the Gordon-Newell theorem can simplify the objective in
Equation (5.1). Recall that for an m-unit system with state-independent policy p
(and corresponding quantiles q), we obtain a Gordon-Newell network with ser-
vice rate
∑
j φi jqi j and routing probabilities φi jqi j/
∑
k φikqik at node i. Let {pi(x)}x∈Sn,m
be the corresponding steady-state distribution. Since q is no longer a function
of the system state, we can no longer set qi = 0 when Xi = 0. Instead, we define
Ai,m(q) =
∑
x∈Sn,m pi(x)1{xi>0} as the steady-state availability of units at node i (i.e.
the probability in steady-state that at least one unit is present at node i). From
Equation (5.2), the state-independent steady-state rate of units moving from i to j
then simplifies to fi j,m(q) = Ai,m(q) · φi jqi j. Further, from Equation (5.3), one can
derive (see e.g. Proposition 1.33 and Equation 1.31 in [121])
Ai,m(q) = (Gm−1(q)/Gm(q)) · ri(q). (5.4)
Notice that ri(q) denotes the traffic intensity at node i under q. To see how
this is derived, note that the probability of at least one unit at i is given by
1
Gm(q)
∑
x∈Sn,m:xi>0
∏n
j=1
(
r j
)x j
. Now since each term in the summation has at least one
factor ri(q), we can pull that out, whereby the remaining summation corresponds
to configurations of m − 1 units over n nodes, thus adding up to Gm−1(q). Again,
we refer the reader to Serfozo [121] for a detailed proof. Now, the objective in
Equation (5.1) can be written as
OBJm(q) =
∑
i
Ai,m(q) ·
∑
j
φi jqi j · Ii j(qi j)
 = ∑
i
fi j,m(q)Ii j(qi j). (5.5)
To ease notation, we omit the explicit dependence on m when clear from context.
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The infinite-unit limit: The stationary distribution described above (for state-
independent pricing policies) holds for any finite m. Moreover, it can be shown
(cf. Theorem 3.18 in [121]) that as m → ∞, the stationary distribution of the
m-unit system (as specified in Equation (5.3)) converges in distribution to a
limiting distribution. The exact form of this limiting system is well understood
(cf. Section 3.7 in [121]), but not consequential for our work; one important fact to
note about the limiting distribution is the existence of a node with availability 1.
This captures the fact that in an infinite-unit system, at least one node must have
an infinite number of units. While an analytical proof of this result can be found
in Section 3.7 of [121], Lemma 5.6 can be interpreted as providing a combinatorial
proof. Combined with Equation (5.4), this gives the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2. Recall that given q = {qi j}, the quantities wi(q) and ri(q) are
independent of m. Then, given a policy with quantiles q, in the infinite-unit limit,
the steady-state availability of each node i is given by ri(q)/max j r j(q).
Proof. To see this note that for any m, the maximum availability node i? obeys
ri?(q) = max j r j(q). Recall thatGm(q) is the Gordon-Newell normalization constant
of Theorem 5.1 and also recall the relation describing the availability of a node
from Equation 5.4. As m→ ∞, the availability of the maximum availability node
goes to 1, i.e. (Gm−1(q)/Gm(q)) · ri?(q) → 1. We thus obtain that Gm−1(q)/Gm(q) →
1/r?i (q), which in turn implies that, as m→ ∞,
Ai,m(q) = (Gm−1(q)/Gm(q)) · ri(q)→ ri/ri?(q).

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5.3 Network state externalities make pricing more complicated
Before describing our analysis in Section 5.4, we take a step back to consider the
complications that these network externalities pose to the pricing task.
Ignoring state externalities can be problematic. As stressed before, the pricing
decisions in the aforementioned setting have a double effect. On the one hand,
they affect the reward we are getting from the current customer. On the other
hand, they may alter the state of the system (configuration of units across nodes).
Ignoring this second effect can lead to very suboptimal decisions even in very
simple examples. Consider a simple network with n = 3 nodes A, B,C and m = 1
unit. There is no demand between nodes A and C. The demand between most
other pairs of nodes is pretty high (φAB = φBA = φBC = 1). However, there is one
pair of nodes where this does not happen: demand wishing to move from C to
B is more anemic and is only φCB =  for some arbitrarily small  > 0. This is
shown in the following figure (where the weights of the edges correspond to the
demand that wants to move across the edges).
Suppose that we are interested in maximizing throughput. If we ignore the
network effect of the decisions, we should set a very low price to ensure that
any user that wants to move has value above the price. Hence, we would set
qAB = qBA = qBC = qCB = 1. We now quantify the throughput of the system under
this policy. The unit moves to C half the times it departs from B and, when this
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happens it remains there for a long time. Sending the unit to C is therefore a
suboptimal decision as it would have been much better to set a large price in the
direction B→ C to ensure that the unit never goes to C and get stuck there. As
a result, ignoring the network effects can lead to arbitrarily ineffective pricing
schemes.
Non-concavity of objective function. To make things worse, the objective func-
tion that takes into account the network effect is not concave in quantiles (or
prices) despite the fact that the reward curves are concave.
The intuition of the non-concavity can be seen in the same figure and comes
from the following three observations. (i) The throughput is small (of order )
when all quantiles are equal to 1. (ii) It is still almost as small when qBC = 1+2 and
the other quantiles are 1. (iii) It is large when qBC =  and the other quantiles are
1. This contradicts concavity as the objective at qBC = 1+2 is smaller than the mean
of the objectives at qBC = 1 and qBC =  (keeping the other quantiles constant).
Explaining in more detail, when qBC = 1, the single unit moves from B to C
about half the times it departs from B; the expected time before an arrival at C is
then equal to (1/), so it is not serving any rides for a long time. When qBC = 1+2
the unit still moves to C about one out of every three times it departs from B and
then spends a lot of time waiting for an arrival at C. However, if qBC = , it only
moves to C a fraction 1+ of the times it departs from B, canceling out the wait of
length 1/ at C. In that case, the throughput is equal to 2+3 (this also happens to
be the solution our Algorithm 6 in Section 5.4 returns). Note that this also implies
non-concavity in prices (e.g., if all passengers have uniform value distributions).
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5.4 Main result: Elevated Flow Relaxation framework
In this section, we introduce our approximation framework which provides
strong finite-unit performance guarantees. To convey the main ideas of our
analysis, we first apply it to the most vanilla setting: using pricing as a control
to maximize throughput. This is the only setting in which a finite guarantee
exists in the literature (due to Waserhole and Jost [125]); we reprove this result
with a different technique in order to illustrate the ingredients of our framework.
In the next section, we show two more results showing the applicability of our
framework. In fact, the framework is more widely applicable as we discuss in
Section 5.6; we refer the interested reader to the paper [17] for other applications
so that we do not confuse the presentation with many different models.
Even for the vanilla setting, there are two fundamental technical hurdles.
First, we want to compare against state-dependent pricing policies in which the
number of potentially distinct prices can be exponential in the number of units.
Second, even if we restrict to state-independent pricing policies, the resulting
problem is non-convex in the resulting quantiles as discussed in Section 5.3. We
circumvent these hurdles by introducing a convex relaxation that restricts the
policy search; in this setting the relaxation is the same as in [125]. The crux of
our technical contribution is a novel approximation framework consisting of
three steps. First, we bound the optimal objective by the objective of the convex
relaxation. Next, we relate the convex relaxation to a system with infinitely many
units. Finally, we compare the objective of a policy in the finite-unit system with
its performance in the infinite-unit system.
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Elevated Objective Function. We restrict our attention to state-independent
pricing policies which reduces the output of the program from an exponential
to a quadratic number of distinct prices (one for each source-destination pair).
Recall from Equation (5.5) that the steady-state objective for state-independent
policies can be written as
OBJm(q) =
∑
i, j
fi j,m(q) · Ii j(qi j)
where fi j,m(q) = Ai,m(q) · φi jqi j are the resulting steady-state rates of units, which
we also refer to as steady-state flows. For throughput, the objective is significantly
simplified as ITi j(qi j) = 1. Similarly, for a state-dependent policy, the objective is:
OBJm(q) =
∑
x∈S n,m
∑
i, j
fi j,m(q(x)) · Ii j(qi j(x))
Turning back our attention to state-independent policies, we first make
a distinction between actual quantiles qi j = 1 − Fi j(pi j) and effective quantiles
q̂i j = fi j,m(q)/φi j = Ai,m(q) · qi j. Whilst actual quantiles are in one-to-one corre-
spondence to prices, effective quantiles incorporate thinning both due to the
demand elasticity and due to the unavailability of units. Note that q̂i j ≤ qi j;
moreover, although any qi j ∈ [0, 1] can be induced via an appropriate price, not
all q̂i j can be realized by prices as effective quantiles (e.g., if m < n, not all effective
quantiles can be equal to 1). Since we assume that the per-ride rewards Ii j(·) are
non-increasing on the quantile space, we have Ii j(qi j) ≤ Ii j(̂qi j); for throughput
this holds with equality, since ITi j(·) = 1.
We now define the elevated objective function as
ÔBJ(q) =
∑
i, j
φi jqi jIi j(qi j) =
∑
i, j
φi jRi j(qi j). (5.6)
The elevated objective is essentially the objective of state-independent quantiles
q ignoring demand thinning due to unavailability. It has two useful properties:
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i) for all m and q, the elevated objective upper bounds the true objective function,
i.e. ÔBJ(q) ≥ OBJm(q), and ii) it is a concave function of q (since we focus on
objectives corresponding to concave reward curves Ri j(·)).
The Flow Polytope. To make the elevated objective function relevant, we need
to reinstate the effect of network externalities that we completely disregarded
by ignoring unavailability. Therefore we impose a set of necessary (though not
sufficient) properties that the steady-state rate of flows { fi j,m(q)} and the effective
quantiles q̂ must satisfy in order to be realizable. These properties form a linear
polytope on these variables, which we refer to as flow polytope as it relates to flow
conservation and capacity constraints. We begin by proving that both properties
are indeed necessary.
Proposition 5.3 (Demand bounding). For actual quantiles q under any state-
dependent policy, the steady-state rate of flows fulfill the capacity bounding
property fi j,m(q) ≤ φi j.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from qi j(·) ≤ 1 which implies∑
x∈Sn,m pi(x)qi j(x) ≤ 1. 
Proposition 5.4 (Supply Circulation). For actual quantiles q under any state-
independent policy, the steady-state rate of flows obey flow conservation∑
k fki,m(q) =
∑
j fi j,m(q) for every i, even for infinite-unit systems. Under
state-dependent policies, flow conservation holds for any finite-unit system:∑
x∈S n,m pi(x) ·
∑
k fki,m(q(x)) =
∑
x∈S n,m pi(x) ·
∑
j fi j,m(q(x))
Proof. We first consider state-independent policies. Recall that wi(q) is defined
to be the leading left eigenvector of {P(q)}i, j, where Pi j(q) = φi jqi j/∑ j φi jqi j. From
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this we get for all i:∑
j
w j(q)
φ jiq ji∑
k φ jkq jk
= wi(q) =
wi(q)∑
k φikqik
∑
k
φikqik
⇒∑
j
r j(q)φ jiqi j =
∑
k
ri(q)φikqik
Multiplying both sides by (Gm−1(q)/Gm(q)), and using our previous formula for
the node availability (cf. Equation 5.4), we get
∑
j A j,m(q)φ jiqi j =
∑
k Ai,m(q)φikqik.
Moreover, by Proposition 5.2 this also holds in the infinite-unit limit.
For state-dependent policies, we prove the claim via contradiction. Suppose
that this does not hold. Then there exists a node that has incoming flow that is
in steady-state less than the outgoing flow. As the system has finite number of
units, this means that, after finite number of time, this node will have 0 units and
then this can no longer be true which establishes the claim. 
Interpreting the demand bounding and supply circulation properties in terms
of effective quantiles of state-independent policies, we find the linear constraints
q̂i j ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
k
φkîqki =
∑
j
φi ĵqi j.
Actual quantiles need not fulfill the supply circulation property, but any (state-
independent) quantiles induce flows (effective quantiles) that fulfill it.
Pricing via the Elevated Flow Relaxation. Combining the elevated objective
and the flow polytope, we obtain the elevated flow relaxation program (cf. Algo-
rithm 6). For the case of maximizing throughput, this is a linear optimization
problem since both objective function and polytope are linear. Recall from above
that the supply circulation property implied flow conservation of the effective
quantiles at each node. Algorithm 6 drops the availability term in the objective
but imposes, as a constraint, the same demand bounding and flow conservation
properties on the actual quantiles.
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Algorithm 6: Elevated Flow Relaxation with Pricing for Throughput
Require: arrival rates φi j, value distributions Fi j
1: Find
{˜
qi j
}
that solve the following relaxation:
maxq
∑
(i, j) φi jqi j∑
k φkiqki =
∑
j φi jqi j ∀ i
qi j ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i, j.
2: Output state-independent prices p˜i j = F−1i j (1 − q˜i j) and respective quantiles q˜i j.
It is important to notice the distinction between the above constraint on
actual quantiles and the supply circulation property of effective quantiles. The
actual quantiles q˜i j returned by the algorithm are constrained to satisfy
∑
k φkiq˜ki =∑
j φi jq˜i j at every node i. They then give rise to effective quantiles q̂ (with q̂i j =
Ai,m(˜q) · q˜i j) which obey the supply circulation property ∑k φkîqki = ∑ j φi ĵqi j (as
proven for any effective quantiles in Proposition 5.4). In other words, the linear
program above restricts our pricing policy to induce actual quantiles which obey
the flow circulation property, thereby mirroring a feature of effective quantiles.
Henceforth, for any actual quantile q, we refer to the property
∑
k φkiqki =
∑
j φi jqi j
as the demand circulation property, in order to distinguish it from the supply
circulation property for the effective quantiles.
The approximation guarantee. Our analysis relies on the three following lem-
mas. Lemma 5.1 shows that the solution of the elevated flow relaxation upper
bounds the true objective of any state-depedendent pricing policy. Lemma 5.3
then shows that the true (non-elevated) objective of the pricing policy returned
by our program is equal to the solution of the program, when applied to an
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infinite-unit system. Finally, Lemma 5.6 enables us to connect this solution to
the true objective of the finite-unit system by showing that the true objective of
any policy in the m-unit system is within a factor of mm+n−1 of the objective in the
infinite-unit system.
Lemma 5.1 (from finite-unit state-dependent to the elevated flow relaxation).
The value of the objective function of the optimal state-dependent policy is upper
bounded by the value of the elevated objective function of the pricing policy q˜
returned by the elevated flow relaxation program:
ÔBJ(˜q) ≥ OPTm.
Proof. The optimal state-dependent pricing policy q?(·) induces a steady-state
distribution pi?(·). Based on that distribution we define, analogously to the effec-
tive quantiles of state-independent policies, the average-fraction of customers
that receive service for each origin-destination pair: q =
∑
x∈S n,m pi
?(x) · q?(x). Then
OPTm =
∑
x∈S n,m
pi?(x)
∑
i, j
φi jq?i j(x) =
∑
i j
φi jqi j = ÔBJ(q).
We complete the proof by showing that ÔBJ(˜q) ≥ ÔBJ(q). To do so, we demon-
strate that q is a feasible solution of the elevated flow relaxation program; this
suffices as q˜ maximizes the elevated objective over the feasible set. We thus
only need to show that q satisfies the demand bounding and demand circulation
properties. The first holds trivially since q is a convex combination of q?(·). The
second holds true because q? induces steady-state flows that obey the supply
circulation property (Proposition 5.4); hence, at every node i we have∑
k
φkiqki =
∑
k
∑
x∈Sn,m
pi?(x) · q?ki(x)φki =
∑
j
∑
x∈Sn,m
pi?(x) · q?i j(x)φi j =
∑
j
φi jqi j,
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which shows that q fulfills the demand circulation property. Hence q is a feasible
solution to the elevated flow relaxation program and the result follows. 
For the second step of our analysis, we use the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 5.2 (demand circulation property implies equal availabilities). For any
m (including ∞) if a state-independent pricing policy q satisfies the demand
circulation property then, at all nodes i, the availabilities Ai,m(q) are equal.
Proof. Consider i? ∈ argmax Ai,m(q). Then the demand circulation and supply
circulation properties imply
Ai?,m(q)
∑
j
φ ji?q ji? = Ai?,m(q)
∑
j
φi? jqi? j =
∑
j
A j,m(q)φ ji?q ji?
and thus
∑
j
(
Ai?,m(q) − A j,m(q))φ ji?q ji? = 0. By choice of i?, each summand is
nonnegative, so for each j such that φ ji?q ji? > 0 we obtain A j,m(q) = Ai?,m(q). All
availabilities being equal then follows inductively using the assumption that our
system is irreducible (cf. Appendix D.2). 
Next we connect the elevated flow relaxation to the infinite-unit system. In
fact, we show a stronger statement, that holds for any policy satisfying demand
circulation and thus also for the solution of the elevated flow relaxation program.
Lemma 5.3 (from elevated flow relaxation to infinite-unit state-independent).
For any pricing policy q satisfying the demand circulation property, the value of
the elevated objective function of q is equal to the value of its objective function
in the infinite-unit system
OBJ∞(q) = ÔBJ(q).
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Proof. Since q satisfies the demand circulation property, by Lemmas 5.2 and
Proposition 5.2, the availability at all nodes is equal to 1. This means that (i) the
value of the objective function in the infinite-unit limit for pricing policy q is
equal to its elevated value (since no term was increased), and (ii) the flow of
customers on each edge is equal to φi j · qi j. 
For the third step of our framework, we introduce two auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 5.4 (approximation of finite-unit equals maximum availability). For any
state-independent pricing policy q, let Am(q) = maxi
(
Ai,m(q)
)
denote the maximum
steady-state availability across all nodes. Then the objective function of q in the
m-unit system is related to the infinite-limit objective as
OBJm(q)
OBJ∞(q)
= rmax(q) · Gm−1(q)Gm(q) = Am(q).
Proof. Let Bi(q) =
∑
j φi jqi j · Ii j(qi j) denote the contribution of node i to the
objective per unit of time in which station i is available. By substituting
Ai,m(q) = (Gm−1(q)/Gm(q)) · ri(q), Ai,∞(q) = ri(q)/rmax(q), and Bi(q) into the defi-
nition of the objectives in Equation (5.5), we obtain
OBJm(q)
OBJ∞(q)
=
∑
i Ai,m(q)Bi(q)∑
i Ai,∞(q)Bi(q)
=
Gm−1(q)
Gm(q)
·∑i ri(q)Bi(q)
1
rmax(q)
·∑i ri(q)Bi(q) = rmax(q) · Gm−1(q)Gm(q) = Am(q),
where the last equality follows from the characterization of the availabilities
in Equation (5.4). Note that the argument relies on OBJ∞(q) , 0 which holds
for all policies/settings we consider. In particular, there is always a policy that
charges  > 0 for every price and achieves a positive objective (since we assumed
Fi j(0) < 1). 
Lemma 5.5 (weighted bipartite graph among state space of different-unit sys-
tems). We call y ∈ Sn,m−1 a neighbor of y + ei ∈ Sn,m∀i ∈ {1, n}. There exists a
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weighted bipartite graph on Sn,m∪Sn,m−1 such that i) an edge has non-zero weight
only if it is connecting neighboring states , ii) for any vertex corresponding to a
state in Sn,m−1 the total weight of incident edges is equal to m+n−1m , and iii) for any
vertex corresponding to a state in Sn,m the total weight of incident edges is equal
to 1.
Proof. Our construction is shown in the following figure. Each state x ∈ Sn,m is
adjacent to y = x − ei ∈ Sn,m−1 for all i with xi > 0. On these edges, the weight
is ωxy = xim . Thus, the total weight incident to x is
∑
y ωxy =
∑
i
xi
m = 1. On the
other hand, each state y ∈ Sn,m−1 is adjacent to the states x = y + ei ∀i ∈ [n].
The respective weight incident on y is
∑
x ωxy =
∑
i
yi+1
m =
m−1+n
m . Finally, there is
positive weight on edges only between neighboring states. This concludes the
proof of the lemma. 
(a) Graph between
S2,3 and S2,2
(b) Construction for general n,m
Lemma 5.6 (from infinite-unit to finite-unit state-independent). For any state-
independent pricing policy q, the value of the objective of the policy q in the
m-unit system is at least m/(m + n − 1) times the value of the objective of the same
policy in the infinite-unit system.
OBJm(q) ≥ mm + n − 1OBJ∞(q).
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Proof. By Lemma 5.4, we have:
OBJm(q)
OBJ∞(q)
= rmax(q) · Gm−1(q)Gm(q) .
In order to uniformly bound the above expression, we apply the weighted
bipartite graph, between the states in Sn,m−1 and the states in Sn,m, described
in Lemma 5.5. Following the same notation as before, we denote the weight
between states x ∈ Sn,m and y ∈ Sn,m−1 by ωxy. Recall that non-zero weights
only exist between neighboring states, i.e. when x = y + ei ∈ Sn,m for some i;
further, the total weight of edges incident to any state in x ∈ Sn,m is equal to∑
y ωxy = 1, and the total weight of edges incident to any state in y ∈ Sn,m−1 is
equal to
∑
x ωxy =
m+n−1
m .
OBJm(q)
OBJ∞(q)
= rmax(p) · Gm−1(q)Gm(q) = rmax(q)
∑
y∈Sn,m−1
∏n
j=1
(
r j(q)
)y j∑
x∈Sn,m
∏n
j=1
(
r j(q)
)x j
= rmax(q) ·
∑
y∈Sn,m−1
∏n
j=1
(
r j(q)
)y j∑
x∈Sn,m
(∑
y∈Sn,m−1 ωxy
)∏n
j=1
(
r j(q)
)x j
= rmax(q) ·
∑
y∈Sn,m−1
∏n
j=1
(
r j(q)
)y j
∑
(x,y)∈Sn,m×Sn,m−1 ωxy
∏n
j=1
(
r j(q)
)y j+(x j−y j)
≥
∑
y∈Sn,m−1
∏n
j=1
(
r j(q)
)y j∑
y∈Sn,m−1
(∑
x∈Sn,m ωxy
)∏n
j=1
(
r j(q)
)y j
=
∑
y∈Sn,m−1
∏n
j=1
(
r j(q)
)y j(
m+n−1
m
)∑
y∈Sn,m−1
∏n
j=1
(
r j(q)
)y j = mm + n − 1
The third equality holds as
∑
y ωxy = 1; the second-to-last follows from
∑
x ωxy =
m+n−1
m . Crucially, ωxy > 0 only holds for neighboring states x ∈ Sn,m and y ∈ Sn,m−1
implying the inequality. 
Theorem 5.5 (approximation guarantee for pricing with throughput objective).
Consider the throughput objective function OBJTm for the m-unit system with
concave reward curves Ri j(·). Let q˜ be the pricing policy returned by Algorithm 6
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and OPTm be the value of the objective function for the optimal state-dependent
pricing policy in the m-unit system. Then
OBJTm(˜q) ≥
m
m + n − 1OPTm. (5.7)
Proof. The proof follows by direct applications of Lemmas 5.1, 5.3, and 5.6. 
5.5 Applying the framework to pricing beyond throughput
We now apply our framework to objectives beyond throughput. We first show
how to maximize general objectives satisfying the concave reward curves as-
sumption such as social welfare unconditonally and revenue with concave rev-
enue curves (Appendix D.1). We then move our attention to multi-objective
settings where we wish to maximize one objective function subject to a lower
bound on another one, as is the case in Ramsey pricing [112].
General objectives with concave reward curves. We first provide the ele-
veated flow relaxation program for pricing with general objectives (Algorithm 7).
To extend our guarantee to objectives beyond throughput, we need a stronger
version of Lemma 5.1 that does not rely on the linearity of the objective.
Lemma 5.7 (from finite-unit state-dependent to the elevated flow relaxation).
For objectives with concave price-setting reward curves Ri j(·), the value of the
objective function of the optimal state-dependent policy is upper bounded by
the value of the elevated objective function of the pricing policy q˜ returned by
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Algorithm 7: Elevated Flow Relaxation with Pricing for General Objective
Require: arrival rates φi j, value distributions Fi j, reward curves Ri j.
1: Find
{˜
qi j
}
that solve the following relaxation:
maxq
∑
(i, j) φi jRi j(qi j)∑
k φkiqki =
∑
j φi jqi j ∀ i
qi j ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i, j.
2: Output state-independent prices p˜i j = F−1i j (1 − q˜i j) and respective quantiles q˜i j.
the elevated flow relaxation Program:
ÔBJ(˜q) ≥ OPTm.
Proof. Using the same notation as in the proof of Lemma 5.1, we have:
OPTm =
∑
x∈S n,m
pi?(x)
∑
i, j
φi jRi j
(
q?i j(x)
)
≤
∑
i j
φi jRi j
(̂
qi j
)
= ÔBJ(̂q)
where the inequality holds by Jensen’s inequality due to the concavity of the
price-setting reward curves Ri j(·). The rest of the proof is identical to the proof of
Lemma 5.1. 
Theorem 5.6 (approximation guarantee for pricing with general objective). Con-
sider any objective function OBJm for the m-unit system with concave reward
curves Ri j(·). Let q˜ be the pricing policy returned by Algorithm 7 and OPTm be
the value of the objective function for the optimal state-dependent pricing policy
in the m-unit system. Then
OBJm(˜q) ≥ mm + n − 1OPTm. (5.8)
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Proof. The proof copies the one of Theorem 5.5 replacing Lemma 5.1 by
Lemma 5.7. 
Multi-objective settings. We now discuss how to derive bicriterion approxi-
mations in multi-objective optimization settings, in which one objective is maxi-
mized subject to a lower bound on another. Formally, the problem is as follows:
we are given a m-unit system, a requirement c ≥ 0, and objectives Φm(·) and Ψm(·);
the goal is to maximize Φm(q) subject to Ψm(q) ≥ c. We again assume that both
objectives can be expressed by concave reward curves
{
RΨi j
}
and
{
RΦi j
}
respectively.
Similarly to Equation (5.6), we first elevate both objectives to obtain Φ̂(̂q) =∑
i, j φi jRΦi j (̂qi j) and Ψ̂(̂q) =
∑
i, j φi jRΨi j (̂qi j). Since per-ride rewards are non-increasing
on the quantiles, this can only increase the values of the objectives. We then
impose the supply circulation and demand bounding constraints to create the
flow polytope constraints. This mathematical program (Algorithm 8) is the
elevated flow relaxation program for our multi-objective setting; we argue below
that this is indeed a relaxation. It can be efficiently optimized since the objective
is concave while the polytope is convex: the convex combination of any two
feasible quantiles is feasible since Ψ̂(·) is concave.
Theorem 5.7 (approximation guarantee for multi-objective pricing). Let Φm and
Ψm be objectives for the m-unit system with concave reward curves. Then the
solution q˜ returned by Algorithm 8 is a (γ, γ) bicriterion approximation for the
multi-objective pricing problem where γ = m/(m + n − 1), i.e. Φm(˜q) ≥ γOPTm and
Ψm(˜q) ≥ γ · c.
Proof. Let q̂ denote the optimal solution of an auxiliary program where we only
elevate the objective Φ (but not Ψ), i.e. we maximize Φ̂(·) subject to Ψm(·) ≥ c as
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Algorithm 8: Elevated Flow Relaxation with Multi-objective Pricing
Require: arrival rates φi j, value distributions Fi j, reward curves RΦi j and R
Ψ
i j,
requirement c.
1: Find
{˜
qi j
}
that solve the following relaxation:
maxq Φ̂(q)∑
k φkiqki =
∑
j φi jqi j ∀ i
qi j ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i, j.
Ψ̂(q) ≥ c
2: Output state-independent prices p˜i j = F−1i j (1 − q˜i j) and respective quantiles q˜i j.
well as the demand circulation and demand bounding constraints. Moreover,
let q? denote the optimal state-dependent solution of the original (non-elevated)
problemW. Then, for the first guarantee, we have:
Φm(˜q) ≥ γΦ̂(˜q) ≥ γΦ̂(̂q) ≥ γΦ(q?) = γOPTm
The first inequality is a simple application of Lemmas 5.3 and 5.6, since q˜ satisfies
demand circulation and we can thus apply the lemmas to the objective Φm(·). The
second inequality holds since any solution of the auxiliary program is a feasible
solution of the elevated flow relaxation. In particular, since the elevated objective
Φ̂(·) is pointwise no less than the original objective Φm(·), the corresponding
constraint in the auxiliary program is tighter. The last inequality holds by the
same argument as in Lemma 5.7.
Regarding the second guarantee, we have:
Ψm(˜q) ≥ γΨ̂(˜q) ≥ γc
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The first inequality is again an application of Lemmas 5.3 and 5.6, while the
second holds since q˜ is a feasible solution of the elevated flow relaxation and
therefore satisfies its last constraint. 
Note that the same approach yields multicriterion approximation algorithms
for settings in which more than one constraint of the form Ψm(·) ≥ c is given.
5.6 Remarks
More information about the paper. The results presented in this chapter are
joint work with Sid Banerjee and Daniel Freund [17]. In this work, we also
show that the approximation framework described in this chapter goes beyond
the simple pricing setting described in this chapter and can extend to multiple
different directions. For example, it can capture different rebalancing controls
(beyond pricing) such as empty-vehicle rebalancing and matching customers to
drivers. It can also extend to incorporate travel-times (instead of assuming that
all travels are instantaneous). Finally, it can address constrained settings such
as pricing that is only origin-based. All these results stem from the three-step
approach described in Section 5.4.
On the approximation ratio. Our main result is an approximation framework
that provides a state-independent policy with a m/(m+n−1) approximation guar-
antee in steady-state. Our guarantee holds for a large class of objectives (revenue,
throughput, welfare), controls (pricing, matching, empty-vehicle rebalancing),
and constraints (multi-objective settings, prices coming from discrete price sets,
travel-times). We note, that for the special case of maximizing throughput via
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pricing without constraints, Waserhole and Jost [125] provide the same guarantee
although their analysis cannot extend more generally; our policy is the same
as theirs for the special case. They also showed that, for this special case, the
approximation ratio for a policy based on this relaxation is tight.
Our work shows the first universal performance bounds for a wide variety
of controls and settings, and has inspired follow-up work that tries to improve
the bounds in specific settings. Notable among these are two works. The first
due to Qian et al. [108] shows how to obtain stronger guarantees, approximation
ratio of 1 − e−Θ(m), for the matching control in settings obeying an additional
complete resource pooling condition (a relaxed version of Hall’s condition) via
reverting to state-dependent policies. The second due to Balseiro et al. [16]
demonstrates how to achieve better dependence on n, approximation ratio of
1 − o(1) competitive ratio when n = θ(m), for particular networks (star networks).
However, understanding the limits and relative strenghts of different algorithms
for particular controls and settings still remains an exciting open direction.
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CHAPTER 6
EFFICIENCY OF DYNAMIC LEARNING OUTCOMES
In multi-agent systems, the platform is not the only entity that utilizes data
in a way to enhance its decision-making. This data is also available to the
other participants of the system who can learn from it and adapt their behavior.
Consider online advertising as an example. Advertisers repeatedly bid for ad
opportunity in various queries, observe their overall allocation and payment.
This enables them to adapt their future bidding to better adjust to the competition.
To analyze agents’ behavior in such complex systems, we ideally wish for
a behavioral assumption that is easily achievable and weak enough so that it
does not prescribe strict behavioral rules. One such behavioral assumption is
that agents perform not much worse than what they would have had if they
committed to a fixed strategy throughout all rounds. This is natural as, if agents
repeatedly perform worse than the best fixed strategy, they can soon realize
this fact and follow the better strategy. It is also easily satisfiable by multiple
online learning algorithms such as the ones we described in Chapter 2; crucially
though this assumption does not require agents to use any particular algorithm
but rather just to satisfy the no-regret guarantee. Finally, empirical evidence
supports this behavioral assumption in settings such as online advertising [102].
In this chapter, we aim to understand the efficiency of these dynamic learn-
ing outcomes, with respect to the total happiness of all participating entities,
referred to as social welfare. Quantifying the inefficiency that selfish behavior
causes to these systems, measured by the so called Price of Anarchy, is one of the
cornerstones of algorithmic game theory. When the game is completely static
and agents have converged to the so called Nash equilibrium of the one-shot
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game we now have a good understanding of this effect which, in many cases,
is only a small deterioration [117, 37, 123]. Recently, these results have been
extended to learning outcomes assuming that all agents employ online learning
algorithms via extensions theorems based on a property referred to as smoothness
[29, 116, 123]. However, these results still make an unrealistic strong assumption,
requiring that the game played is completely identical across rounds. This is
clearly not the case in applications like online advertising where there is signifi-
cant turnover both in the player set and in their valuations of different outcomes.
This chapter provides a general theory to make the aforementioned extension
theorems robust even in settings where such population churn is present and
very frequent.
6.1 Preliminaries on efficiency of selfish outcomes
Games and mechanisms. We consider game settings played repeatedly, where
the population of players is evolving over time (as described in Section 6.2). Let
G be an n-player normal form stage game and assume that game G is played
repeatedly for T rounds.1 Each player i has a strategy space S i, with maxi |S i| = N,
a type vi ∈ Vi and a cost function ci(s; vi) that depends on the strategy profile
s ∈ ×iS i, and on her type. We denote with C(s; v) = ∑i∈[n] ci(s; vi) the social cost,
where s is a strategy profile and v a type profile. Our main application described
in this chapter concerns the case when the stage game is a utility maximization
mechanism M, which takes as input a strategy profile and outputs an allocation
Xi(s) for each player and a payment Pi(s). We assume that players have quasi-
1Although the game rules remain unaltered across rounds, the changes in participants affect
the payoff matrix.
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linear utility ui(s; vi) = vi(Xi(s)) − Pi(s) and the welfare is the sum of valuations
(sum of utilities of bidders and revenue of auctioneer): W(s; v) =
∑
i∈[n] vi(Xi(s)).
Disregarding the selfish behavior of the participants, we can define the op-
timal solution of the underlying optimization problem. Let Xn be the “feasible
solution space” of the setting without incentives. In combinatorial auctions (the
application in this chapter), this corresponds to the set of feasible partitions of
items to bidders, while in network routing games it is the set of feasible integral
flows. We overload the social cost and welfare notations and, for a feasible
solution (or allocation) x ∈ Xn, use C(x; v) and W(x; v) to denote the social cost or
welfare of the solution2. We denote the optimal social cost or welfare for a type
profile v as OPT(v) = minx∈Xn C(x; v) and OPT(v) = maxx∈Xn W(x; v) respectively.
Application: Simultaneous first-price auctions. The application we discuss in
this chapter concerns simultaneous first-price auctions. There are m items (e.g.
ad opportunity) that the n players compete for. Players repeatedly participate
in item auctions for each such item by submitting individual bids. The item
gets assigned to its highest bidder and this player pays her bid (first-price) – ties
are broken arbitrarily. Our results also extend to other auction formats such as
second-price as well as hybrid auctions.
Each player cares about her individual utility which, as discussed before, is
assumed to be quasilinear: equal to her valuation from acquiring items minus the
price she pays. We use vti(A) to denote the valuation of the i-th player at time t if
she obtains all items in set A; her valuation when not obtaining items is vti(∅) = 0.
Valuations are additive across time but, at each round, users are unit-demand:
2Overloading the notation does not create ambiguity assuming the strategy sets S i are disjoint
from the possible solutions X.
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if they get more than one item in a single round, their valuation is equal to the
maximum value they have among these items while they still pay the price for
all. We denote by vti( j) the value of an item j for buyer i at time t; as a result, the
player’s value for a set A is vti(A) = max j∈A v
t
i( j). While we mostly focus on the
unit-demand assumption, some of our results extend to more general valuation
functions (see Section 6.5). We also assume that valuations are normalized to be
in [0, 1] and all non-zero valuations are at least ρ > 0 for some small constant ρ.
Regarding the players’ bidding, we assume that the bids on each item comes
from a sufficiently fine discrete bidding spice. We assume that the bids are always
multiples of δ · ρ for some small δ > 0, where ρ is the minimum value from an
item defined in the previous paragraph. Finally, we assume that players never
bid for more than one item. As a result, the number of strategies available to
each player is N = m
δ·ρ (deciding whict item to target and how much to bid).
No-regret learning in games. In settings like the above it is clear that bidding
the true valuation is not a good idea since this can only lead to utility 0: either
the player wins the item and pays her valuation as a price, or she loses and
gets again utility 0. Instead, we assume that the players employ strategies that
provide them a good performance in the long run. In particular, we assume that
they satisfy the no-regret learning properties described in Section 2.1. Recall the
definition of -approximate regret from Section 2.2 (defined for a fixed  > 0):
ApxReg( f , ) = (1 − )
T∑
t=1
`tA(t) −
T∑
t=1
`tf ,
where `tA(t) denotes the loss of of the learner with respect to the selected action
A(t) and `tf denotes the loss with respect to a comparator f respectively.
Instantiated to a game setting, the -approximate regret of player i com-
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pared to a fixed strategy s?i will be shorthanded as ApxRegi
(
s?i , 
)
= (1 −
)
∑T
t=1 ci(s
t; vi) − ∑Tt=1 ci(s?i , s−i; vi) for a cost minimization game. Respectively,
for a utility-maximization mechanism, we define approximate regret as:
ApxRegi
(
s?i , 
)
=
T∑
t=1
ui(s?i , s−i; vi) − (1 + )
T∑
t=1
ui(st; vi).
Solution-based Smoothness in Games and Mechanisms. Smooth games
were introduced by Roughgarden [116] as a general framework bounding the
price of anarchy in games. He also showed that smoothness based price of anar-
chy bounds extend to outcomes in repeated games where the set of players is
fixed throughout the period and all players use no-regret learning.
We require a somewhat more general variant of smooth games, that compares
the cost or utility resulting from a strategy choice to the social welfare of a specific
solution, rather than comparing to the social optimum. For two strategy vectors
s and s? we use (s?i , s−i) to denote the vector where player i uses strategy s
?
i and
all other players j use their strategy s j.
Definition 6.1 (Solution-based smooth game). A cost-minimization game G is
solution-based (λ, µ)-smooth for λ > 0 and µ < 1, if for any feasible solution x ∈ Xn, any
type profile v and any player i, there exists a strategy s?i ∈ S i depending only on her type
vi and her part of the solution xi such that for any strategy profile s∑
i
ci(s?i (vi, xi), s−i; vi) ≤ λC(x; v) + µC(s; v)
This means that, when players satisfy the no-regret property (as described
in Section 2.1), the average social cost of these no-regret learning outcomes is
bounded by λ1−µOPT as time grows large.
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In particular, we present this result for -approximate regret learners as
this allows us to extend it in the next section. We assume that learners have
expected -approximate regret of order O(log(NT )/) which is the case for almost
all adversarial online learning algorithms. For simplicity, we omit the O-notation.
Proposition 6.1. If a game is solution-based (λ, µ)-smooth expected -
approximate regret of E
[
ApxRegi(s
?
i , )
]
≤ log(NT )

for all s?i , the average expected
cost is at most λ1−µ− ·C(x; v) + 11−µ− · n log(NT )·T for all feasible solutions x.
Proof. Let st be the strategy vector at round t. Adding the -approximate regret
inequalities for each player, and applying the smoothness property:
1
T
∑
t
E
[
C(st; v)
]
=
1
T
· 1
1 − 
∑
t
∑
i∈[n]
(1 − ) · E[ci(st; vi)]
≤ 1
T
· 1
1 −  · E
∑
t
∑
i
ci(s?i (vi, xi), s
t
−i; vi) +
∑
i
ApxRegi(s
?
i (vi, xi), )

≤ 1
1 −  ·
λC(x; v) + µ · 1T ∑
t
E
[
C(st; v)
]
+
1
T
· n log(NT )


The claimed bound follows by rearranging terms. 
Note that it was crucial that strategy s?i was fixed across rounds since we
used that player i does not regret not deviating to it. Since s?i is a function of the
underlying optimization problem, this will no longer be the case in an evolving
population as departures of players change the underlying optimization problem
and may affect s?i . We tackle this in the next section.
The application of this chapter is about mechanisms. For mechanisms we use
the version of the smoothness definition of Syrgkanis and Tardos which assumes
that all players have quasi-linear utilities. We again define a mechanism smooth
with respect to a solution x, and allow the choice of strategy s? to depend only on
the player’s part of the solution xi and her type vi. More formally:
138
Definition 6.2 (Solution-based smooth mechanism). A mechanismM is solution-
based (λ, µ)-smooth for λ, µ ≥ 0, if for any feasible solution x ∈ Xn, any valuation profile
v and any player i, there exists a deviating strategy s∗i ∈ S i depending only on vi and xi
such that for any strategy profile s,∑
i
ui(s∗i (vi, xi), s−i; vi) ≥ λW(x; v) − µREV(s).
where REV(s) =
∑n
i=1 Pi(s).
Syrgkanis and Tardos [123] proved that a (λ, µ)-smooth mechanism has price
of anarchy bounded by max(µ, 1)/λ, and the average social welfare of no-regret
learning outcome is also at least (λ/max(µ, 1))OPT(v). For example, simultaneous
first-price auctions are ( 12 , 1)-smooth implying efficiency of 2. Analogously:
Proposition 6.2. If a mechanism is solution-based (λ, µ)-smooth and players sat-
isfy expected -approximate regret of E
[
ApxRegi(s
?
i , )
]
≤ log(NT )

∀s?i , the average
expected social welfare is at least λmax(µ,1+) ·W(x; v)− 1max(µ,1+) · n log(NT )·T for all feasible
solutions x ∈ Xn.
Proof. Let st be the strategy vector at round t and U(st; vt) denote the welfare
that comes from the players’ utilities (and not the designer’s revenue which
is denoted by REV(st)). Adding the -approximate regret inequalities for each
player, and applying the smoothness property:
1
T
∑
t
E
[
U(st; v)
]
=
1
T
· 1
1 + 
∑
t
∑
i∈[n]
(1 + ) · E[ui(st; vi)]
≥ 1
T
· 1
1 + 
· E
∑
t
∑
i
ui(s?i (vi, xi), s
t
−i; vi) −
∑
i
ApxRegi(s
?
i (vi, xi), )

≥ 1
1 + 
·
λW(x; v) − µ · 1T ∑
t
E
[
REV(st)
] − 1
T
· n log(NT )


The claimed bound comes from rearranging terms and noting that W(st; v) =
U(st; vt) + REV(st) 
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6.2 Shifting learning and efficiency of dynamic outcomes
Dynamic population model. We focus on repeated game settings when the
population evolves over time. Our model is formalized in the next definition.
Definition 6.3 (Repeated game/mechanism with dynamic population). A re-
peated game with dynamic population consists of a stage game G played for T
rounds. Let Pt denote the set of players at round t, where each player i ∈ Pt has a private
type vti. After each round, every player independently exits the game with a (small)
probability p > 0 and is replaced by a new player with an arbitrary type. The utility
of players is additive across rounds. This repeated game is denoted by Γ = (G,T, p);
similarlyM = (M,T, p) denotes a corresponding mechanism.
Our model of dynamic population assumes that after each round every player
independently exits the game with a turnover probability p > 0; each player is
expected to participate in 1/p rounds. To keep our model simple, we assume
that when a player exits, she is replaced by a new participant. This assumption
guarantees that there are exactly n players in each iteration, with a p fraction of
the population changing each round in expectation. We make no assumption on
the types of the new arriving players which can be selected adversarially.
To simplify notation, we use player i to denote the current i-th player, where
this player is replaced by a new i-th player with probability p each round. An
alternate view of the dynamic player population is to think of players as changing
types after each iteration with a small probability p. We refer to such a change as
player i switches or turns over.
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Approximate regret with shifting comparators. To deal with a shifting envi-
ronment, online learning guarantees against a comparator fixed throughout
the whole time horizon are not strong enough to provide meaningful efficiency
guarantees. Instead, we make a slightly stronger behavioral assumption, requir-
ing that players have, for each time interval, low approximate regret against
a comparator fixed within this interval. This allows us to have different com-
parators for different intervals. More formally, in utility settings, the adaptive
approximate regret for interval [τ, τ′) is defined as:
AdApxReg
(
s?i , , τ, τ
′) = τ′−1∑
t=τ
ui(s?i , s
t
−i; vi) − (1 + )
τ′∑
t=τ
ui(st; vti).
When τ = 1 and τ′ = T , this recovers the original approximate regret notion
but it allows flexibility to have different comparators for different intervals; if
the number of these comparators is not too large, the resulting guarantees are
strong. This robustness against changing comparators dates back to Herbster
and Warmuth [69]. The adaptive regret guarantee that compares to inteval-based
fixed comparators was introduced by Hazan and Seshadhri [68] and further
studied by Luo and Schapire [91] and Daniely et al. [43]. For the approximate
regret version of the question, which will be useful in our setting, the bounds
for each interval are of the form: E
[
AdApxReg
(
s?,1:Ti , , τ, τ
′)] = O( log(Nτ′)

)
. This is
satisfied by many full-feedback algorithms, e.g. sleeping experts algorithms such
as the one of Blum and Mansour [30] for loss settings, or variants of multiplicative
weights such as Noisy Hedge [9, 53] for both utilities and losses. We will again
omit the O-notation from the bound to simplify notation and we will refer to the
behavioral assumption that imposes that this is satisfied as: the players satisfy the
adaptive approximate regret property.
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Efficiency of dynamic learning outcomes. We now provide an efficiency result
for learners that satisfy the adaptive approximate regret property. We also require
the underlying game to satisfy one more property, which is satisfied for example
in simultaneous first-price auctions when players do not bid over their value.
This property establishes that players with no items in the feasible allocation will
have literally no regret against a deviating strategy that attempts to “win” the
empty allocation and not only a regret that vanishes over time on average.
Property 1. The utility of any player i who is not allocated a resource is always nonneg-
ative, i.e. ui(s; vi) ≥ 0 for any strategy that is used by the players.
Under this property, we provide the efficiency guarantee which we instantiate
in the remainder of the chapter. Let x1, . . . , xT denote a sequence of benchmark
solutions. To denote the number of times that either the solution of player i
changes, or her type changes when she is previously allocated a resource, we use
Ki(x1:Ti ) = 1 +
T∑
t=2
1
[(
xti , x
t−1
i
)
or
(
xt−1i , ∅ and vti , vt−1i
)]
.
Unlike Proposition 6.2, we compare against a β-approximately optimal bench-
mark instead of the optimal one, for reasons that become clear in the next section.
Note that the optimal solution is now changing with time as a function of player
turnover. With no turnover and β = 1, Theorem 6.3 reverts to Proposition 6.2.
Theorem 6.3. Consider a repeated mechanism with dynamic populationM =
(M,T, p), such that the stage mechanism M is solution-based (λ, µ)-smooth, satis-
fies Property 1, and utilities are in [0, 1]. Suppose that there exists a randomized
sequence (v1:T , x1:T ) such that xt is feasible (pointwise) and β-approximately opti-
mal (in-expectation) for each t, i.e. β · E[W(xt; vt)] ≥ E[OPT(vt)]. If players satisfy
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the adaptive approximate regret property:
∑
t
E
[
W(st; vt)
] ≥ λ
β ·max(µ, 1 + )
∑
t
E
[
OPT(vt)
] −∑
i
E
[
Ki
(
x1:Ti
)]
· log(NT )
max(µ, 1 + ) · 
where m is such that for any feasible allocation x, |{i : xi , ∅}| ≤ m.
Proof. In a dynamic population game, the underlying optimization problem is
changing over time. Therefore the smoothness analysis described in the proof
of Proposition 6.2 requires a stronger learning property. To deal with this, we
define time-dependent deviating strategies that are related to the underlying
optimization problem of the round. We then use the adaptive learning property
to show that the players do not regret any sequence of such deviating strategies.
Let s?,ti be the deviation s
?
i (v
t
i, x
t
i) defined by the smoothness property and s
?,1:T
i
be the sequence of these deviations. Since the deviating strategy s?,ti is determined
by the allocation and type of the player, Ki(x1:Ti ) is an upper bound on the number
of times that s?,1:Ti changes. Let ri(s
?,1:T
i , s
1:T ; v1:T ) be the approximate regret that
player i has compared to selecting s?,ti at every round, i.e.:
ri(s?,1:Ti , s
1:T ; v1:T ) =
T∑
t=1
ui(s?,ti , s
t
−i; v
t) − (1 + )
T∑
t=1
ui(st; vt) (6.1)
For shorthand, we denote this with r?i in this proof.
Let τi,r be the round that the strategy s?,ti of player i changes for the r-th time or
her type changes while being allocated a resource. For any period [τi,r, τi,r+1) that
the strategy s?,ti is fixed, the adaptive approximate regret property guarantees
that the player’s expected regret Ri(τr, τr+1) = E
[
AdApxReg(s?,1:Ti , , τr, τr+1)
]
with
respect to this strategy is at most
Ri(τr, τr+1) ≤ log(NT )

.
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Moreover, if in period r, xti = ∅, then by Property 1 we have that: Ri(τr, τr+1) ≤ 0.
Thus, if we denote with Xi,r the indicator of whether in period r, xti = ∅, we obtain:
Ri(τr, τr+1) ≤ Xi,r · log(NT )

.
Summing over the Ki(x1:T ) periods where strategies are fixed and summing over
players, we can bound the total expected approximate regret across players by:
E
∑
i
r?i
 ≤ E
Ki(x
1:T )∑
r=1
Xi,r · log(NT )

 ≤∑
i
E
[
Ki(x1:T )
]
· log(NT )

The rest of the proof follows the arguments of Proposition 6.2. More formally,
using the notation there:∑
t
E
[
U(st; vt)
]
=
1
1 + 
∑
t
∑
i∈[n]
(1 + ) · E[ui(st; vti)]
≥ 1
1 + 
· E
∑
t
∑
i
ui(s?i (v
t
i, x
t
i), s
t
−i; v
t
i) −
∑
i
r?i

≥ 1
1 + 
·
λ∑
t
E
[
W(xt; vt)
] − µ∑
t
E
[
REV(st)
] −∑
i
E
[
Ki(x1:T )
]
· log(NT )


The claimed bound comes again from rearranging terms, noting that W(st; v) =
U(st; vt) + REV(st), as well as applying that β · E[W(xt; vt) ≥ E[OPT(vt)]]. 
6.3 Classical smoothness analysis leads to ineffective results
In the previous section, we made two steps away from the classical smooth-
ness analysis [116, 123]. First, we assumed that the learners apply adaptive
approximate regret guarantees rather than the more classical no-regret against
a benchmark fixed throughout time. Second, instead of taking the optimal so-
lution as the benchmark allocation we wish to compete with, we turned to a
β-approximately optimal solution. We now explain why both these deviations
are essential to provide efficiency guarantees in dynamic environments.
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Need for adaptive learning. From a player’s perspective, using no-regret learn-
ing against a fixed comparator can be problematic. Consider a toy scenario where
the are m items and a special player has value 1j for item j ∈ {1, . . . , log(T )}. We
assume that initially she has no competition but at time i·Tm , player i ∈ {1,m − 1}
arrives and this player significantly dominates her in value for all items and has
the same preference order among items. As a result, after the i-th player arrives,
our special player can realistically win only one of the i lower-valued items.
Any fixed benchmark provides a utility to the player of T/m (assuming that
the payments are non-existing). This is because the i-th element is winnable
only in the first i·Tm rounds. In fact, as we will see in the next chapter, classical
algorithms such as vanilla multiplicative weights achieve performance exactly
equal to that of the best fixed benchmark [59] and, if the learner uses something
like that, then their utility will be therefore exactly T/m.
In contrast, adaptive learning guarantees that the learner can obtain reward
from the best shifting benchmark: in this case selecting the i-th item in rounds[
(i−1)·T
m ,
i·T
m − 1
]
. Since at these items, the learner faces essentially no competition,
the reward she gets there is Hm · T/m. Hence satisfying the adaptive approximate
regret property leads to a multiplicative increase in performance of Hm at the
expense of an additive dependence of m in the regret which vanishes as T grows
large. Fortunately, the player can indeed achieve performance as good as that by
many natural algorithms, which means that the stronger behavioral assumption
is better suited to what players should and can aim in such evolving settings.
Not using the optimum as a benchmark in smoothness analysis. The original
smoothness analysis uses the optimal allocation as the comparator x in the proof
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of Proposition 6.2; this gives the efficiency guarantee as W(x; v) = OPT. The issue
with this approach in dynamic environments is that the optimal solution can be
significantly unstable: a single change in a random player’s type can significantly
disturb the allocations of most other players. Since the number of these changes
comes in the regret term, having such instability means that, unless the turnover
probability is really small (the types of the players change very rarely), the regret
term may dominate the efficiency term, making the bound vacuous.
To observe this instability, consider a simple setting with m items and n = m
players. Each player i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} has value 1 for the items i and i+ 1 and 0 for
all other items, while the m-th player has value 1 for item m. Clearly the optimal
allocation assigns the i-th item to the i-th player. Now consider that a turnover
happens to a random player and the new arriving player has value 1 only for
item 1. If the player who turned over has identity higher than m/2 (this happens
with probability half), the new optimal solution comes from an augmenting path
affecting at least half of the players. This is because the new player gets item 1
and all players (until the player who turned over) switch to the next item. This
means that in expectation at least n/4 players’ allocations in the optimal solution
is affected by a single type change in a random player. Hence the solution is
unstable causing the additive error term in Theorem 6.3 to become really high
(unless the probability of turnover is very small and hardly any changes occur).
In the next two sections, we describe how using approximately optimal
solutions instead of the optimal solution can lead to significant improvement in
stability of the resulting allocations. This implies that the efficiency guarantees
we suggest are robust even to a large population churn (a constant fraction of
the player set turning over) without significant degradation.
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6.4 Robustness of efficiency in dynamic games via stability
The previous section demonstrates that, for the smoothness analysis to obtain
efficient guarantees with dynamic population, there should exist a sequence of
approximately optimal solutions that is relatively stable: a single change in a
random player does not alter the allocation of most players. In this section, we
demonstrate such a stable solution sequence for our main application (first-price
auctions with unit-demand bidders) and subsequently instantiate the efficiency
guarantee that this leads to. In the next section, we show a general way to achieve
such stability via a connection to differential privacy.
Stability via layered greedy matching. To obtain a stable and approximately
optimal solution sequence, we use a layered version of the greedy matching
algorithm. The greedy algorithm initially does not allocate any item to any player.
Subsequently it considers item valuations vti( j) in decreasing order assigning item
j to player i if, when vti( j) is considered, neither item j nor player i are matched. To
make this algorithm more stable we define the layered-greedy matching algorithm,
which works as follows. Recall that ρ > 0 denotes the smallest non-zero value
that a player has for any item. For a positive  ≤ 1/3, we round each player’s
value down to the closest number of the form ρ(1 + )` for some integer `, and
run the greedy algorithm with these rounded values. It is well known that the
greedy algorithm guarantees a solution that is within a factor of 2 to optimal. We
lose an additional factor of (1 + ) by working with the rounded values.
The greedy algorithm will have many ties and we will resolve ties in a way to
make the output stable. In particular, among all player-item pairs with the same
rounded value at round t, we break ties in favor of pairs matched in the previous
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round t − 1. Note that this neither affects anything in the mechanism nor makes
assumption on how the mechanism breaks ties; it is just inside the proof to show
the existence of an approximately optimal stable solution sequence.
We now provide the key ingredient for our efficiency guarantee, a lemma
showing that the above algorithm provides a sequence of near-optimal and stable
solutions; hence such a sequence exists for the underlying optimization problem.
Lemma 6.1 (Stability via layered-greedy matching). For any  > 0, there exists
a randomized sequence of solutions for the underlying matching problem (de-
pending on the randomness in the type sequence) such that a) the total welfare
at any round is near-optimal: W(xt; vt) ≥ 1−2 OPT(vt) and b) the expected number
of changes in the allocation of a player is bounded by
E
∑
i
Ki(x1:T )
 ≤ m · (2 + 2pT ) · log(1+)(1/ρ).
Proof. The solutions in the sequence of the theorem come by applying the layered-
greedy matching algorithm with parameter  > 0. The approximation result
holds as we lose a factor of 2 due to the greedy algorithm and another factor of
(1 + ) due to the layers. Since 11+ > 1 − , result (a) follows.
To show the stability let `(vti( j)) be the highest integer ` such that v
t
i( j) ≥
ρ(1 + )`−1, i.e. the rounded down version of vti( j) is ρ(1 + )
`(vi( j))−1, which we call
the layer of this value. For example, any value in the range [ρ, ρ(1 + )) is in
layer 1. Let `t( j) denote `(vti( j)) if item j is assigned to player i at time t, and let
`t( j) = 0 if item j is not assigned at time t. We will use the potential function
Φ(xt) =
∑
j
`t( j)
to show stability. As all values are upped bounded by 1, the number of possible
values that the potential function can take is m · log(1+)(1/ρ).
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The crux of the proof relies in the following steps. First, we show that changes
in assignments of non-departing players correspond to increases in the potential
function. Moreover, the potential function can decrease only due to departures:
when a player assigned to item j leaves at time t, this immediately decreases
the potential function by `t( j) ≤ log(1+)(1/ρ). Ignoring initial steps, the aggregate
increase in the potential function is the same as the aggregate decrease. Hence,
the expected number of changes is upper bounded by bounding the expected
decrease in the potential function. This argument is formalized below.
The allocation of the solution can change only due to a turnover: either a
player that holds an item in the greedy solution departs and leaves her previously
assigned item open for current players, or a new player arrives and gets assigned
to an item. Every time that a player that holds an item departs, she leaves that
item temporarily free in the greedy solution. Unless this is the last time that the
item has a holder in the greedy solution, at some point (either at the same round
or in the future), some player i will get assigned to this item. Due to the layered
version of the greedy algorithm needs to increase the potential function by at
least 1. If player i was previously assigned to another item, this item becomes free
and some other player may move to that item by increasing again the potential
function by at least 1. As a result, the total increase in the potential function,
caused by someone getting an unassigned item is associated to at most 2 changes.
The case where the item remains unassigned for all the future rounds, contributes
in total at most m extra changes in allocation (over the whole time horizon).
Now consider the scenario where an arriving player misplaces another player
from the greedy solution (instead of getting an unassigned item). For this to
happen, her rounded value is higher than the one of the current owner; hence,
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the potential function increases by 1. This affects the allocation of the previous
holder of the item who may either cease being allocated or replace a player in
another item again increasing the potential function by at least 1 (and this may
propagate across subsequently misplaced players as well). As a result, each
increase in the potential function that is caused by someone getting a previously
assigned item contributes at most 2 changes in the allocation of other players.
Combined with the previous point, the total number of changes is at most:
∑
i
Ki(x1:T ) ≤ 2 · Total Increase in Φ + m (6.2)
Since the potential function can only get integer non-negative values and is
bounded by m · log(1+)(1/ρ) and taking into account end-game effects, the total
increase in the potential function is:
Total Increase in Φ ≤ Total Decrease in Φ + m · log(1+)(1/ρ). (6.3)
We are therefore left to bound the expected total decrease in the potential
function. This can only happen when a player among the ones that hold items
departs. Each such player departs with probability p and hence the expected
number of such players departing at each round is at most m · p (which is
independent of the number of players and depends only on the number of
items). Whenever this happens, the potential function can decrease by at most
log(1+)(1/ρ) since this is the maximum layer the corresponding item can be in. As
a result, the expected decrease in the potential function is at most:
E
[
Total Decrease in Φ
] ≤ p · m · T · log(1+)(1/ρ) (6.4)
The theorem follows by combining (6.2), (6.3), and (6.4). 
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Smoothness with discrete bidding spaces. To apply Theorem 6.3, we need to
establish that the mechanism with the discrete bidding space is smooth. (1/2, 1)-
smoothness of the simultaneous first price auction with submodular bidders (a
super-set of unit-demand valuations) and continuous bids was known by [123].
A simple modification of the result of [123] shows that if the discretization is fine
enough, then the mechanism is approximately (1/2, 1) solution-based smooth.
Since the techniques are similar to [123], we defer this proof to Appendix E.
Lemma 6.2 (Smoothness of simultaneous discrete-bidding first price auction).
The simultaneous first price mechanism where players are restricted to bid on
at most d items and on each item submit a bid that is a multiple of δ · ρ, is a
solution-based
(
1
2 − δ, 1
)
-smooth mechanism, when players have submodular
valuations, such that all marginals are either 0 or at least ρ and such that each
player wants at most d items, i.e. vti(S ) = maxT⊆S :|T |=d v
t
i(T ).
Efficiency guarantee We now provide the efficiency guarantee that has many
nice properties. First, it is parametric; we get an extra factor of 2 due to the use of
greedy algorithm in the proof but, other than that, the additional error goes to 0
as p→ 0. Second, the turnover probability can be very high without big loss in
efficiency as there is no dependence on the number of players or items, depends
only the range of item valuations. In particular, even if a constant fraction of the
players is changing at every round then we still do not see much loss in efficiency,
which makes the guarantee meaningful even with high player turnover.
Theorem 6.4 (Main theorem for unit-demand bidders). Consider simultaneous
first price auctions with dynamic population, non-overbidding unit-demand
bidders, and discrete bidding space of multiples of δ · ρ for some δ > 0. As-
sume that the average optimal welfare in each round is at least mρ, that is
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1
T
∑T
t=1 E
[
OPT(vt)
] ≥ mρ (all items can be allocated for the minimum value). If
players satisfy the adaptive approximate regret property and T ≥ 1p then ∀′ > 0:∑
t E[W(st; vt)] ≥
(
(1−2δ)·(1−′)
4·(1+) − p ·
(4 log(1+′)(1/ρ) ln(NT )
ρ
))
E
[
OPT(vt)
]
where N is the number of different strategies considered by a player.
Proof. We apply Theorem 6.3 with xt being the allocation of the layered-greedy
algorithm with parameter ′ > 0. We use the (1/2 − δ, 1) solution-based smooth-
ness of the first price auction with discrete bidding space established in Lemma
6.2 and the stability of the solution sequence produced by the layered-greedy
algorithm establised in Lemma 6.1. Using that pT > 1, we obtain:∑
t
E[W(st; vt)] ≥ (1 − 2δ)(1 − 
′)
4 · (1 + )
∑
t
E[OPT(~vt)] −m · 4 · p · T · log(1+′)(1/ρ) · ln(NT )
The theorem then follows using the lower bound on the optimum solution
1
T
∑T
t=1 E[OPT(~vt)] ≥ mρ. Since we never run the greedy-layered matching, ′ is
just inside the proof; it only affects the solution xt and not the possible bids, and
therefore it is fine to define this parameter arbitrarily. 
6.5 Stability in dynamic games via differential privacy
In the last technical section of this chapter, we provide a general way to derive
stable approximately optimal solutions (the essential buliding block in the ef-
ficiency guarantees), by stressing a connection of such solutions to differential
privacy. Differential privacy offers a general framework to find solutions that are
close to optimal, yet more stable to changes in the input than the optimum itself.
To guarantee privacy, the output of the algorithm should depend only minimally
on any single player’s input. This is exactly what we need in our framework.
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Background on differential privacy. Differential privacy has been developed
for databases storing private information for a population. A database D ∈ Vn is
a vector of inputs, one for each user. Two databases are i-neighbors if they differ
just in the i-th coordinate, i.e. only in the input of the i-th user. If two databases
are i-neighbors for some i, they are called neighboring databases. Dwork et al. [50]
define an algorithm as differentially private if one user’s information has little
influence on the outcome. In the setting of a game or mechanism the outcome
for player i clearly should depend on player i’s input (her claimed valuation, or
source destination pair), so cannot be differentially private. The notion of joint
differential privacy has been developed by Kearns et al. [76] to adapt differential
privacy to such settings. We use X to denote the set of possible outcomes for one
player, so an algorithm in this context is a randomized mapping A : Vn → Xn.
The algorithm is jointly differentially private, if for all players i, the output for all
other players is differentially private in the input of player i. More formally:
Definition 6.4 ([76]). An algorithmA : Vn → Xn is (, δ)- jointly differentially private
if for every i, every pair of i-neighbors D,D′ ∈ Vn, and every subset of outputs S ⊆ Xn−1.
P[A(D)−i ∈ S ] ≤ e · P[A(D′)−i ∈ S ] + δ (6.5)
If δ = 0, we say thatA is -jointly differentially private.
Over the last years there have been a number of algorithms developed that
solve problems near-optimally in a differentially private way; see the book of
Dwork and Roth [48] for a survey. Via connecting joint different privacy to stable
solution sequences, we provide dynamic efficiency guarantees for settings like
online advertising and routing via taking advantage of algorithms for solving
matching problems [70] and finding socially optimal routing [115] respectively.
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Stability via differential privacy. We now show that differentially private
solutions imply stability. This is the main building block for efficiency guarantees.
Lemma 6.3. Suppose that there exists an algorithmA : Vn → ∆(Xn) that is (, δ)-
jointly differentially private, takes as input a valuation profile v and outputs a
distribution of solutions such that a sample from this distribution is feasible with
probability 1 − γ, and is β-approximately optimal in expectation (for 0 ≤  ≤ 1/2,
β > 1, δ > 0, and 0 < γ < 1). Consider a sample v1:T from the distribution of
valuations produced by the adversary in a repeated mechanism with dynamic
populationM = (M, p,T ). There exists a randomized sequence of solutions x1:T
for the sequence v1:T , such that a) for each 1 ≤ t ≤ T , xt conditional on vt is a
β-approximation to OPT(vt) in expectation over the randomness of the algorithm:
β ·E[W(xt; vt)] ≤ E[OPT(vt)] and b) the expected number of changes in the solution
is bounded by
E
∑
i
Ki(x1:T )
 ≤ p · n · T · (1 + n(2 + 2γ + δ))
To prove this main lemma, we require two auxiliary lemmas. First, we
bound the total variation distance between the outputs of a differentially private
algorithm on two inputs that differ only on one coordinate (the type of one
player). Total variation distance is a general measure for the distance between
distributions. For two distributions µ and η on some finite probability space Ω
the following are two equivalent versions of the total variation distance:
dtv(µ, η) =
1
2
‖µ − η‖1 = max
A⊂Ω
(µ(A) − η(A)), (6.6)
where in the 1-norm in the middle we think of µ and η as a vector of probabilities
over the possible outcomes.
Lemma 6.4. Suppose thatA : Vn → ∆(Xn) is an (, δ)-joint differentially private
algorithm with failure probability γ (for 0 ≤  ≤ 1/2 , δ > 0, and 0 < γ < 1)
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that takes as input a valuation profile v and outputs a distribution over feasible
solutions σ. Let σ and σ′ be the algorithm’s outputs on two inputs v and v′
that differ only in coordinate i. Then we can bound the total variation distance
between σ−i and σ′−i by dtv(σ−i, σ
′
−i) ≤ (2 + δ).
Proof. Condition (6.5) of joint differential privacy guarantees that if we let S ⊆
Xn−i be a subset of possible solutions for players other than i, and σ−i(S ) and
σ′−i(S ) be the probability that the two distributions assign on S , then for any S :
σ−i(S ) ≤ e · σ′−i(S ) + δ. Since  ≤ 1/2, we can use the bound e ≤ 1 + 2 to get that
σ−i(S ) − σ′−i(S ) ≤ 2σ′−i(S ) + δ ≤ 2 + δ. Thus by the second definition of the total
variation distance in Equation (6.6) we get that dtv(σ−i, σ′−i) ≤ 2 + δ. 
Second, we use a simple lemma from basic probability theory.
Lemma 6.5 (Coupling Lemma). Let µ and η be two probability measures over
a finite set Ω. There is a coupling ω of (µ, η), such that if the random variable
(X,Y) is distributed according to ω, then the marginal distribution on X is µ, the
marginal distribution on Y is η, and
P[X , Y] = dtv(µ, η),
Proof of Lemma 6.3. Suppose that A : Vn → ∆(Xn) is an (, δ)-joint differentially
private algorithm as described in the definition of the lemma. The differentially
private algorithm fails with probability γ. We denote with σ the output distribu-
tion over solutions for an input v, where we use the optimal solution in the low
probability event that the algorithm fails. (EquivalentlyA could be a randomized
algorithm and σ its implicit distribution over solutions).
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Let σ1, . . . , σT , be the sequence of distributions output by A when run on
a deterministic sequence of valuation profiles v1, . . . , vT with the modification
described in the paragraph above. To simplify the discussion we assume that
only one player changes valuation at each time-step t. Essentially we break every
transition from time-step t to t + 1 into many sequential transitions where only
one player changes at every time step, and then deleting the solutions from the
resulting sequence that correspond to the added steps. Thus the number of steps
within this proof should be thought as being equal to n · p · T in expectation.
By Lemma 6.4, we know that the total variation distance of two consecutive
distributions without the modification of replacing failures with the optimal
solution is at most 2 + δ. Since, by the union bound, the probability that any of
the two consecutive runs of the algorithm fail is at most 2γ, we can show that the
total variation distance of the latter modified output is at most 2 + δ + 2γ, i.e. for
any t ∈ [T ]: dtv(σt+1−i , σt−i) ≤ 2 + δ + 2γ (see Lemma 6.6 for a formal proof).
We can turn the sequence of distributions σ1, . . . , σT into a distribution of
sequences of allocations x1:T by coupling the randomness used to select the
solutions in different distributions σt. To do this, we take advantage of the
coupling lemma from probability theory (Lemma 6.5). If at step t no player
changes values, then σt = σt+1, and we select the same outcome from the two
distributions, so we get P
[
xt−i , x
t+1
−i
]
= 0.
Now consider a step in which a player i changes her private type vi. We use
Lemma 6.5 to couple xt+1−i and x
t
−i so that
3
P[xt+1−i , xt−i] = dtv(σt+1−i , σt−i) ≤ 2 + δ + 2γ. (6.7)
3One can think of it as sampling xt+1 conditional on xt and assuming the joint distribution
of xt and xt+1 is as prescribed by the coupling lemma applied to σt and σt+1. This is to address
concerns that xt is already coupled with xt−1 in the previous step.
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Note that this couples the ith coordinate xt+1i and x
t
i in an arbitrary manner, which
is fine, as we assumed that the valuation of player i changes at this step.
We have defined a probability distribution of sequences x1:T for every fixed
sequence of valuations v1:T . We extend this definition to random sequences of
valuation in the natural way adding the distribution of valuations v1:T .
We claim that the resulting random sequences of (valuation,solution) pairs
satisfies the statement of the theorem: the β-approximation follows by the guar-
antees of the private algorithm and by the fact that we use the optimal solution
when the algorithm fails. Next we argue about the stability of the sequence.
Consider a player i, and the distribution of her sequence (v1:Ti , x
1:T
i ). In each step
t her valuation vti changes with probability p, contributing pT in expectation to
the number of changes. In a step t when some other value j , i changes, we use
(6.7) to bound the probability that xti , x
t+1
i by 2 + δ+ 2γ. Thus any change in the
value of some other player j contributes at most (2 + 2γ + δ) to the expectation
of the number of changes for player i. The expected number of such changes in
other values is (n − 1)pT over the sequence, showing that
E[Ki] = pT + (n − 1)pT (2 + 2γ + δ) ≤ pT (1 + n(2 + 2γ + δ)).
Summing over players, we obtain the lemma. 
Lemma 6.6. Let q and q′ be the output of an (, δ)-joint differentially private
algorithm with failure probability γ, on two valuation profiles v and v′ that differ
only in coordinate i. Let σ and σ′ be the modified output where the outcome is
replaced with optimal outcome when the algorithm fails. Then:
dtv(σ,σ′) ≤ 2 + δ + 2γ
Proof. Consider two random coupled random variables y, y′ that are implied by
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Lemma 6.5 applied to distributions q and q′, such that y ∼ q and y′ ∼ q′ and
P
[
y , y′
]
= dtv(q, q′) ≤ 2 + δ (by Lemma 6.4). Now consider two other random
variables x and x′ where x = y except for the cases where y is an outcome of a
failure in which case x is equal to the welfare optimal outcome and similarly
for x′ and y′. Obviously: x ∼ σ and x′ ∼ σ′, thus (x, x′) is a valid coupling for
distributions σ and σ′. Thus if we show that Pr[x , x′] ≤ 2 + δ + 2γ, then by
properties of total variation distance dtv(σ,σ′) ≤ Pr[x , x′] ≤ 2 + δ + 2γ, which is
the property we want to show.
Let fail be the event that either y or y′ is the outcome of a failed run of the
algorithm. Then by the union bound P
[
fail
] ≤ 2γ. Thus we have:
P
[
x , x′
]
= P
[
x , x′ | ¬fail] · P[¬fail] + P[x , x′ | fail] · P[fail]
≤ P[x , x′ | ¬fail] · P[¬fail] + 2γ
= P
[
y , y′ | ¬fail] · P[¬fail] + 2γ
≤ P[y , y′] + 2γ ≤ dtv(q, q′) + 2γ ≤ 2 + δ + 2γ
This completes the proof of the Lemma. 
Efficiency guarantee for dynamic games via differential privacy. We can now
provide the resulting efficiency guarantee.
Theorem 6.5. Consider a repeated mechanism with dynamic populationM =
(M,T, p), such that the stage mechanism M is solution-based (λ, µ)-smooth and
T ≥ 1p . Assume that there exists an (, δ)-joint differentially private algorithm
A : Vn → Xn with error parameter γ that satisfies the conditions of Lemma 6.3. If
players satisfy the adaptive approximate regret property then:∑
t
E
[
W(st; vt)
] ≥ λ
βmax(µ, 1 + )
∑
t
E
[
OPT(vt)
]−∑
i
2pnT (1 + n( + γ + δ)) log(NT )
max(µ, 1 + ) · 
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Proof. The proof follows directly by combining Theorem 6.3 and Lemma 6.3. 
Using this theorem, we can obtain efficiency guarantees for simultaneous
auctions where players have submodular valuation functions, assuming the
number of players is large enough. This comes from using the algorithm PAlloc
of Hsu et al. [70] which provide near-optimal differentially private guarantees in
large markets. Similarly, applying the equivalent of the above theorem for cost
games (which is omitted from this thesis), we can provide efficiency guarantees
for routing games via the differenitally private algorthm of Rogers et al. [115].
6.6 Remarks
More information about the papers. The results in this chapter are based
mostly on joint work with Vasilis Syrgkanis and E´va Tardos [94]. The connection
between approximate regret learners and efficiency of outcomes is based on joint
work with Dylan Foster, Zhiyuan Li, Karthik Sridharan, and E´va Tardos [53].
The dynamic population model, the interval-based behavioral assumption, and
the stability results leading to efficiency appear in [94]. In that paper, we also
instantiate the differential privacy framework to simultaneous auctions with
submodular valuations and routing games as hinted in the end of the last section.
Learning as a behavioral assumption. Decentralized dynamics as a model of
player behavior in repeated settings dates back to the seminal work of Brown
on fictitious play in two-player zero-sum games [31] which converges to the
so called min-max value of the game [114]. The rate of this convergence has
been subsequently extensively studied both for fictitious play [114, 45] as well as
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for other learning dynamics in zero-sum games [44, 111]. Hart and Mas Collel
showed that in more general games, uncoupled dynamics do not converge to
Nash equilibria but provided a dynamic satisfying a stronger notion of regret
(internal regret) that converges to the so called correlated equilibria. Despite that,
Blum et al. [27] showed that in games such as routing, generic decentralized no-
regret learning dynamics do converge to an approximate form of Nash equilibria.
Subsequently, multiple works have aimed to understand the exact topological
trajectories of decentralized dynamics to shed more light on their convergence,
for example [79, 98].
In this chapter, we focus on properties of the outcomes in game settings where
players use generic no-regret learning dynamics instead of analyzing the exact
dynamic. In particular, we analyze the social welfare in this repeated game where
the behavioral assumption for the players is that they use no-regret learning.
Quantifying the inefficiency caused by the selfish behavior of players is due
to the seminal works on price of anarchy by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou
[82], and Roughgarden and Tardos [117], with Nash equilibrium as a notion
for selfish behavior. Using the learning behavioral assumption to capture the
selfish behavior of the players in this context was initiated by Blum et al. [29].
The smoothness extension theorem of Roughgarden [116] provided a general
framework to make price of anarchy guarantees hold even under this weaker
learning behavioral assumption. Our work goes one step further and provides a
framework to make these results robust to drastically evolving game settings.
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CHAPTER 7
A FAIRNESS VIEW ON ONLINE LEARNING
In the final facet of this thesis, we expand the focus of online decision-making
beyond a mere optimization perspective and aim to address the greater societal
context of these decisions. Until now, we focused on understanding how online
decision-making techniques can help platforms and other agents adapt to the
optimization complexities of modern systems. Recently, there are emerging
concerns regarding approaches that focus on just optimizing objectives such as
revenue or welfare. Ethical considerations slowly start coming to the picture
with respect to the functioning of online markets as platforms’ decisions affect
multiple different agents. Hence there is a sense of urgency to undertand short-
comings with respect to important considerations such as fairness and privacy,
and mitigate them through either algorithmic or regulatory interventions.
One consideration that has become more and more prominent with respect to
how algorithmic decisions affect people is fairness across different population
groups. Although there is still ongoing debate on what classifies as fair [19,
24, 41], recent works identify morally objectionable practices [46, 7, 8] suggest
operational remedies for particular tasks [49, 65, 71] or point to fundamental
obstacles preventing them [40, 78]. However, most of them focus on analyzing
existing datasets in an offline manner which disregards the fact that decisions
often need to be made in an online manner without the benefit of the complete
dataset. Approaches that incorporate the online nature of modern markets tend
to heavily rely on the input being completely i.i.d. (see Section 7.6). This then
enables them to imitate the offline approaches by initially exploring to find the
best fair policy (for the fairness notion of interest) and then repeatedly use it.
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In this chapter, we focus on understanding the extra complexities that the
online aspect of this decision-making adds to the picture in settings where
the i.i.d. assumption on the input is not necessarily valid (e.g. because the
input evolves as we discussed in the previous chapter). In particular, for these
settings we wish to understand the interplay between online optimization and
fairness with respect to different notions of group fairness. Our goal is to identify
which group fairness notions are compatible with optimization occurring in an
online manner and point to places where system designers may need to be extra
thoughtful when dealing with non-i.i.d. online datasets.
7.1 Preliminaries on online learing with multiple groups
Before discussing fairness considerations, we first formally describe the online
learning setting with multiple groups; this slightly extends the exposition in
Chapter 2 but all notions are redefined for completeness and notational simplicity.
In particular, unlike that chapter where the losses were treated as abstract, here
we provide more context on their origin, in order to distinguish between different
types of mistakes (e.g. false positives and false negatives, defined in Section 7.2).
Online learning setting with group context. We focus on the full-feedback ad-
versarial online learning setting (also referred to as learning with expert advice).
A learner needs to make sequential decisions for T rounds by combining the pre-
dictions of a finite set F of d hypotheses (also referred to as experts). We denote
the outcome space by Y; in binary classification, this corresponds to Y = {+,−}.
Additionally, we introduce a set of disjoint groups by G which identifies subsets
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of the population based on a protected attribute (gender, ethnicity, income, etc).
The online learning setting with group context proceeds in T rounds. Each
round t is associated with a group context g(t) ∈ G and an outcome y(t) ∈ Y.
We denote the resulting T -length time-group-outcome sequence tuple by σ =
{(t, g(t), y(t)) ∈ N × G × Y}Tt=1. This is a random variable that can depend on the
randomness in the generation of the groups and the outcomes. We use the
shorthand σ1:τ = {(t, g(t), y(t)) ∈ N × G × Y}τt=1 to denote the subsequence until
round τ. The exact protocol for generating these sequences is described below.
At round t = 1, 2, . . . ,T :
1. An example with group context g(t) ∈ G either arrives stochastically or is
adversarially selected.
2. The learning algorithm or learner L commits to a probability distribution
pt ∈ ∆(d) across experts where ptf denotes the probability that she follows
the advice of expert f ∈ F at round t. This distribution pt can be a function
of the sequence σ1:t−1. We call the learner group-unaware if she ignores the
group context g(τ) for all τ ≤ t when selecting pt.
3. An adversaryA then selects an outcome y(t) ∈ Y. The adversary is called
adaptive if the groups/outcomes at round t = τ + 1 are a function of the
realization of σ1:τ; otherwise she is called oblivious. The adversary always
has access to the learning algorithm, but an adaptive adversary additionally
has access to the realized σ1:t−1 and hence also knows pt.
Simultaneously, each expert f ∈ F makes a prediction yˆtf ∈ Yˆ, where Yˆ is
a generic prediction space. For example, in binary classification, the pre-
diction space could simply be the positive or negative labels: Yˆ = {+,−}, or
the probabilistic score: Yˆ = [0, 1] with yˆtf interpreted as the probability the
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expert f ∈ F assigns to the positive label in round t, or even an uncalibrated
score like the output of a support vector machine: Yˆ = R.
Let ` : Yˆ×Y → [0, 1] be the loss function between predictions and outcomes.
This leads to a corresponding loss vector `t ∈ [0, 1]d where `tf = `
(
yˆtf , y(t)
)
denotes the loss the learner incurs if she follows expert f ∈ F .
4. The learner then observes the entire loss vector `t (full feedback) and incurs
expected loss
∑
f∈F ptf `
t
f . For classification, this feedback is obtained by
observing y(t).
In this chapter, we consider a setting where all the experts f ∈ F are fair in
isolation (formalized below). Regarding the group contexts, our main impossi-
bility results (Theorems 7.1 and 7.2) assume that the group contexts g(t) arrive
stochastically from a fixed distribution, while our positive result (Theorem 7.3)
holds even when they are adversarially selected.
For simplicity of notation, we assume throughout the presentation that the
learner’s algorithm is producing the distribution pt of round t = τ + 1 determin-
istically based on σ1:τ and therefore all our expectations are taken only over σ
which is the case in most algorithms. Our results extend when the algorithm
uses extra randomness to select the distribution.
Regret notions. The typical way to evaluate the performance of an algorithm
in online learning is via the notion of regret. This has already been discussed in
Chapter 2 but we redefine it here comparing the expected performance of the
algorithm to the one of the best expert in hindsight on the realized sequence σ.
RegretT =
T∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptf `
t
f − minf?∈F
T∑
t=1
`tf? .
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For any fixed loss vector (determined by the groups and outcomes at every
round), the above definition is the same as what we called expected regret in
Chapter 2. In our impossibility results, we assume that the losses come in fact
from particular distributions and we are interested in the expectation of this
regret notion with respect to the randomness in the groups and outcomes (as
we want to argue that even in expectation, the vanishing regret property is not
compatible with particular fairness notions). To facilitate exposition, we therefore
incorporate the algorithm’s expectation inside the regret notion in the above
definition; hence, any additional expectation relates to the groups and outcomes.
An algorithm satisfies the no-regret property (or Hannan consistency) in our
setting if for any losses realizable by the above protocol, the regret is sublinear
in the time horizon T , i.e. RegretT = o(T ). This property ensures that, as time
goes by, the average regret vanishes. Many online learning algorithms, such as
multiplicative weights updates satisfy this property with RegretT = O(
√
T log(d)).
We focus on the notion of approximate regret (as in Chapters 2 and 6), which
is a relaxation of regret that gives a small multiplicative slack to the algorithm.
More formally, -approximate regret with respect to expert f ? ∈ F is defined as:
ApxReg,T ( f
?) =
T∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptf `
t
f − (1 + )
T∑
t=1
`tf? .
We note that typical algorithms guarantee ApxReg,T ( f
?) = O(ln(d)/) simultane-
ously for all experts f ? ∈ F . When the time-horizon is known in advance, by
setting  =
√
ln(d)/T , such a bound implies the aforementioned regret guarantee.
In the case when the time horizon is not known, one can also obtain a similar
guarantee by adjusting the learning rate of the algorithm appropriately.
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7.2 On combining fair expert advice fairly
Group fairness in online learning. We now define non-discrimination (or
fairness) with respect to a particular evaluation metricM, e.g. in classification,
the false negative rate metric (FNR) is the fraction of examples with positive
outcome that the algorithm predicts as negative incorrectly. For any realization
of the time-group-outcome sequence σ and any group g ∈ G, metricM induces a
subset of the populationSσg (M) that is relevant to it. For example, in classification,
Sσg (FNR) = {t : g(t) = g, y(t) = +} is the set of positive examples of group g. The
performance of expert f ∈ F on the subpopulation S σg (M) is denoted by
Mσf (g) =
1
|Sσg (M)|
∑
t∈Sσg (M)
`tf .
Definition 7.1. An expert f ∈ F is called fair in isolation with respect to metric
M if, for every sequence σ, her performance with respect toM is deterministically the
same across groups, i.e. Mσf (g) =Mσf (g′) for all g, g′ ∈ G.
Similarly, the learner’s performance on this subpopulation is
MσL(g) =
1
|Sσg (M)|
∑
t∈Sσg (M)
∑
f∈F
ptf `
t
f .
To formalize our non-discrimination desiderata, we require the algorithm to have
similar expected performance across groups, when given access to fair in isolation
predictors. We make the following assumptions to avoid trivial impossibility
results due to low-probability events or underrepresented populations. First, we
take expectation over sequences generated by the adversaryA (that has access
to the learning algorithm L). Second, we require the relevant subpopulations to
be, in expectation, large enough. Our positive results do not depend on either of
these assumptions. More formally:
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Definition 7.2. Consider a set of experts F such that each expert is fair in isolation
with respect to metricM. Learner L is called α-fair in composition with respect to
metricM if, for all adversaries that produce Eσ[min(|S σg (M)|, |S σg′(M)|)] = Ω(T ) for all
g, g′ ∈ G, it holds that:
∣∣∣∣Eσ[MσL(g)] − Eσ[MσL(g′)]∣∣∣∣ ≤ α.
We note that, in many settings, we wish to have non-discrimination with
respect to multiple metrics simultaneously. For instance, the notion of equalized
odds [65] requires fairness in composition both with respect to false negative rate
and with respect to false positive rate (defined analogously). Since we provide
an impossibility result for equalized odds, focusing on only one metric makes
the result even stronger.
Optimizing performance vs preserving fairness. Our goal is to develop on-
line learning algorithms that combine fair in isolation experts in order to achieve
both vanishing average expected -approximate regret, i.e. for any fixed  > 0
and f ? ∈ F , Eσ
[
ApxReg,T ( f
?)
]
= o(T ), and also non-discrimination with respect
to fairness metrics of interest. We show that, when the fairness notion requires to
balance false negative rates across groups, satisfying both the aforementioned
guarantees is not possible (Section 7.3). In contrast, we can design effective
algorithms that satisfy an alternate fairness notion: balance of the average perfor-
mance experienced by each group (Section 7.4). Crucially, this requires a specific
property that prevents the algorithm from being very good; at the absence of this
property, impossibility results come back even for the latter notion 7.5).
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7.3 Impossibility: Balance of false negative rates unachievable
In this section, we study a popular group fairness notion, equalized odds, in
the context of online learning. A natural extension of equalized odds for online
settings would require that the false negative rate, i.e. percentage of positive
examples predicted incorrectly, is the same across all groups and the same also
holds for the false positive rate. We assume that our experts are fair in isolation
with respect to both false negative as well as false positive rate. A weaker
notion of equalized odds is equality of opportunity where the non-discrimination
condition is required to be satisfied only for the false negative rate. We first study
whether it is possible to achieve the vanishing regret property while guaranteeing
α-fairness in composition with respect to false negative rate for arbitrarily small α.
When the input is i.i.d., this is trivial as we can learn the best expert in O(log d)
rounds and then follow its advice; since the expert is fair in isolation, this will
guarantee vanishing non-discrimination.
In contrast, we show that, in a non-i.i.d. online setting, this goal is unachiev-
able. We demonstrate this in phenomenally benign settings where there are
just two groups G = {A, B} that come from a fixed distribution and just two
experts that are fair in isolation (with respect to false negative rate) even per
round – not only ex post. Our first construction (Theorem 7.1) shows that any
no-regret learning algorithm that is group-unaware cannot guarantee fairness in
composition, even in instances that are perfectly balanced (each pair of label and
group gets 1/4 of the examples) – the only adversarial component is the order in
which these examples arrive. This is surprising because such a task is straightfor-
ward in the stochastic setting as all hypotheses are non-discriminatory. We then
study whether actively using the group identity can correct the aforementioned
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similarly to how it enables correction against discriminatory predictors [65].
The answer is negative even in this scenario (Theorem 7.2): if the population is
sufficiently not balanced, any no-regret learning algorithm will be unfair in com-
position with respect to false negative rate even if they are not group-unaware.
Group-unaware algorithms. We first present the impossibility result about
group-unaware algorithms.
Theorem 7.1. For all α < 3/8, there exists  > 0 such that any group-unaware
algorithm that satisfies Eσ
[
ApxReg,T ( f )
]
= o(T ) for all f ∈ F is α-unfair in compo-
sition with respect to false negative rate even for perfectly balanced sequences. In
particular, for any group-unaware algorithm that ensures vanishing approximate
regret1, there exists an oblivious adversary for assigning labels such that:
• In expectation, half of the population corresponds to each group.
• For each group, in expectation half of its labels are positive and the other
half are negative.
• The false negative rates of the two groups differ by α.
Proof sketch. Consider an instance that consists of two groups G = {A, B}, two
experts F = {hn, hu}, and two phases: Phase I and Phase II. Group A is the group
we end up discriminating against while group B is boosted by the discrimination
with respect to false negative rate. At each round t the groups arrive stochastically
with probability 1/2 each, independent of σ1:t−1.
The experts output a score value in Yˆ = [0, 1], where score yˆtf ∈ Yˆ can be
interpreted as the probability that expert f assigns to label being positive in
1This requirement is weaker than vanishing regret so the impossibility result applies to
vanishing regret algorithms.
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round t, i.e. y(t) = +. The loss function is the expected probability of error given
by `(yˆ, y) = yˆ · 1{y = −} + (1 − yˆ) · 1{y = +}. The two experts are very simple:
hn always predicts negative, i.e. yˆthn = 0 for all t, and hu is an unbiased expert
who, irrespective of the group or the label, makes an inaccurate prediction with
probability β = 1/4+
√
, i.e. yˆthu = β · 1{y(t) = −}+ (1− β) · 1{y(t) = +} for all t. Both
experts are fair in isolation with respect to both false negative and false positive
rates: FNR is 100% for hn and β for hu regardless the group, and FPR is 0% for hn
and β for hu, independent of the group. The instance proceeds in two phases:
1. Phase I lasts for T/2 rounds. The adversary assigns negative labels on
examples with group context B and assigns a label uniformly at random to
examples from group A.
2. In Phase II, there are two plausible worlds:
(a) if the expected probability the algorithm assigns to expert hu in Phase
I is at least Eσ
[∑T/2
t=1 p
t
hu
]
>
√
 · T then the adversary assigns negative
labels for both groups
(b) else the adversary assigns positive labels to examples with group
context B while examples from group A keep receiving positive and
negative labels with probability equal to half.
We will show that for any algorithm with vanishing approximate regret
property, i.e. with ApxReg,T ( f ) = o(T ), the condition for the first world is
never triggered and hence the above sequence is indeed balanced.
We now point to why the above instance is unfair in composition (the complete
proof is provided in Appendix F.1). This stems from the two following claims:
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1. In Phase I, any -approximate regret algorithm needs to select the negative
expert hn most of the times to ensure small approximate regret with respect
to hn. This means that, in Phase I (where we encounter half of the positive
examples from group A and none from group B), the false negative rate of
the algorithm is close to 1.
2. In Phase II, any -approximate regret algorithm should quickly catch up
to ensure small approximate regret with respect to hu and hence the false
negative rate of the algorithm is closer to β. Since the algorithm is group-
unaware, this creates a mismatch between the false negative rate of B (that
only receives false negatives in this phase) and A (that has also received
many false negatives before).

Group-aware algorithms. We now turn our attention to group-aware algo-
rithms, that can use the group context of the example to select the probability of
each expert and provide a similar impossibility result. There are three changes
compared to the impossibility result we provided for group-unaware algorithms.
First, the adversary is not oblivious but instead is adaptive. Second, we do not
have perfect balance across populations but instead require that the minority
population arrives with probability b < 0.49, while the majority population ar-
rives with probability 1 − b. Third, the labels are not equally distributed across
positive and negative for each population but instead positive labels for one
group are at least a c percentage of the total examples of the group for a small
c > 0. Although the upper bounds on b and c are not optimized, our impossibility
result cannot extend to b = c = 1/2. Understanding whether one can achieve
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fairness in composition for such values of b and c is an interesting open question.
Theorem 7.2. For any group imbalance b < 0.49 and 0 < α < 0.49−0.99b1−b , there exists
0 > 0 such that for all 0 <  < 0 any algorithm that satisfies Eσ
[
ApxReg,T ( f )
]
=
o(T ) for all f ∈ F , is α-unfair in composition.
Proof sketch. The instance has two groups: G = {A, B}. Examples with group
context A are discriminated against and arrive randomly with probability b < 12
while examples with group context B are boosted by the discrimination and arrive
with the remaining probability 1 − b. There are again two experts F = {hn, hp},
which output score values in Yˆ = [0, 1], where yˆtf can be interpreted as the
probability that expert f assigns to label being + in round t. We use the earlier
loss function of `(yˆ, y) = yˆ · 1{y = −} + (1 − yˆ) · 1{y = +}. The first expert hn is again
pessimistic and always predicts negative, i.e. yˆthn = 0, while the other expert hp is
optimistic and always predicts positive, i.e. yˆthp = 1. These experts again satisfy
fairness in isolation with respect to false negative and false positive rate. Let
c = 1/1012 denote the percentage of the input that is about positive examples for
A, ensuring that |Sσg (FNR)| = Ω(T ). The instance proceeds in two phases.
1. Phase I lasts Θ·T rounds for Θ = 101c. The adversary assigns negative labels
on examples with group context B. For examples with group context A, the
adversary acts as following:
• if the algorithm assigns probability on the negative expert below
γ() = 99−2100 , i.e. p
t
hn
(σ1:t−1) < γ(), the adversary assigns negative label.
• otherwise, the adversary assigns positive labels.
2. In Phase II, there are two plausible worlds:
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(a) the adversary assigns negative labels to both groups if the expected
number of times that the algorithm selected the negative expert with
probability higher than γ() on members of group A is less than c · b ·T ,
i.e. Eσ
[
1
{
t ≤ Θ · T : g(t) = A, pthn ≥ γ()
}]
< c · b · T .
(b) otherwise she assigns positive labels to examples with group context
B and negative labels to examples with group context A.
Note that, as before, the condition for the first world will never be triggered
by any no-regret learning algorithm (we elaborate on that below) which
ensures that Eσ |S σA(FNR)| ≥ c · b · T .
The proof is based on the following claims, shown in Appendix F.2:
1. In Phase I, any vanishing approximate regret algorithm enters the second
world of Phase II.
2. This implies a lower bound on the false negative rate on A, i.e. FNR(A) ≥
γ() = 99−2100 .
3. In Phase II, any -approximate regret algorithm assigns large enough prob-
ability to the positive expert hp for group B. This implies an upper bound
on the false negative rate on B, i.e. FNR(B) ≤ 12(1−b) . Therefore this provides
a gap in the false negative rates of at least α.

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7.4 Main positive result: Balance in accuracy achievable
The negative results of the previous section give rise to a natural question of
whether fairness in composition can be achieved for some other fairness metric in
an online setting. We answer this question positively by suggesting the equalized
error rates metric EER which captures the average loss over the total number of
examples (independent of whether this loss comes from false negative or false
positive examples). The relevant subset induced by this metric Sσg (EER) is the set
of all examples coming from group g ∈ G. We again assume that experts are fair
in isolation (Definition 7.1) with respect to equalized error rate and show that a
simple scheme where we run separately one instance of multiplicative weights
for each group achieves fairness in composition (Theorem 7.3). The result holds
for general loss functions (beyond pure classification) and is robust to the experts
only being approximately fair in isolation. A crucial property we use is that
multiplicative weights not only does not perform worse than the best expert; it
also does not perform better [59].
The algorithm. We run separate instances of multiplicative weights with a
fixed learning rate η, one for each group. More formally, for each pair of expert
f ∈ F and group g ∈ G, we initialize weights w1f ,g = 1. At round t = 1, 2, . . . ,T ,
an example with group context g(t) arrives and the learner selects a probability
distribution based to the corresponding weights: ptf =
wtf ,g(t)∑
j∈F wtj,g(t)
. Then the weights
corresponding to group g(t) are updated exponentially: wt+1f ,g = w
t
f ,g · (1−η)`
t
f ·1{g(t)=g}.
Theorem 7.3. For any α > 0 and any  < α such that running separate instances of
multiplicative weights for each group with learning rate η = min(, α/6) guaran-
tees α-fairness in composition and -approximate regret of at most O
(|G| log(d)/).
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Proof. The proof is based on the property that multiplicative weights performs
not only no worse than the best expert in hindsight but also no better. Therefore
the average performance of multiplicative weights at each group is approxi-
mately equal to the average performance of the best expert in that group. Since
the experts are fair in isolation, the average performance of the best expert in all
groups is the same which guarantees the equalized error rates desideratum. We
make these arguments formal below.
We follow the classical potential function analysis of multiplicative weights
but apply bidirectional bounds to also lower bound the performance of the
algorithm by the performance of the comparator. For each group g ∈ G and
every expert f ∈ F , let L f ,g = ∑t:g(t)=g `tf · 1{g(t) = g} be the cumulative loss of
expert f in examples with group context g, and Lˆg =
∑T
t=1
∑
f∈F ptf `
t
f · 1{g(t) = g} to
denote the expected loss of the algorithm on these examples. We also denote the
best in hindsight expert on these examples by f ?(g) = argmin f∈F L f ,g. Recall that
wtf ,g = (1 − η)
∑
τ≤t:g(τ)=g `τf is the weight of expert f in the instance of group g and let
Wt,g =
∑
j∈F wtj,g be its potential function.
To show that the algorithm does not perform much worse than any expert,
we follow the classical potential function analysis and, since (1 − η)x ≤ 1 − ηx for
all x ∈ [0, 1] and η ≤ 1, we obtain:
Wt+1,g =
∑
j∈F
wtj,g(1 − η)`
t
j·1{g(t)=g} ≤
∑
j∈F
wtj,g(1 − η`tj · 1{g(t) = g}) = Wt,g(1 − η
∑
j∈F
ptj`
t
j).
By the classical analysis, for all f ∈ F and g ∈ G:
wT+1f ,g = (1 − η)
∑T
t=1 `
t
f ·1{gt=g} ≤ WT+1,g ≤ d ·
T∏
t=1
(1 − η
∑
j∈F
ptj`
t
j · 1{g(t) = g})
where the left inequality follows since all summands of WT+1,g are positive and
the right inequality follows by unrolling WT+1,g and using that W1,g = d.
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Taking logarithms and using that −η − η2 < ln(1 − η) < −η for η < 1/2, this
implies that for all f ∈ F :
Lˆg ≤ (1 + η) · L f ,g + ln(d)
η
(7.1)
We now use the converse side of the inequalities to show that multiplicative
weights also does not perform much better than the best expert in hindsight
f ?(g). Using that (1 − η)x ≥ 1 − η(1 + η)x for all x ∈ [0, 1], we obtain:
Wt+1,g =
∑
j∈F
wtj,g · (1 − η)`
t
j·1{g(t)=g} ≥
∑
j∈F
wtj,g ·
(
1 − η(1 + η) · `tj · 1{g(t) = g}
)
= Wt,g ·
1 − η(1 + η)∑
j∈F
pti`
t
i
.
Using that f ?(g) is the best expert in hindsight, we can upper bound
∑
j∈F wtj,g ≤
d ·max j∈F wtj,g = d ·max f∈F (1 − η)
∑t
t=1 `
t
f 1{gt=g}. Similarly to before, it follows that:
d · (1 − η)
∑T
t=1 `
t
f?(g)
1{gt=g} ≥ WT+1 ≥ d ·
T∏
t=1
1 − η(1 + η)∑
j∈F
ptj`
t
j

which, for η < 1/2, implies that:
L̂g ≥ (1 − 4η) · L f?(g),g (7.2)
The expected -approximate regret of this algorithm is at most 6 · |G| times the
one of a single multiplicative weights instance (by summing over inequalities
(7.1) for all g ∈ G and since /6 ≤ η ≤ ). What is left to show is that the α-fairness
in composition guarantee is satisfied, that is there exists T0 (function of α and
) such that when the number of examples from each group is at least T0, the
maximum difference between average expected losses across groups is bounded
by α. Let g? be the group with the smallest average expected loss. We will show
that the maximum difference from the average expected loss of any other group
g is at most α for T0 = 6 ln(d)ηα . Since the experts are fair in isolation, we know that
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L f ,g
|{t:gt=g}| =
L f ,g′
|{t:gt=g′}| for all f ∈ F and g, g′ ∈ G. Combining this with inequalities (7.1)
and (7.2) and the fact that the losses are in [0, 1] and η ≤ α/6, we obtain:
L̂g
|{t : g(t) = g}| −
L̂g?
|{t : g(t) = g?}| ≤
(1 + η)L f?(g),g
|{t : g(t) = g}| +
ln(d)
η|{t : g(t) = g}| −
(1 − 4η)L f?(g?),g?
|{t : g(t) = g?}|
≤ 5η · L f?(g?),g?|{t : g(t) = g?}| +
ln(d)
η · T0 ≤ α.

Remark 7.1. If the instance is instead only approximately fair in isolation with respect
to equalized error rates, i.e. the error rates of the two experts are not exactly equal but
within some constant κ, the same analysis implies (α + κ)-fairness in composition with
respect to equalized error rates.
7.5 Balance in accuracy only when learning is not too good
The reader may be also wondering whether it suffices to just run separate learning
algorithms in the two groups or whether multiplicative weights has a special
property. In the following theorem, we show that the latter is the case. In
particular, multiplicative weights has the property of not doing better than the
best expert in hindsight. The main representative of algorithms that do not
have such a property are the algorithms that achieve low approximate regret
compared to a shifting benchmark (tracking the best expert), which we already
discussed in the previous chapter. More formally, approximate regret against a
shifting comparator f ? = ( f ?(1), . . . , f ?(T )) is defined as:
ApxReg,T ( f
?) =
∑
t
ptf `
t
f − (1 + )
∑
t
`tf?(t).
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Typical bounds are E[ApxReg( f ?)] = O(K( f
?)·ln(dT )

) where K( f ?) = 1+
∑T
t=2 1{ f ?(t) ,
f ?(t−1)} is the number of switches in the comparator. We show that any algorithm
that achieves such a guarantee even when K( f ?) = 2 does not satisfy fairness
in composition with respect to equalized error rate. This indicates that, for the
metric of equalized error rates, the algorithm not being too good is essential.
Theorem 7.4. For any α < 1/2 and  > 0, any algorithm that can achieve the
vanishing approximate regret property against shifting comparators f of length
K( f ) = 2, running separate instances of the algorithm for each group is α-unfair
in composition with respect to equalized error rate.
Proof. Our instance has two groups G = {A, B}, two experts F = { f1, f2}, and three
phases described below.
1. Phase I lasts for half of the time horizon {1, . . . ,T/2} and during this time,
we receive examples from group A. At round t, the adversary selects
loss `tf = 1 for the expert f ∈ F that is predicted with higher probability
(ptf ≥ 1/2) and `th = 0 for the other expert h ∈ F − { f }.
2. Phase II lasts
∑T/2
τ=1 `
τ
f1
rounds and involves examples in B. The adversary
selects losses `tf1 = 1 and `
t
f2
= 0.
3. Phase III lasts
∑T/2
τ=1 `
τ
f2
rounds and again involves examples in B. The
adversary now selects losses `tf1 = 0 and `
t
f2
= 1.
The instance is fair in isolation with respect to equalized error rates as the
cardinality of both groups is the same (half of the population in each group) and
the experts make the same number of mistakes in both groups. By construction,
the algorithm has expected average loss at least 12 in members of group A.
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We now focus on group B. By the shifting approximate regret guarantee and
given that there exists a sequence of experts of length 2 that has 0 loss, it holds
that the total loss of the algorithm needs to be sublinear on T and, in particular,
at most ( 12 − α) · T2 , which implies an expected error rate of 12 − α. Subtracting the
two error rates concludes the proof. 
7.6 Remarks
More information about the paper. The results presented in this chapter are
joint work with Avrim Blum, Suriya Gunasekar, and Nathan Srebro [28]. With
respect to the equalized error rates, we also show that group-unaware algorithms
also suffer from impossibility results. Our work opens up a number of interesting
questions with respect to whether other fairness metrics are compatible with
the no-regret property. Additionally, in the impossibility result for group-aware
algorithms, we heavily used that the adversary is adaptive and there was some
imbalance between the two populations; understanding what happens when
this is not the case would be interesting.
On balance across groups as a fairness notion. Our work points to an issue
that balance notions suffer from. If it is difficult to classify correctly a particular
group, balance notions require the decision-maker to jeopardize the performance
in other (possibly easily classifiable) groups. Providing bad treatment despite
enough confidence about the best alternative is arguably immoral and, in cases
such as clinical trials, explicitly illegal. Tackling this concern, in an ongoing joint
work with Avrim Blum, we suggest a group fairness notion for online decision-
179
making that, instead of focusing on equality, aims for accuracy in all (possibly
overlapping) populations and discuss the arising incentive issues.
On fairness in online decision-making. Dealing with fairness issues in online
decision-making has gained much attention over the last few years. One line of
work extends individual notions of fairness which require that similar individuals
(with respect to some similarity metric) should be treated similarly [49] to online set-
tings [90, 57, 62]. Another line of work aims to achieve the so called meritocratic
fairness [71, 73], which says that an individual/group of higher intrinsic quality
should never be selected with smaller probability than less qualified candidates.
Regarding notions targeting discrimination against particular groups, beyond
our work, there have been nice attempts to tackle important considerations of se-
quential decision-making. In particular, a line of work points to counterintuitive
externalities of using contextual bandit algorithms agnostic to the group iden-
tity and suggest that heterogeneity in data can replace the need for exploration
[20, 74, 109]. Other works have focused on designing bandit algorithms that
restrict the probabilities of selecting a particular group to avoid overexposure or
equivalently underexposure [38], or are only given one-sided feedback [21].
One important distinction compared to these works is that we do not assume
that the input is i.i.d. over time. A main complication in most of the above
works is that the algorithm needs to be very pessimistic throughout exploration
to learn the best fair policy but subsequently the algorithm can just use this policy
over time. In non-i.i.d. settings, the fairness consideration does not only affect
an initial stage; the algorithm needs to balance the optimization goal with the
fairness constraint throughout all time. Focusing on the simplest extension of
adversarial online learning with fairness concerns (all experts assumed to be
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individually fair), our work sheds light on which notions of fairness are amenable
to non-i.i.d. inputs arriving online.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FROM CHAPTER 2.
A.1 Concentration inequality
Lemma 2.2 (restated). Let x1, x2, . . . , xT be a sequence of nonnegative random
variables, each with xt ∈ [0, 1], and let mt = Et−1[xt] = E[xt|x1, . . . , xt−1], the random
variable that is the expectation of xt conditioned on the sequence x1, x2, . . . , xt−1.
Let  > 0, and X =
∑T
t=1 xt and M =
∑T
t=1mt. Then, with probability at least 1 − δ
X − (1 + )M ≤ (1 + ) ln(1/δ)

and also with probability at least 1 − δ
(1 − )M − X ≤ (1 + ) ln(1/δ)

Proof. The proof follows the outline of classical Chernoff bounds for independent
variables combined with the law of total expectation to handle the dependence.
First claim. For parameters b, λ > 0 to be set later, it holds:
P[X − (1 + )M > b] ≤ e−λb E
[
eλ(X−(1+)M)
]
= e−λb E
 T∏
t=1
eλ(xt−(1+)mt)
 (A.1)
We will prove by induction on T that the expectation above is at most 1 if we use
λ = ln(1+ ). Given this fact, we can set b such that e−λb = e− ln(1+)b = δ. Using that
ln(1 + ) ≥ /(1 + ) for all  ≥ 0, it follows that b = ln(1/δ)ln(1+) ≤ (1+)·ln(1/δ) .
Base of induction for first claim. Now consider the expectationE
[∏
t=1T eλ(xt−(1+)mt)
]
for λ = ln(1 + ), we prove by induction on T that this expectation is at most 1.
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For the base case of T = 1 we have a single random variable x1 ∈ [0, 1] and its
expectation m1 = E[x1]. The expectation is E
[
eλ(x1−(1+)m)
]
= E
[
eλx1
]
· e−λ(1+)m1 .
Note that for any value of x ∈ [0, 1], the following simple inequality holds:
eλx ≤ xeλ − x + 1
This is true as it holds with equality for x = 0 and 1, and the difference is a concave
function (as the second derivative of g(x) = eλx − xeλ + x − 1 is g′′(x) = λ2eλx ≥ 0),
so the inequality is true between the two points. Now write its expectation as:
E
[
eλx1
]
≤ E
[
xeλ − x1 + 1
]
= E
[
x ·
(
eλ − 1
)
+ 1
]
= m ·
(
eλ − 1
)
+ 1 ≤ em·(eλ−1).
Using this in the expectation of (A.1), we obtain:
E
[
eλ(x1−(1+)m)
]
≤ em·(eλ−1) · e−λ(1+)m = em(eλ−1−λ(1+)) ≤ 1
where the last inequality follows from the choice of λ = ln(1+ ), as the multiplier
of m in the exponent with this choice of λ is
eλ − 1 − λ(1 + ) =  − (1 + ) ln(1 + ) ≤  − (1 + )
(
 − 2/2
)
= −
2(1 − )
2
< 0.
Inductive step for first claim. Now we are ready to prove the general case.
Using the law of total expectation, we obtain:
E
 T∏
t=1
eλ(xt−(1+)mt)
 = ET−1∏
t=1
eλ(xt−(1+)mt) · eλ(xT−(1+)mT )

= E
T−1∏
t=1
eλ(xt−(1+)mt) · E
T−1
[
eλ(xT−(1+)mT )
]
where Et−1[·] is the random variable taking expectation over the last term con-
ditioned on all the previous terms x1, . . . , xT−1. Note that conditioned on the
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previous terms, the conditional expectation ET−1
[
eλ(xT−(1+)mT )
]
is exactly the base
case, and hence at most 1 by the above, so we can conclude that
E
 T∏
t=1
eλ(xt−(1+)mt)
 ≤ ET−1∏
t=1
eλ(xt−(1+)mt)

and the statement follows by the induction hypothesis.
Second claim. To prove the lower bound, we proceed in an analogous way.
For λ = − ln(1 − ), using that 1/(1 − ) ≥ 1 + , we obtain the equivalent of the
inequality (A.1) with b = ln(1/δ)ln(1/(1−)) ≤ ln(1/δ)ln(1+) .
P[(1 − )M − X > b] ≤ e−λb E
[
eλ((1−)M−X)
]
= e−λb E
 T∏
t=1
eλ((1−)mt−xt)
 (A.2)
Regarding a bound on the expectation, consider first a single variable m1 = E[x1].
E
[
e−λx1
]
≤ E
[
x1e−λ − x1 + 1
]
= m1
(
e−λ − 1
)
+ 1 ≤ em1(e−λ−1)
We now bound the expectation as
E
[
eλ((1−)m1−x1)
]
≤ eλ(1−)m1 E
[
e−λx1
]
≤ eλ(1−)m1 · em1·(e−λ−1) = em1(λ(1−)+(e−λ−1)) ≤ 1
where the last inequality follows from the choice of λ = − ln(1−), as the multiplier
of m in the exponent with this choice of λ is
λ(1 − ) + (e−λ − 1) = −(1 − ) ln(1 − ) −  ≤ (1 − ) −  = −2 < 0.
using the fact that ln(1 − ) ≤ −. The induction then follows as before. 
A.2 Transforming approximate regret to small-loss guarantees
Lemma 2.3 (restated). Suppose we have a randomized algorithm that takes as
input any  > 0 and guarantees that, for some q ≥ 1 and some function Ψ(·), and
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any δ > 0, with probability 1 − δ, for any time horizon s and any comparator f :
(1 − )
s∑
t=1
`tA(t) ≤
s∑
t=1
`tf +
Ψ(δ)
q
.
Assume using this algorithm over multiple phases (by restarting the algorithm
when a phase end). We run each phase τ with τ = 2−τ until τL̂τ > Ψ(δ)(τ)q where L̂τ
denotes the cumulative loss of the algorithm for phase τ. For any δ > 0, the regret
for this multi-phase algorithm is bounded, with probability at least 1 − δ by:
Regret ≤ O
((
L?
) q
q+1 Ψ
(
δ
log(L?+1)+1
) 1
q+1
+ Ψ
(
δ
log(L?+1)+1
)
+ 1
)
Proof. We denote the loss of the algorithm within phase τ as L̂τ and the loss of
the best arm within the phase as L?τ . Note that on any phase τ, by our premise
about approximate regret on each phase, with probability at least 1 − δ′,
L̂τ − L?τ ≤ τL̂τ +
Ψ(δ′)
(τ)q
The term τL̂τ of the right hand side can be split in two terms, i) all but the last
round of the phase and ii) the last round. The first term is bounded by Ψ(δ
′)
(τ)q
due
to the doubling condition. The second term can be upper bounded by τ since
the losses are in [0, 1]. Hence, for phase τ, with probability 1 − δ′:
L̂τ − L?τ ≤
2 · Ψ(δ′)
(τ)q
+ τ.
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Letting Γ denote the last phase and summing over the phases, we have:
L̂ − L? ≤
Γ−1∑
τ=0
2Ψ(δ′)
(τ)q
+
Γ−1∑
τ=0
τ + ΓL̂Γ +
Ψ(δ′)
(Γ)q
≤ 2Ψ(δ′) Γ∑
τ=0
1
2−qτ
+
Γ−1∑
τ=0
2−τ + ΓL̂Γ
≤ 2Ψ(δ′) · 2q(Γ+1) − 1
2q − 1 + 2 + ΓL̂Γ
≤ 4Ψ(δ′) 1
(Γ)q
+ 2 + ΓL̂Γ Since q ≥ 1
≤ 4
(
Ψ(δ′)
(Γ)q
)1/(q+1)
·
(
2q
Ψ(δ′)
(Γ−1)q
)q/(q+1)
+
(
ΓL̂Γ
)1/(q+1) · (ΓL̂Γ)q/(q+1) + 2
≤ 2q+2
(
Ψ(δ′)
(Γ)q
)1/(q+1)
·
(
PL̂Γ−1
)q/(q+1)
+
(
Ψ(δ′)
(Γ)q
)1/(q+1)
·
(
ΓL̂Γ
)q/(q+1)
+ 2
Thus we conclude that:
L̂ − L? ≤ O
((
Ψ
(
δ′
))1/(q+1) · (L̂)q/(q+1) + 1)
To replace the dependence of L̂ by L?, we apply Young’s inequality, the approxi-
mate regret property, and the sub-additivity property. For simplicity of presenta-
tion, we remove the multiplicative and additive constants and use a = q/(q + 1)
so that the analysis is clear for different small-loss powers.
L̂ − L? ≤ Ψ(δ′)1−a · (L̂)a ≤ (1 − a)Ψ(δ′) + aL̂⇒
L̂ ≤ 1
1 − aL
? + Ψ
(
δ′
)
Replacing to the previous guarantee and applying the subadditivity property
L̂ − L? ≤ Ψ(δ′)1−a · (L̂)a ≤ Ψ(δ′)1−a · ( 1
1 − aL
? + Ψ
(
δ′
))a
≤ 1
1 − a
(
L?
)a
Ψ
(
δ′
)1−a
+ Ψ
(
δ′
)
Since there are at most log
(
L? + 1
)
+ 1 phases, setting δ′ = δlog(L?+1)+1 suffices for
the high probability statements to hold for all phases. 
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FROM CHAPTER 3.
B.1 Active arm elimination with enlarged confidence intervals
Lemma 3.1 (restated). Assume that c is a valid upper bound for the total cor-
ruption and we run Active Arm Elimination with wd(a, t) =
√
log(2kT/δ)
n(a,t) +
c
n(a,t) .
Then, with probability at least 1 − δ, arm a? never becomes eliminated.
Proof. The crux of the proof lies in establishing that, with high probability, the
upper bound of the confidence interval of a? never becomes lower than the
lower bound of the confidence interval of any other arm a and therefore a? does
not become eliminated. More formally, let θ˜(a, t) be the empirical mean of the
rewards from arm a until time t (that is the uncorrupted part) and µ˜(a, t) be the
empirical mean of the corrupted rewards from the same arm. We also denote by
n(a, t) the number of times we selected arm a till then. Recall that µ(a) is the mean
of arm a. By Hoeffding inequality, for any arm a, with probability at least 1 − δ′:
|θ˜(a, t) − µ(a)| ≤
√
log(2/δ′)
n(a, t)
.
We set δ′ = δ/kT to establish that this holds for all arms and all time steps (after
arm a has been played n(a) times). As a result, for any arm a and any time t:
θ˜(a, t) ≤ µ(a) +
√
log(2kT/δ)
n(a,t) and θ˜(a
?, t) ≥ µ(a?) −
√
log(2kT/δ)
n(a?,t) .
Let’s focus now on the actual (corrupted) empirical means. Since c is a valid
upper bound on the total corruption then the (corrupted) empirical means can
be affected by at most absolute corruption c. Hence:
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µ˜(a, t) ≤ θ˜(a, t) + cn(a,t) and µ˜(a?, t) ≥ θ˜(a?, t) − cn(a?,t) .
Combining the above inequalities with the fact that the actual mean of a? is
higher than the one of a, i.e. µ(a?) ≥ µ(a), we establish that µ˜(a, t) − µ˜(a?, t) ≤
wd(a, t) + wd(a?, t) and therefore arm a? is not eliminated. Since this holds for all
times and arms, the lemma follows. 
Lemma 3.2 (restated). Assume that c is a valid upper bound for the total cor-
ruption and we run Active Arm Elimination with wd(a, t) =
√
log(2kTδ)
n(a,t) +
c
n(a,t) .
Then, with probability at least 1 − δ, all arms a , a? become eliminated after
N(a) = 36 log(2kT/δ)+6c
∆(a)2 plays.
Proof. The proof stems from the following observations. By Lemma 3.1, arm a? is
with high probability never eliminated. Assume that arm a is played N(a) times
and let τ(a) be the time that arm a is played for the N(a)-th time. We will show
that, with high probability, arm a is dominated by a? at this point, i.e. after N(a)
plays of arm a, with high probability, the lower confidence bound of arm a? is
above the upper confidence bound of arm a.
More formally, let again θ˜(a, t) be the empirical mean of the rewards from arm
a until time t (that is the uncorrupted part) and µ˜(a) be the empirical mean of the
corrupted rewards from the same arm. By Hoeffding inequality, for any arm a,
with probability at least 1 − δ′:
|θ˜(a, t) − µ(a)| ≤
√
log(2/δ′)
n(a, t)
. (B.1)
As a result, setting again δ′ = δ/kT , after N(a) = 36 log(2kT/δ)+6c
∆(a)2 plays of arm a, the
empirical uncorrupted mean of a is, with high probability, at most:
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θ˜(a, τ(a)) ≤ µ(a) +
√
log(2KT/δ)
N(a) ≤ µ(a) + ∆(a)6 .
Similarly, the empirical stochastic mean of a? is, with high probability, at least:
θ˜
(
a?, τ(a)
) ≥ µ(a?) − √ log(2kT/δ)N(a) ≥ µ(a?) − ∆(a)6
Since the corruptions are upper bounded by C ≤ c, they can only contribute to a
decrease in the average empirical (corrupted) means by at most ∆(a)6 which is not
enough to circumvent the gap ∆(a) due to the choice of N(a):
µ˜
(
a?, τ(a)
) ≥ θ˜(a?, τ(a)) − cN(a) ≥ θ˜(a?, τ(a)) − ∆(a)6
µ˜((a, τ(a)) ≤ θ˜(a, τ(a)) + cN(a) ≤ θ˜(a, τ(a)) + ∆(a)6
Finally, at time τ(a), the width of both arms, played N(a) times at this point, is:
wd
(
a?, τ(a)
)
= wd(a, τ(a)) =
√
log(2kT/δ)
N(a) +
c
N(a) ≤ ∆(a)3 .
Combining the above, with probability 1− δ, if arm a is not eliminated until then,
it is eliminated at time τ(a), i.e. µ˜(a?, τ(a)) − µ˜(a, τ(a)) ≥ wd(a?, τ(a)) + wd(a, τ(a)):
µ˜
(
a?, τ(a)
) − µ˜(a, τ(a)) ≥ θ˜(a?, τ(a)) − θ˜(a, τ(a)) − 2 · ∆(a)
6
≥ µ(a?) − µ(a) − 4 · ∆(a)
6
≥ µ(a?) − µ(a) − 4 · ∆(a)
6
− 2 · ∆(a)
6
+ wd
(
a?, τ(a)
)
+ wd(a, τ(a))
≥ µ(a?) − µ(a) − ∆(a) + wd(a?, τ(a)) + wd(a, τ(a))
≥ +wd(a?, τ(a)) + wd(a, τ(a))

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B.2 Fast-slow active arm elimination race intervals
In this section, we provide the proof of Theorem 3.1. To handle the corruption, we
bound with high probability the total corruption experienced by the slow active
arm elimination instance S (Lemma 3.3). To deal with an adaptive adversary, we
need a martingale concentration inequality; specifically we apply a Bernstein-
style inequality introduced in [23] (Lemma B.1).
Lemma B.1 (Lemma 1 in [23]). Let X1, . . . , XT be a sequence of real-valued random
numbers. Assume, for all t, that Xt ≤ R and that E[Xt|X1, . . . , Xt−1] = 0 for R > 0.
Also let V =
∑T
t=1 E[X2t |X1, . . . , Xt−1]. Then, for any δ > 0:
P
 T∑
t=1
Xt > R ln(1/δ) +
e − 2
R
· V
 ≤ δ
Lemma 3.3 (restated). If the total corruption is C ≤ c then the slow active arm
elimination algorithm S observes, with probability at least 1 − δ, corruption of at
most ln(1/δ) + 3 during its exploration phase (when picked with probability 1/c).
Proof. The first observation is that the expected corruption encountered by algo-
rithm S is at most a constant (total corruption of C encountered with probability
1/c). The rest of the proof focuses on bounding the variance of this random
variable (actual corruption encountered by the layer). Crucially, since we want to
allow the adversary to be adaptive, we should not assume independence across
rounds but only conditional independence (conditioned on the history) and this
is why some more involved concentration inequality is necessary. Therefore we
create a martingale sequence (actual corruption minus expected corruption) and
apply a Bernstein-style concentration inequality.
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Let Zta be the corruption that is observed by the exploration phase of the
algorithm if arm a is selected. For every round t, if adversary selects corruption
Cta then Zta is therefore a random variable equal to Cta with probability 1/c and 0
otherwise. Given that the adversary is adaptive and may select the corruptions
based on the realizations of the previous rounds, we need to use an appropriate
concentration inequality. We use a Bernstein-style inequality, introduced in [23]
(Lemma B.1). Initially we resolve the randomness conditioning on ` = S (the slow
algorithm is selected). Since active arm elimination is deterministic, conditioned
on selecting algorithm S, the selected arm is deterministic. Let a(S, t) be the
arm that would be selected if ` = S (which happens with probability 1/c). The
martingale sequence is now
Xt = Zta(S,t) − E
[
Zta(S,t) | H(1 : t − 1)
]
,
whereH(1 : t) corresponds to the history up to round t. Note that
E
[
X2t |X1, . . . , Xt−1
]
=
1
c
(
Ca(S,t) − Ca(S,t)c
)2
+
c − 1
c
(
Ca(S,t)
c
)2
=
(
Ca(S,t)
)2
c
(
c − 1
c
)2
+
c − 1
c
(
Ca(S,t)
c
)2
≤ 2 · Ca(S,t)
c
.
The last inequality holds as Cta(S,t) ∈ [0, 1] and Ca(S,t) ≤ c.
Therefore, summing over all the rounds,
V =
∑
t
E
[
X2t |X1, . . . , Xt−1
]
≤
∑
t
2
Ca(S,t)
C
≤ 2
C
·
∑
t
max
a
Cta
 ≤ 2.
A trivial upper bound of |Xt| is R = 1, since the rewards are in [0, 1]. Applying
Lemma B.1, we show that, w.p. 1 − δ:
∑
t
Xt ≤ ln(1/δ) + 2(e − 2) ≤ ln(1/δ) + 2
191
The bound of the statement then for the corruption experienced by S then follows
by adding the expected corruption E
[∑
t Za(S,t) | H(1 : t − 1)] ≤ 1:∑
t
Zta(S,t) =
∑
t
Xt + E
∑
t
Za(S,t) | H(1 : t − 1)
 ≤ ln(1/δ) + 3.

Theorem 3.1 (restated) With probability 1 − δ, the fast-slow active arm elimina-
tion has regret O
(∑
a,a?
log(kT/δ)
∆(a)
)
for the stochastic case and O
(
k · c ·∑a,a? (log(kT/δ))2∆(a) )
for the C-corrupted case with C ≤ c.
Proof. The fast and slow algorithms are run with widths (for ` ∈ {F,S}):
wd`(a) =
√
log(8kT/δ)
n`(a)
+
c`
n`(a)
where cF = 0 for the fast instance and cS = log(8kT/δ) + 3 for the slow instance S.
Stochastic case. Let δst` = δ/4 be the failure probability of instance ` ∈ {F,S}
when the input is stochastic. If we are in the stochastic case, the total corruption
is 0 and hence less than both cF and cS. By Lemma 3.2 with probability 1 − δst` for
all arms a, it holds that arm a , a? is eliminated after at most N(a) plays where:
N(a) =
36 log(2kT/δst` ) + 6 log(2kT/δ
st
` )
∆(a)2
=
42 log(2kT/δst` )
∆(a)2
. (B.2)
For a pseudoregret guarantee, the result follows directly by multiplying the
number of plays for any suboptimal arm a , a? with its expected contribution
to regret every time it is selected which is ∆(a). Setting δ = 1/T makes the
contribution of the failure probability to regret at most a constant since δ · T = 1.
For a high-probability guarantee, the regret coming from a suboptimal arm
a after N(a) plays may be more than the expected regret N(a)∆(a). We define as
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in Lemma 3.2, θ˜(a, t) to be the empirical mean of the rewards from arm a until
time t and n(a, t) to be the corresponding number of plays. By the Hoeffding
inequality there, i.e. Eq. (B.1), for any arm a, with probability at least 1 − δst` (this
corresponds to the same failure probability we have already considered):
|θ˜(a, t) − µ(a)| ≤
√
log
(
2kT/δst`
)
n(a, t)
.
Hence, the total reward of a , a? after N(a) plays is at most:
√
N(a) · log(2kT/δst` ) = N(a) ·
√
log(2kT/δst`
N(a)
≤ N(a) · ∆(a).
which implies that the guarantee also holds with high probability.
Corrupted case. The most interesting case is the C-corrupted setting for some
C ≤ c. Let δcoS = δ/4 be the failure probability in Lemma 3.3. By Lemma 3.3,
with probability at least 1 − δcoS , the actual corruption experienced by the slow
active arm elimination algorithm is at most ln(1/δcoS ) + 3. Therefore, similar to the
stochastic case, we can obtain a high-probability guarantee on the regret coming
from selecting suboptimal arms in the slow active arm elimination instance S.
What is left is to bound the regret coming from the fast active arm elimination
instance F. Towards this goal, we bound the number of times that a suboptimal
arm is played in the fast instance by the expected time that it remains active at
the slow instance. By Eq. B.2, with probability at least 1− δstS − δcoS , arm a is played
in the slow instance, at most NS(a) times where:
NS(a) =
42 log(2kT/δstS )
∆(a)2
.
For a pseudoregret, we can directly use this bound of the slow instance to bound
the number of times a is played in the fast instance. In particular, for any play of
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arm a in the slow instance, there are in expectation at most k ·c ·NS(a) total rounds
as every move in the slow instance occurs with probability 1/c and at least 1/k of
these moves are plays of a while it is still active. Hence, arm a is eliminated in
the fast instance F after k · c · NS(a) rounds and, till then, it contributes ∆(a) to the
regret in expectation when played, which provides the pseudoregret guarantee.
For a high probability guarantee, let δmoveS = δ/4kT and observe that with prob-
ability at least 1 − δmoveS , we make one move at the slow instance S at most every
O
(
c log
(
1/δmoveS
))
moves at the fast instance F. This can be seen by considering the
following process: One tosses coins with bias p = 1/c until she observes heads
for the first time (heads is the p-biased event). After M tosses of the coins the
probability that no heads have arrived is at most (1 − p)M. To ensure that this is
less than δmoveS , we need to wait M ≥
log(1/δmoveS )
log( 11−p )
, which is achieved by M = log(1/δ
move
S )
p/(1−p) .
By union bound on the failure probabilities for each such draw, we obtain
that, with failure probability δelS = k · NS(a) · δmoveS ≤ δ/4 (since NS(a) ≤ T ), arm a
gets inactivated in F after at most NF(a) plays where:
NF(a) = k · NS(a) · c · log(1/δelS ) =
42 · c · k · (log(8KT/δ))2
∆(a)2
.
The last part is to prove that the regret experienced throughout those rounds is
not too large. This follows again by Eq. (B.1) in a way analogous to the stochastic
case. The total failure probability is at most δstF + δ
st
S + δ
co
S + δ
el
S = δ. 
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B.3 Multi-layer active arm elimination race
Theorem 3.2 (restated) With probability 1 − δ, the multi-layer active arm elimi-
nation race has regret in the agnostic C-corrupted case bounded by:
O
∑
a,a∗
k ·C · log(kT/δ) + log(T )
∆(a)
· log(kT/δ)
.
Proof. The proof is similar to Theorem 3.1 with layer `? = argmin`
[
2` > C
]
playing
the role of the slow instance S and smaller layers behave as the fast layer F.
Robust layers are essentially stochastic. For layers ` ≥ `?, it holds that the
total corruption they experience is, in expectation, less than 1 since C ·2−` ≤ 1 and,
as in Lemma 3.3, with high probability less than c` = log(4kT · logT/δ)+ 3. Hence,
as in the stochastic case of Theorem 3.1, we establish a O
(
log(2KT/δst` )
∆(a)
)
bound on the
regret caused by any suboptimal arm a, with failure probability δst` = δ/(2 logT ).
Since there are log(T ) such levels, the regret coming from these layers is upper
bounded by the second term of the theorem with failure probability δ/2.
Not robust layers eventually corrected by `?. For ` < `?, we treat them simi-
larly to the fast layer F in the corrupted case of Theorem 3.1. In particular, similar
to the proof there, we upper bound the number of times any suboptimal arm
is played in layer `?, as in Eq. (B.2). Then we can bound the number of times
that this arm is played in faster layers as in the proof there with c = 2−`? . Since,
we do not know the corruption C in advance (and it is adaptively selected), we
need to take a union bound over all the number of layers as well which results to
selecting failure probabilities δco` = δ
el
` = δ/(2 logT ). Finally, to be agnostic to C,
we use c = 2`? instead of c = C; this only increases regret by a constant factor. 
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APPENDIX C
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FROM CHAPTER 4
In this section, we provide the proof of the lemma connecting spread to absolute
and squared loss. Before doing so, we provide a useful auxiliary lemma.
Lemma C.1. For odd T = 2n + 1, one pair (AT , BT ) minimizing either absolute or
squared loss subject to the constraints of the spread definition is A2n+1 = (0 . . . 2n)
and BT = (n . . . n).
Proof. First we show that there exists a BT minimizing the loss with bi = b j for all
i, j. Assume otherwise; then there exist two subsequent i, j with b′i > b
′
j. Since ai <
a j + 1 by the assumption on spread, minx∈bi,b j{`(ai, b) + `(a j, b)} ≤ `(ai, bi) + `(a j, b j).
Applying this recursively, we conclude that such a BT exists.
Second, we show that there exist an AT that consists of elements ai+1 = ai + 1.
Since the elements of BT are all equal to b, the sequence
∑2n
i=0 `(ai, b) is minimized
for both absolute and squared loss when ai = b + i − n.
Last, the exact value of b does not make a difference and therefore we can set
it to be b = n concluding the lemma. 
Lemma 4.1 restated: For absolute loss, `1(A, B) =
∑
i |ai − bi|, the spread of `1
is S `1(m) ≤
√
5m. For squared loss, `2(A, B) =
∑
(ai − bi)2, the spread of `2 is
S `2(m) ≤ 3
√
14m.
Proof. It will be easier to restrict ourselves to odd T = 2n + 1 and also assume
that T ≥ 3. This will give an upper bound on the spread (which is tight up to
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small constant factors). By Lemma C.1, a pair of sequence minimizing abso-
lute/squared loss is AT = (0, . . . , 2n) and BT = (n, . . . , n). We now provide bounds
on the spread based on this sequence, that is we find a T = 2n + 1 that satisfies
the inequality `(AT , BT ) ≤ m.
Absolute loss: The absolute loss of the above sequence is:
`(AT , BT ) = 2 ·
n∑
j=1
j = 2 · n(n + 1)
2
= n(n + 1) =
T − 1
2
· T + 1
2
=
T 2 − 1
4
.
A T that makes `(AT , BT ) ≥ m is T =
√
4m + 1. Therefore, for absolute loss
S `(m) ≤
√
5m, since m ≥ 1
Squared loss: The squared loss of the above sequence is:
`(AT , BT ) = 2 ·
n∑
j=1
j2 = 2 · n(n + 1)(2n + 1)
6
=
(T 2 − 1) · T
12
=
T 3 − T
12
≥ 8T
3
9 · 12 =
2T 3
27
where the inequality holds because T ≥ 3.
A T that makes `(AT , BT ) ≥ m is T = 3
√
14m. Therefore, for squared loss
S `(m) ≤ 3
√
14m. 
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APPENDIX D
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FROM CHAPTER 5.
D.1 Concave reward curves
In this section, we investigate conditions under which throughput, social welfare
and revenue satisfy the conditions of theorem 5.6. In particular, we first show
that the respective reward curves R(q) = qI(q) are concave. We then prove that
the concave reward curves assumption implies the non-increasing (quantiles)
per-ride rewards assumption.
Lemma D.1. Revenue (i) satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 5.6 under reg-
ular value distributions, Throughput (ii) and Social Welfare (iii) satisfy the as-
sumptions under any value distribution.
Proof. We drop the subscripts throughout this proof to simplify notation. We
begin by considering (i) revenue, for which the result holds due to the fact that the
reward curve is concave if and only if the distribution is regular (cf. Proposition
3.10 in [66]). For (ii) throughput, R(q) = q · I(q) = q is a linear function of q for any
value distribution and thus concave.
Lastly, for (iii) social welfare, we use the so-called hazard rate h(y) = f (y)1−F(y) of
a distribution F with density f . Given F, denote by p(q) and q(p) a price as a
function of its corresponding quantile and vice-versa. Then, by the definition of
hazard rate:
q(p) = exp
(
−
∫ p(q)
0
h(y)dy
)
(D.1)
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Taking logarithms and differentiating, we obtain:
− 1
q(p)
= h(p(q))
dp(q)
dq
(D.2)
Hence, as R(q(p)) = q(p) · I(q(p)) and f (p) = (1 − F(p))h(p) = q(p)h(p) we have
R(q) =
∫ ∞
p(q)
v f (v)dv =
∫ ∞
p(q)
vh(v) exp
(
−
∫ v
0
h(y)dy
)
dv
The first derivative dR(q)dq of R(q) is equal to
−p(q)h(p(q)) exp
(
−
∫ p(q)
y=0
h(y)dy
)
dp(q)
dq
=
p(q) exp
(
− ∫ p(q)
y=0
h(y)dy
)
q(p)
= p(q),
where the first equality comes from Equation (D.2), the second from (D.1).
The second derivative is then given by
d2R(q)
dq2
=
dp(q)
dq
= − 1
qh(p(q))
= −1 − F(p(q))
f (p(q))q(p)
< 0,
which concludes the proof of the Lemma. 
Lemma D.2. If a function I(·) has the property that qI(q) is concave, then I(·)
is non-increasing. In particular, if some objective satisfies the concave reward
curves assumption, it also satisfies the non-increasing (in quantiles) per-ride
rewards assumption.
Proof. Suppose the statement was not true, then there must exist q1, q2 with
0 < q1 < q2 such that I(q1) < I(q2). Let A =
q1
q2
. Then
q1I(q2) = A · q2I(q2) = A · q2I(q2) + (1 − A) · 0 · I(0)
≤ (A · q2 + (1 − A) · 0)I(A · q2 + (1 − A) · 0) = q1I(q1),
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where the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality since the function qI(q)
is a concave function. As q1 > 0, it follows that I(q2) ≤ I(q1) and we therefore
arrive at a contradiction. 
D.2 Irreducibility of the priced system
We justify here our assumption from Section 5.2 that the infinite-unit solutions
we obtain induce a connected graph; to do so, we first need to assume that the
graph created by edges (i, j) on which φi j > 0 is strongly connected, that is, the
directed graph with edge-set
{
(i, j) : φi j > 0
}
contains a path from any node to any
other. We then prove that given any solution to the infinite-unit pricing problem,
there exists a solution with arbitrarily close objective that also induces a strongly
connected graph. For simplicity, we assume that throughput is the objective,
yet the extension to other objectives is immediate. Throughout this section we
work with the flow fi j,∞(q) induced by demands in the infinite-unit system, but
suppress all dependencies on∞ in the notation.
Theorem D.1 (Irreducible Markov Chain). Let  > 0. Suppose quantiles q
induce a steady-state rate of units fi j,∞(q) on k components; then there exist
quantiles q′ that induce fi j,∞(q′) such that the graph with edge-set {(i, j) : fi j,∞(q′) >
0} is strongly connected and the throughput with q′ is at least (1 − ) times that
of q in the infinite-unit system.
Proof. Notice first that we may assume without loss of generality that q fulfills
the demand circulation property; indeed, whether an arc has non-zero demand
on it is independent of the number of units and by Lemma 5.1 there is a solution
in the relaxation (with demand circulation) that has an elevated throughput that
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is no less than
∑
i, j fi j(q). To prove the theorem we repeatedly increase demand
on some edges (i, j) with φi j > 0 and fi j(q) = 0, but also decrease demand on some
edges (i¯, j¯) with fi¯ j¯(q) > 0. Equivalently, we increase quantiles qi j and decrease
quantiles qi¯ j¯. To ensure that edges of the second kind do not have their flow
reduced by too much relative to fi¯ j¯(q), we set
δ =

k
×min
{
min
i, j
{
fi j(q) : fi j(q) > 0
}
,min
i, j
{
φi j − fi j(q) : φi j − fi j(q) > 0
}}
.
Whenever we change the demand on an edge, this is done by an additive δ
amount. Reducing flow at most k times to obtain fi j(q′) we guarantee that
φi j ≥ fi j(q′) ≥ (1 − ) fi j(q) holds which implies that the total throughput cannot
change by more than a factor (1 − ).
As we assume that our underlying graph with edge-set {(i, j) : φi j > 0} is
strongly connected, it must be the case that the graph with edge set {(i, j) :
φi jqi j > 0} contains a minimal sequence of components C1,C2, . . . ,Cd = C1, d > 2,
and nodes u`, v` ∈ C` such that φu`v`+1 > 0, but fu`v`+1 = 0. In particular, it being
minimal implies that no component other than the first appears repeatedly. Since
each u`, v` are in the same strongly connected component of the graph with edge-
set {(i, j) : fi j(q) > 0}, we know that for each ` there exists a simple path from
u` to v` with positive demand on it. We change the quantiles as follows: for all
pairs (u`, v`+1) we increase the quantiles qu`,v`+1 so that the steady-state rate of units
increases by δ and for each edge along the path from u` to v` we decrease the
quantiles so that the steady-state rate of units decreases by δ. At all other edges
the quantiles remain unchanged.
We first argue that this again gives rise to a demand circulation: Each node
along a path within a component has its in-flow and out-flow (of demand)
reduced by δ, whereas at the nodes ui, vi both the sum of in-flows and the sum of
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out-flows have remained the same. At all other nodes, nothing is altered. Thus,
flow conservation continues to hold. By choice of δ none of the edge-capacities
are violated. Thus, the resulting demand {phii jqi j} is in the flow relaxation with at
most k − 1 distinct components. Applying this procedure repeatedly, we obtain
a single strongly connected component such that the throughput with q′ in the
infinite-unit limit (by Lemma 5.3) is within (1−) of the throughput of fi j,∞(q). 
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APPENDIX E
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FROM CHAPTER 6
E.1 Smoothness of first-price auctions with discrete bids
Before providing the proof of smoothness with discrete bidding space, we for-
mally define a submodular valuations. A valuation function vti(·) is submodular
if, for any S ,T such that S ⊆ T and any x < T , vti(S + {x}) − vi(S ) ≥ vti(T + {x}).
Lemma 6.2. The simultaneous first price mechanism where players are restricted
to bid on at most d items and on each item submit a bid that is a multiple of δ · ρ,
is a solution-based
(
1
2 − δ, 1
)
-smooth mechanism, when players have submodular
valuations, such that all marginals are either 0 or at least ρ and such that each
player wants at most d items, i.e. vti(S ) = maxT⊆S :|T |=d v
t
i(T ).
Proof. Consider a valuation profile v = (v1, . . . , vn) for the n players and a bid
profile b = (b1, . . . , bn). Each valuation vi is submodular and thereby also falls
into the class of XOS valuations [88], i.e. it can be expressed as a maximum over
additive valuations. More formally, for some index set Li:
vi(S ) = max
`∈Li
∑
j∈S
a`i j
Furthermore, by the assumption that marginals are either 0 or at least ρ, it can
be easily shown that a`i j is either 0 or at least ρ. Moreover, when the player has
value for at most d types of items, it can also be shown that for any ` ∈ Li at most
d of the (a`i j) j∈[m] will be non-zero.
Consider a feasible allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) of the items to the bidders, where
xi is the set of types of items allocated to player i (the latter is feasible if each
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item is never allocated more than its supply). Consider the following deviation
b?i (vi, xi) that is related to the valuation vi of player i and to allocation xi: Let
`?(xi) = argmax`∈Li
∑
j∈xi a
`
i j. Then on each item j ∈ xi with a`
∗(xi)
i j > 0, submit⌊
a`
∗(xi)
i j
2
⌋
δ·ρ
.1 On each j < xi, submit a zero bid. This submits at most d non-zero bids.
Now we argue that these deviations imply the solution-based smoothness.
Let p j(b) be the lowest winning bid on item j, under bid profile b. Observe that
for each j, if p j(b) <
⌊
a`
∗(xi)
i j
2
⌋
δ·ρ
, the player wins item j and pays
⌊
a`
∗(xi)
i j
2
⌋
δ·ρ
. Hence:
ui(b?i (vi, xi), b−i; vi) ≥
∑
j∈xi
a`?(xi)i j −
a`
?(xi)
i j
2

δ·ρ
 · 1
p j(b) <
a`
?(xi)
i j
2

δ·ρ

≥
∑
j∈xi
a`
?(xi)
i j
2

δ·ρ
· 1
p j(b) <
a`
?(xi)
i j
2

δ·ρ

≥
∑
j∈xi

a`
?(xi)
i j
2

δ·ρ
− p j(b)

≥
∑
j∈xi
a`
?(xi)
i j
2
− δ · ρ − p j(b)

≥
(
1
2
− δ
)∑
j∈xi
a`
?(xi)
i j −
∑
j∈xi
p j(b)
=
(
1
2
− δ
)
vi(xi) −
∑
j∈xi
p j(b)
Summing over players and observing that REV(b) ≥ ∑ j∈xi p j(b), we get the lemma.

1We denote with bxcδ·ρ the highest multiple of δ · ρ that is less than or equal to x.
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APPENDIX F
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FROM CHAPTER 7.
F.1 Complete proof for group-unaware algorithms
Theorem 7.1. For all α < 3/8, there exists  > 0 such that any group-unaware
algorithm that satisfies Eσ
[
ApxReg,T ( f )
]
= o(T ) for all f ∈ F is α-unfair in compo-
sition with respect to false negative rate even for perfectly balanced sequences. In
particular, for any group-unaware algorithm that ensures vanishing approximate
regret1, there exists an oblivious adversary for assigning labels such that:
• In expectation, half of the population corresponds to each group.
• For each group, in expectation half of its labels are positive and the other
half are negative.
• The false negative rates of the two groups differ by α.
Proof. Consider an instance that consists of two groups G = {A, B}, two experts
F = {hn, hu}, and two phases: Phase I and Phase II. Group A is the group we end
up discriminating against while group B is boosted by the discrimination with
respect to false negative rate. At each round t the groups arrive stochastically
with probability 1/2 each, independent of σ1:t−1.
The experts output a score value in Yˆ = [0, 1], where score yˆtf ∈ Yˆ can be
interpreted as the probability that expert f assigns to label being positive in
round t, i.e. y(t) = +. The loss function is the expected probability of error given
1This requirement is weaker than vanishing regret so the impossibility result applies to
vanishing regret algorithms.
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by `(yˆ, y) = yˆ · 1{y = −} + (1 − yˆ) · 1{y = +}. The two experts are very simple:
hn always predicts negative, i.e. yˆthn = 0 for all t, and hu is an unbiased expert
who, irrespective of the group or the label, makes an inaccurate prediction with
probability β = 1/4+
√
, i.e. yˆthu = β · 1{y(t) = −}+ (1− β) · 1{y(t) = +} for all t. Both
experts are fair in isolation with respect to both false negative and false positive
rates: FNR is 100% for hn and β for hu regardless the group, and FPR is 0% for hn
and β for hu, independent of the group. The instance proceeds in two phases:
1. Phase I lasts for T/2 rounds. The adversary assigns negative labels on
examples with group context B and assigns a label uniformly at random to
examples from group A.
2. In Phase II, there are two plausible worlds:
(a) if the expected probability the algorithm assigns to expert hu in Phase
I is at least Eσ
[∑T/2
t=1 p
t
hu
]
>
√
 · T then the adversary assigns negative
labels for both groups
(b) else the adversary assigns positive labels to examples with group
context B while examples from group A keep receiving positive and
negative labels with probability equal to half.
We will show that for any algorithm with vanishing approximate regret
property, i.e. with ApxReg,T ( f ) = o(T ), the condition for the first world is
never triggered and hence the above sequence is indeed balanced.
We now show why this instance is unfair in composition with respect to false
negative rate. The proof involves showing the following two claims:
1. In Phase I, any -approximate regret algorithm needs to select the negative
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expert hn most of the times to ensure small approximate regret with respect
to hn. This means that, in Phase I (where we encounter half of the positive
examples from group A and none from group B), the false negative rate of
the algorithm is close to 1.
2. In Phase II, any -approximate regret algorithm should quickly catch up
to ensure small approximate regret with respect to hu and hence the false
negative rate of the algorithm is closer to β. Since the algorithm is group-
unaware, this creates a mismatch between the false negative rate of B (that
only receives false negatives in this phase) and A (that has also received
many false negatives before).
Upper bound on probability of playing hu in Phase I. We now formalize the
first claim by showing that any algorithm with Eσ
[∑T/2
t=1 p
t
hu
]
>
√
 · T does not
satisfy the approximate regret property. The algorithm suffers an expected loss
of β every time it selects expert hu. On the other hand, when selecting expert hn,
it suffers a loss of 0 for members of group B and an expected loss of 1/2 for
members of group A. Hence, the algorithm’s expected loss in the first phase is:
E
σ
 T/2∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptf · `tf
 = Eσ
 T/2∑
t=1
pthu
 · β + Eσ
 T/2∑
t=1
pthn · 1g(t)=A
 · 12
= E
σ
 T/2∑
t=1
pthu
 · β +
T2 − Eσ
 T/2∑
t=1
pthu

 · 14
=
T
8
+
(
β − 1
4
)
· E
σ
 T/2∑
t=1
pthu
 = T8 + √ · Eσ
 T/2∑
t=1
pthu

In contrast, the negative expert has, in Phase I, expected loss of:
E
σ
 T/2∑
t=1
`thn
 = T8 .
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Therefore, if Eσ
[∑T/2
t=1 p
t
hu
]
>
√
 ·T , the -approximate regret of the algorithm with
respect to hn is linear to the time-horizon T (and therefore not vanishing) since:
E
σ
 T/2∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptf · `tf − (1 + )
T/2∑
t=1
`thN
 = T8 + √ · Eσ
 T/2∑
t=1
pthu
 − (1 + )T8 > 78 · T.
Upper bound on probability of playing hn in Phase II. Regarding the second
claim, we first show that Eσ
[∑T
t=T/2+1 p
t
hn
]
≤ 16√ · T for any -approximate regret
algorithm with  < 1/16. The algorithm’s expected loss in the second phase is:
E
σ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
∑
f∈F
ptf `
t
f
 = Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn
 · 34 +
T2 − Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn

 · β.
Since, in Phase I, the best case scenario for the algorithm is to always select expert
hn and incur a loss of T/8, this implies that for  < 1/16:
E
σ
 T∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptf `
t
f
 ≥ T8 + T2 · β + Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn
 · (34 − β
)
=
(
1 + 2
√

)
· T
4
+ E
σ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn
 · (12 − √
)
>
T
4
+ E
σ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn
 · 14 .
On the other hand, the cumulative expected loss of the β-inaccurate expert hu is
E
 T∑
t=1
`thu
 = β · T = T4 + √ · T.
Therefore, if the algorithm has Eσ
[∑T
t=T/2+1 p
t
hn
]
> 16
√
 · T , the -approximate
regret of the algorithm with respect to hu is linear to the time-horizon since:
E
σ
 T∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptf `
t
f − (1 + )
T∑
t=1
`thu
 >
T4 + Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn
 · 14
 − (1 + ) · (T4 + √ · T
)
≥ E
σ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn
 · 14 − 3√ · T > √ · T.
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The last inequality holds since  · T/4 +  · √ · T + √ · T ≤ 3√ · T for  ≤ 1.
Thus, we have shown that, when  < 1/16, for any algorithm with vanishing
approximate regret, necessarily we have Eσ
[∑T
t=T/2+1 p
t
hn
]
≤ 16√ · T .
Gap in false negative rates between groups A and B. We now compute the
expected false negative rates for the two groups, assuming that  < 1/16. Since
we focus on algorithms that satisfy the vanishing regret property, we have already
established that:
E
σ
 T/2∑
t=1
pthu
 ≤ √ · T and Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn
 ≤ 16√ · T. (F.1)
For ease of notation, let GtA,+ = 1{g(t) = A, y(t) = +} and GtB,+ = 1{g(t) = B, y(t) = +}.
Since the group context at round t arrives independent of σ1:t−1 and the adversary
is oblivious, we have that GtA,+,G
t
B,+ are independent of σ
1:t−1, and hence also
independent of pthu , p
t
hn
.
Since the algorithm is group-unaware, the expected cumulative probability
that the algorithm uses hn in Phase II is the same for both groups. We combine
this with the facts that under the online learning protocol with group context,
examples of group B arrive stochastically with probability half but only receive
positive labels in Phase II, we obtain:
E
σ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn ·GtB,+
 = 12 · Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthn
 ≤ 8√ · T. (F.2)
Recall that group B in Phase I has no positive labels, hence the false negative rate
on group B is:
E
σ
[
FNRσL(B)
]
= E
σ

∑T
t=T/2+1G
t
B,+ ·
(
pthu · β + pthn · 1
)
∑T
t=T/2+1 ·GtB,+
 = β + Eσ
 (1 − β) ·∑Tt=T/2+1GtB,+ · pthn∑T
t=T/2+1G
t
B,+

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In order to upper bound the above false negative rate, we denote the following
good event by
EB(η) =
σ1:T : T∑
t=T/2+1
GtB,+ > (1 − η)E
 T∑
t=T/2+1
GtB,+

.
By Chernoff bound, the probability of the bad event is:
P
[
¬EB(η)
]
= exp
−η2 · E
[∑T
t=T/2+1G
t
B,+
]
2
.
For ηB =
√
16 log(T )
T , this implies that P[¬EB(ηB)] ≤ 1/T 2 since Eσ[
∑T
t=T/2+1G
t
B,+] =
T
4 .
Therefore, by first using the bound on
∑T
t=T/2+1G
t
B,+ on the good event and the
bound on the probability of the bad event, and then taking the limit T → ∞, it
holds that:
E
σ
[
FNRσL(B)
]
= β + E
σ
 (1 − β) ·∑Tt=T/2+1GtB,+ · pthn∑T
t=T/2+1G
t
B,+

≤ β + 1 − β
1 − ηB ·
8
√
 · T
T/4
· P
[
EB(ηB)
]
+ 1 · P
[
¬EB(ηB)
]
≤ β + 32
√

1 − ηB +
1
T 2
→ 1
4
+ 33
√
.
We now move to the false negative rate of A:
E
σ
[
FNRσL(A)
]
= E
σ

∑T
t=1G
t
A,+ ·
(
pthu · β + pthn · 1
)
∑T
t=1G
t
A,+
.
Letting EA(η) =
{
σ1:T :
∑T
t=1G
t
A,+ < (1 + η)E
[∑T
t=1G
t
A,+
]}
and, since P[¬EA(η)] =
exp
(
− η2·E
[∑T
t=1G
t
A,+
]
3
)
, we obtain that, for ηA =
√
24 log(T )
T , P[¬EA(ηA)] = 1T 2 .
Recall that for our instance Eσ
[
GtA,+
]
= T/4 and GtA,+ is independent of p
t
hu
.
From our previous analysis we also know that:
E
σ
 T/2∑
t=1
pthuG
t
A,+
 ≤ √ · T4 and Eσ
 T∑
t=T/2+1
pthuG
t
A,+
 ≤ T8 (F.3)
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As a result, using that E
[∑T/2
t=1 G
t
A,+
]
= E
[∑T
t=T/2+1G
t
A,+
]
= T8 and Inequalities (F.3),
we obtain:
E
σ
 T∑
t=1
GtA,+ ·
(
pthu · β + pthn · 1
) = E
σ
 T∑
t=1
GtA,+ · −
T∑
t=1
GtA,+ · pthu(1 − β)

≥ T
4
(
1 − (1 − β) · (1
2
+
√
)
)
.
Therefore, similarly with before, it holds that:
E
σ
[
FNRσL(A)
]
= E
σ

∑T
t=1G
t
A,+ ·
(
pthu · β + pthn · 1
)
∑T
t=1G
t
A,+

≥ 1 − (1 − β) · (
1
2 +
√
)
(1 + ηA)
· P
[
EA(ηA)
]
+ 0 · P
[
¬EA(ηA)
]
≥
1
2 −
√
 + β2
1 + ηA
(
1 − 1
T 2
)
>
1
2 −
√
 + 18
1 + ηA
(
1 − 1
T 2
)
→ 5
8
− √.
As a result, the difference between the false negative rate in group A and the
one at group B is 38 + 34
√
 which can go arbitrarily close to 3/8 by appropriately
selecting  to be small enough, for any vanishing approximate regret algorithm.
This concludes the proof. 
F.2 Complete proof for group-aware algorithms
Theorem 7.2. For any group imbalance b < 0.49 and 0 < α < 0.49−0.99b1−b ,
there exists 0 > 0 such that for all 0 <  < 0 any algorithm that satisfies
Eσ
[
ApxReg,T ( f )
]
= o(T ) for all f ∈ F , is α-unfair in composition.
Proof. The instance has two groups: G = {A, B}. Examples with group context
A are discriminated against and arrive randomly with probability b < 12 while
examples with group context B are boosted by the discrimination and arrive with
the remaining probability 1 − b. There are again two experts F = {hn, hp}, which
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output score values in Yˆ = [0, 1], where yˆtf can be interpreted as the probability
that expert f assigns to label being + in round t. We use the earlier loss function
of `(yˆ, y) = yˆ · 1{y = −} + (1 − yˆ) · 1{y = +}. The first expert hn is again pessimistic
and always predicts negative, i.e. yˆthn = 0, while the other expert hp is optimistic
and always predicts positive, i.e. yˆthp = 1. These experts again satisfy fairness
in isolation with respect to false negative and false positive rate. Let c = 1/1012
denote the percentage of the input that is about positive examples for A, ensuring
that |Sσg (FNR)| = Ω(T ). The instance proceeds in two phases.
1. Phase I lasts Θ·T rounds for Θ = 101c. The adversary assigns negative labels
on examples with group context B. For examples with group context A, the
adversary acts as following:
• if the algorithm assigns probability on the negative expert below
γ() = 99−2100 , i.e. p
t
hn
(σ1:t−1) < γ(), the adversary assigns negative label.
• otherwise, the adversary assigns positive labels.
2. In Phase II, there are two plausible worlds:
(a) the adversary assigns negative labels to both groups if the expected
number of times that the algorithm selected the negative expert with
probability higher than γ() on members of group A is less than c · b ·T ,
i.e. Eσ
[
1
{
t ≤ Θ · T : g(t) = A, pthn ≥ γ()
}]
< c · b · T .
(b) otherwise she assigns positive labels to examples with group context
B and negative labels to examples with group context A.
Note that, as before, the condition for the first world will never be triggered
by any no-regret learning algorithm (we elaborate on that below) which
ensures that Eσ |S σA(FNR)| ≥ c · b · T .
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The proof is based on the following claims:
1. In Phase I, any vanishing approximate regret algorithm enters the second
world of Phase II.
2. This implies a lower bound on the false negative rate on A, i.e. FNR(A) ≥
γ() = 99−2100 .
3. In Phase II, any -approximate regret algorithm assigns large enough prob-
ability to the positive expert hp for group B. This implies an upper bound
on the false negative rate on B, i.e. FNR(B) ≤ 12(1−b) . Therefore this provides
a gap in the false negative rates of at least α.
Proof of first claim. To prove the first claim, we apply the method of contradic-
tion. Assume that the algorithm has Eσ
[
1
{
t ≤ Θ · T : g(t) = A, pthn ≥ γ()
}]
< c ·b ·T .
This means that the algorithm faces an expectation of at least (Θ − c) · b · T neg-
ative examples, while predicting the negative expert with probability at most
γ() = 99−2100 ,thereby making an error with probability 1 − γ(). Therefore the
expected loss of the algorithm is at least:
E
σ
Θ·T∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptf · `tf
 > (Θ − c) · b · T · (1 − γ()) = c · b · (1 + 2) · T.
At the same time, expert hn makes at most c ·b ·T errors (at the positive examples)
E
σ
 T∑
t=1
`thn
 < c · b · T.
Therefore, if Eσ
[
1{t ≤ Θ · T : g(t) = A, pthn ≥ f ()}
]
< c · b · T , the -approximate
regret of the algorithm with respect to hn is linear to the time-horizon T (and
therefore not vanishing) since:
E
σ
 T∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptf `
t
f − (1 + )
T∑
t=1
`thn
 >  · c · b · T.
This violates the vanishing approximate regret property, leading to contradiction.
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Proof of second claim. The second claim follows directly by the above con-
struction, since positive examples only appear in Phase I when the probability of
error on them is greater than γ().
Proof of third claim. Having established that any vanishing approximate re-
gret algorithm will always enter the second world, we now focus on the expected
loss of expert hp in this case. This expert makes errors at most in all Phase I and
in the examples of Phase II with group context A:
E
σ
 T∑
t=1
`thp
 ≤ Θ · T + b · (1 − Θ) · T ≤ Θ · T + 0.49 · (1 − Θ) · T
Since group B has only positive examples in Phase II, the expected loss of the
algorithm is at least:
E
σ
 T∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptf `
t
f
 ≥ Eσ
 T∑
t=Θ·T+1
pthn · 1g(t)=B

We now show that Eσ
[∑T
t=Θ·T+1 p
t
hn
· 1g(t)=B
]
≤ (12 +) ·(1−Θ) ·T . If this is not the case,
then the algorithm does not have vanishing -approximate regret with respect to
expert hp since:
E
σ
 T∑
t=1
∑
f∈F
ptf `
t
f − (1 + )
T∑
t=1
`thp
 > (12 + 
)
(1 − Θ)T − (1 + )0.49(1 − Θ)T − (1 + )ΘT
≥
(
1
2
+  − 0.49 − 0.49
)
· (1 − Θ) · T − (1 + ) · Θ · T
> (0.01 + 0.51) · 100
101
· T − 1 + 
101
· T ≥ 50
101
 · T
Given the above, we now establish a gap in the fairness with respect to false
negative rate. Since group A only experiences positive examples when expert hn
is offered probability higher than γ() = 99−2100 , this means that:
E
σ
[
FNRσL(A)
]
→ 0.99 − 0.02
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Regarding group B, we need to take into account the low-probability event that
the actual realization has significantly less than (1−b)(1−Θ) ·T examples of group
B in Phase II (all are positive examples). This can be handled via similar Chernoff
bounds as in the proof of the previous theorem. As a result, the expected false
negative rate at group B is:
E
σ
[
FNRσL(B)
]
→
Eσ
[∑T
t=Θ·T+1 p
t
hn
· 1g(t)=B
]
Eσ
[∑T
t=Θ·T+1 ·1g(t)=B
] ≤ ( 12 + ) · (1 − Θ) · T
(1 − b) · (1 − Θ) · T =
1
2 + 
1 − b
which establishes a gap in the fairness with respect to false negative rate of
α→ 0.49−0.99b1−b selecting  > 0 appropriately small. 
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